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Abstract
Private data is generally governed by privacy policy, which often places re-
strictions on the purposes for which a governed entity may use such data
(e.g. EU directive 95/46/EC requires data processor to use private data
only for the purposes it intends for). Laws require data processor to en-
sure the correct usage of data; this leads to the need of privacy policy
enforcement. To enforce privacy policy using formal or automated meth-
ods requires a semantics of purpose restrictions to determine whether an
action is for a purpose and that purpose could be achieved or not once
access permission is granted. We model purpose as a workflow and we
argue that an action is for a purpose if and only if that action is part of
a plan for the satisfaction of that purpose. Based on that formalisation,
we propose an approach to enforce purpose. In our approach, the access
authorisation is based not only on the control of workflow process, but also
on the estimation of the level of certainty of purpose achievement, which is
determined by purpose achievement prediction (a probabilistic system
estimating how likely user can reach his claimed purpose after access permis-
sion is granted). The prediction module is built using Association Rule
Learning method where user’s access history and contextual information
are used as the input data for rule analysis. The semantics of purpose with
our enforcement approach enable us to create and implement an algorithm
for enforcing the privacy policies, and to describe formally and compare rig-
orously with previous enforcement methods. To validate our semantics, we
provide an example application, build a prototype and validate it against
the existing enforcement methods with the specific validation criteria.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Protecting Private Data
Private Data is a category of information associated with an individual person and it
can be used to uniquely identify, contact or locate that person. For example, health
records are considered as private data. Unlike public data that can be accessible with-
out any restriction, accessing private data needs an authorisation from data owner as
required by laws [28].
EU Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2 (a) [28] defines private data as any
information related to an identifiable natural person. An identifiable per-
son is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
With widespread use of the Internet and the advance of multimedia technology like
compression techniques, digital content can be distributed instantaneously across the
Internet to end-users around the globe. However, without proper protection, digital
content (in particular, private data of individual) can be copied, altered or transferred,
which results in privacy violation. For example, the use of social media networks such
as Facebook or Twitter to circulate unauthorised personal videos or photos is a form of
privacy violation and by laws in some countries like US [59] or European countries [28],
such activity is considered as illegal. Although there are laws applied to the processing
of private data of individual in a digital world, the enforcement of such laws is still the
major concern. This is because to e↵ectively enforce such laws in vast network (e.g.
Facebook) requires the powerful data usage control technology that is able to manage
properly and e↵ectively the circulation of such data.
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1.2 Legislations: Privacy Policies and Purpose of
Use
Purpose of use is a key concept in privacy policies. In 1995, EU proposed the Directive
95/46/EC [28] on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of private
data and on the free movement of such data. It aims at ensuring that private data is
used in compliance with its intended PURPOSE.
“EU Directive 95/46/EC, Article 6 states that : Member States shall
provide that personal data must be [...] collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with
those purposes...
Article 8 (3): the person or institution processing personal data must
take a full responsibility and make sure that such data must be safely pro-
cessed... ”
The United States also has laws putting purpose restrictions on information in some
domains such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for
medical information and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [59] for financial records. Other
example of privacy laws is the special agreement, such as the Safe Harbor Frameworks1,
which is implemented between the European Union, the United States and Switzerland.
These laws and best practices motivate organisations to discuss in their privacy policies
the purposes for which they will use information. Some privacy policies inform users
that the policy provider may use certain information for certain purposes. For example,
the privacy policy of Wallonie Healthcare Network in Belgium [54] states, “We may
disclose your [protected health information] for public health activities and researches
[. . .] with anonymity”. Other examples include the privacy policy of Yahoo Email
2, which states that “Yahoo’s practice is not to use the content of messages stored
in your Yahoo Mail account for marketing purposes”. Some policies even limit the
use of certain information to an explicit list of purposes. Privacy policy of Facebook
3 states that “Facebook provides advertisers with information of user for marketing
purpose. However, personally identifying information is removed, or combined with
other information so that it is no longer a personally identifying information”.
These examples show that each organisation has its own privacy policies and to
verify that an organisation obeys its privacy policies requires semantics of purpose re-
strictions and policy enforcement. In particular, for policy enforcement, it requires the
1http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/, retrieved Nov. 23th, 2014.
2https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ latest access: 19th March 2015.
3https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms latest access: 19th March 2015.
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ability to determine that the organisation under scrutiny obeys at least two classes
of purpose restrictions. As shown in the example rule from Yahoo, the first require-
ment is that the organisation does not use certain sensitive information for a given
purpose. The second, as the example rule from Facebook, is that the organisation uses
certain sensitive information only for a given list of purposes. In summary, two legal
responsibilities of organisation when handling private data are:
1. When processing private data, organisation needs to ensure that it is properly
protected and it is used in compliance with its original purpose, EU Directive
95/46/EC, Article 6.
2. When private data is shared across boundary, organisation is bound to a legal
responsibility to make sure that such data must be safely processed, EU Directive
95/46/EC, Article 8(3).
1.3 Research Methodology
The research methodology we have followed to address our research questions is inspired
by the guidelines of Pe↵ers et al [60], design science research methodology. However,
our method deviates slightly from Pe↵ers in that we separate our research activities
into only 4 instead of 6 activities proposed by Pe↵ers. We combine the “demonstration
” and “evaluation” activities into one single activity. In this section, we begin with
the motivation where the problems and challenges are identified. Then, we detail the
research objectives and a brief description of the solutions. The following section fo-
cuses on the design and development activity where we point out our proposed system
architecture and techniques to be used to support our proposed solutions. Finally, the
demonstration and evaluation section where we discuss system prototype implementa-
tion and its evaluation against a set of defined criteria .
1.3.1 Motivation
Private data protection in distributed healthcare is not a new research topic, but al-
though many solutions have been proposed [50][35][38][52], only a few simple ones
have been implemented. For example, the HL7 framework [37], which intends to make
healthcare systems to be able to work in interoperable way by providing the stan-
dard messaging protocol for sharing healthcare records between di↵erent healthcare
information systems. However, HL7 is more about message protocol rather than a
tool to control and protect the usage of health records in distributed environment in
a secure manner. Similarly, the technologies like Digital Rights Management (DRM),
some of them [83][71] can also be used, but they cannot provide the security we need
as required by law [28] for processing of private data. This is because the existing
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DRM technologies are not specifically built for private data. They are built to protect
commercial contents (e.g. multimedia contents); they are content-specific[66][71]. This
rules out the possibility of using existing DRM technologies, without complement or
extra support functionalities, to control the processing of private data.
So far we are not aware of a complete solution designed for managing and enforcing
privacy-aware usage control policies in distributed healthcare. Consequently, it would
be best to design a dedicated system for distributed healthcare, in a way that addresses
the requirements [10] in such system.
Figure 1.1: Example of two hospitals share Edward’s health records. Edward’s health
records are transferred to Broussais for Edward’s heart treatment purpose.
1.3.2 Thesis Objectives
We start with an example in Figure 1.1, an informal private data processing scenario
in distributed healthcare system. We suppose that two hospitals, one in Paris France
(Broussais) another in Namur Belgium (CHR-Namur), have signed a cooperation agree-
ment on sharing their patients’ medical records. Under the agreement both hospitals
can share their patient’s medical records when needed. The processing of patient’s
medical record must be strictly controlled and must comply with the policies defined
by the data owner. For example, if Broussais processes the medical records belong-
ing to CHR-Namur, Broussais must fully respect the data usage policy defined by
CHR-Namur (representing the data owner).
A Belgium citizen, Edward, has registered in CHR-Namur hospital for heart treat-
ment. All the medical records concerning his heart are managed by CHR-Namur under
the heart treatment purpose. This means, CHR-Namur can share his medical records
for such purpose and only for his treatment. Some time later, when Edward visits
Paris, he faces a heart disorder and needs an emergency treatment (surgery). Edward
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is hosted at Broussais hospital in Paris. Before performing heart surgery, the cardiolo-
gist needs his past heart medical records for pre-surgery examination. The cardiologist
acquires those medical records from CHR-Namur under CHR-Namur-Broussais agree-
ment. The medical records are transferred to Broussais and they stay there for a limited
period of time, to be precise, during the treatment of Edward. During those periods,
cardiologist can examine Edward’s medical records given that the usage policies defined
by CHR-Namur are respected.
The legislations, Directive 95/46/EC, require CHR-Namur to protect the health
records of Edward when processing them locally and CHR-Namur takes also a full
responsibility when sharing Edward’s medical records to Broussais. Broussais, on the
other hand, bonds to the CHR-Namur-Broussais agreement. In short, both parties
need to ensure that Edward’s medical records are correctly processed as their intended
purpose. Given this scenario, we can see that managing and enforcing privacy usage
control policy is really important because it is the only way to ensure that both parties
respect the privacy policies they defined when the private data of patient stay at their
local system. We believe that it is possible to enforce privacy-aware policies
if we have a usage control system integrated with an e↵ective and e cient
purpose enforcement technique that is able to prevent the usage of data
that does not correspond to the data owner’s intended purpose. Thus, the
objectives of thesis are:
“to design, implement and evaluate a privacy-aware usage control sys-
tem supporting purpose enforcement for the processing of private data.”
In order to achieve our research goal, we need to cover the following issues: de-
sign of (1) privacy-aware usage control model, (2) privacy-aware usage control policy
and policy expression language, (3) privacy-aware usage control policy enforcement
technique and (4) privacy-aware usage control system architecture supporting purpose
enforcement. The research is broken down into five main research questions that ad-
dress di↵erent issues we listed above.
RQ1.1: what are the requirements for the protection of private data in
distributed system? We focus on distributed healthcare. Therefore, we expect to
investigate the existing healthcare information systems. Since private data is protected
by laws, what are the legal and technical requirements for the processing of such data?
We will need to study thoroughly and analyse deeply the legal documents for the pro-
tection of such data. European laws will be the target of our study. However, we will
also take a look at USA and Canada laws.
RQ1.2: since the purpose of use plays an important role in privacy policies, we need
to define the meaning of purpose and its model. How to model the purpose of use
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in such a way so that it can be easily managed and e↵ectively enforced in
distributed environment?
RQ1.3: what usage control model should be used to e↵ectively control the
usage of private data in distributed environment? Are the existing usage control
models good enough to be used in our context? We need to survey di↵erent existing
usage control models, and based on the requirements identified in RQ1.1, we determine
the appropriate usage control model. Once the usage control model is defined, which
policy language should be used?
RQ1.4: what are the e cient and e↵ective ways to enforce the purpose
of use for privacy-aware policy in distributed environment?
RQ1.5: what are the existing usage control technologies that can be used to
control access and usage of private data in distributed environment? We will
study the existing technologies and examine how di↵erent techniques may have varying
degree of e↵ectiveness when used in our system context. If the existing technologies
are not appropriate to be used in our context, we consider the extension of the existing
technologies or a completely new one.
Figure 1.2: An illustration of step-by-step processes to address the research questions.
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1.3.3 Design and Development
In design and development activity, we identify desired functionalities and its architec-
ture and then create the actual usage control system that can be used to support the
processing of private data. In order to create a usage control system, we propose a step-
by-step processes as presented in Figure 1.2. We start from requirements elicitation.
The requirements are collected based on the study and analysis of the existing system
[54] and also study of the EU directive 95/46/EC [28]. Based on those requirements, in
step 2, we work on usage control model. The proposed usage control model takes into
account all the requirements we identified in step 1. The usage control policies derived
from the proposed usage control model need to be expressed in the machine readable
policy language. Thus, our third step is to identify the appropriate policy language
that can be used to express such policy. In order to make sure that client respects the
usage control policy defined by data owner, we need to create the policy enforcement
technique. The fourth step dedicates to this work. The fifth step is the development of
usage control system architecture that takes into account all the desired functionalities
and requirements for controlling the usage of private data. The final step in design and
development is the creation of the prototype of the usage control system.
1.3.4 Demonstration: Application Domains
We mainly focus on the protection of private data. At the early state of our research
we considered two application domains: the distributed healthcare information sys-
tems and social networks (e.g. Facebook). However, after a series of researches, we
find that although social networks deal largely with private data, privacy protection is
less important when comparing with distributed healthcare since healthcare systems
deal mostly with sensitive private data. Therefore, we focus our research on distributed
healthcare as our main domain application for implementation and validation. Other
domain that we also consider in this thesis is the perimeter protection system [9] where
privacy protection is also the important issue.
Distributed Healthcare: health record history is important in the course of a treat-
ment process for the proper continuing care of patients. Over last decade, with the
increase of the electronic materials in healthcare and the improvement of network
and system, Electronic Health Records (EHR) has become increasingly common and
widespread to replace the traditional paper-based record. However, making the infor-
mation available electronically poses new security concerns, especially when exchanging
it between di↵erent healthcare institutions, as it is more vulnerable to attacks compared
with paper-based.
Given the fact that healthcare information systems deal largely with sensitive pri-
vate data, failure to secure such data can lead to huge fines, lawsuits or long-term loss
of patients’ trust. Yet to provide adequate security, in a manner that is not burdensome
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to patient can be a major challenge. Our research focuses on this type of system; par-
ticularly, a distributed system where two healthcare institutions share patients’ health
records for a particular purpose. Our main research goal is to produce a system that
is able to e↵ectively control the usage of data when it is being processed at client side
application.
Since 2013 we have been participating in the European project, the Privacy Pre-
serving Perimeter Protection. Our role in the project is to design the privacy enhancing
technology that could be used to protect personal data of the individual a↵ected from
the surveillance in the protected facility. This provides us a real application domain
where we could implement our finding.
P5 Project: Privacy Preserving Perimeter Protection Project (P5) is European FP7
(http://www.foi.se/p5) project for the protection of critical infrastructures to benefit
the sustainability of society and future well-being of the European Citizens. The goal
of the P5 project is an intelligent perimeter proactive surveillance system that works
robustly under a wide range of weather and lighting conditions and that has strong
privacy preserving features. The system will monitor the region outside the security
area of critical buildings and infrastructures, and give early warning if terrestrial or
airborne threats are detected. A multispectral sensor suite comprising both passive
and active sensor is used (e.g. a system based on radar, visual and thermal sensors).
The sensor suite will be complemented with advanced algorithms for information fu-
sion, object detection and classification, privacy preservation and high level modelling
of intent and behaviour analysis.
Figure 1.3: A graphical summary of the contributions.
1.4 Claimed Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is a sound foundation for purpose management
and enforcement for privacy policies. Specifically, it consists of (see Figure 1.3):
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1. C1: a systematic investigation and understanding of security requirements for the
protection of private data. We target healthcare system for our study. We start
with a systematic analysis of various access and usage control requirements of
the Re´seau Sante´ Wallon (RSW) [54], a network of healthcare system in French
speaking region in Belgium. At the same time, to fully understand the legal
requirements for the processing of such data, we study thoroughly the Directive
95/46/EC concerning the protection of private data of individual. The motiva-
tion behind the study of 95/46/EC directive is to align the technical and legal
requirements. From the conclusion drawn from the survey, we propose generic
usage control requirements for distributed healthcare system. The work on access
and usage control requirements was published in the 7th International Conference
on Health Informatics, Barcelona, Spain, 2013 [10].
2. C2: a systematic investigation of access and usage control models. The motiva-
tion behind our investigation is to find out which models can be used to address
the access and usage control to private data. We start with a survey of vari-
ous access and usage control models. A survey shows that although there are
numbers of works focusing on access control model for private data, there is a
lack of focus on usage control model for private data in distributed environment.
From the conclusion drawn in survey and the usage control requirements in C1,
we propose a usage control model where “purpose of use” is incorporated. The
result of our work on privacy-aware usage control model was published in the
Fourth International Conference on eHealth, Telemedicine and Social Medicine
(eTELEMED 2012) [11]. More details about the proposed usage control model,
one can find in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6).
3. C3: an understanding of “Purpose” and its role in privacy policies. This includes
the understanding of the meaning of “Purpose” by public and the meaning of
“Purpose” defined in legislation, in particular, Directive 95/46/EC. From this
study, we draw a formal definition of “Purpose”. Based on the formal definition
of purpose, we propose a purpose model. Purpose is modelled as workflow. Based
on this formulation we propose a purpose enforcement technique in C4. The work
on purpose modelling was published in the Fourth International Conference on
eHealth, Telemedicine and Social Medicine (eTELEMED 2012) [11].
4. C4: we propose a purpose enforcement technique, which is based on the prediction
of the purpose achievement. The prediction model is built based on Association
Rule Learning technique [4] where the information, such as user’s role, contextual
information and user’s past access history are used as input data for rule analysis.
The proposed technique is able to tell if the purpose can be achieved successfully
or not once access permission is granted. It is worth noting that before arriv-
ing at the conclusion of using association rule learning method for analysing the
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access log of user, we have studied di↵erent prediction and forecasting methods,
such as Markov Decision Process [65], Naive Bayes [34], Logistic Regression [47],
k-nearest neighbor algorithm [21] and Decision Tree [67]. Among them, only four
can be used in our context: Markov Decision Process, Decision Tree, Associa-
tion Rule Learning and Naive Bayes, but with di↵erent degree of e↵ectiveness.
However, Association Rule Learning is the best among them (see Section 6.1.3
for more details). The result of this research, “Towards enforcement of purpose
for privacy policy in distributed healthcare”, was published in 3rd IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Consumer eHealth Platforms, Services and Applications,
Las Vegas, USA, CCNC 2013 [12].
5. C5: privacy-aware usage control architecture supporting purpose enforcement.
To support the proposed purpose enforcement technique for privacy policies, we
need to have a dedicated usage control system being able to enforce the privacy
policies using our proposed purpose enforcement technique. With that reason, we
propose a complete and comprehensive privacy-aware usage control architecture
for distributed system. This system will act as a secure platform at remote client
system. It is responsible for ensuring that the privacy policy and the purpose
of use are properly enforced. The work related to the design of usage control
system supporting purpose enforcement was published in International Journal
of Security and Networks, August 2013 [13].
6. C6: a complete implementation and validation of all the definitions, proper-
ties and analyses in a toolset. A privacy-aware usage control has been imple-
mented in Java. The Enterprise-Java-XACML1 policy decision engine has been
used in our implementation. However, in order to support our proposed enforce-
ment technique and system architecture, we need to extend the core engine of
Enterprise-Java-XACML [87]. This is because Enterprise-Java-XACML is orig-
inally an attribute-based access control engine. Beside of the use of Enterprise-
Java-XACML, we also use XACML policy language to express both the privacy-
aware usage policies and purpose enforcement policies.
7. C7: a complete implementation of our privacy protection method in P5 project
[32] for preserving privacy of individual a↵ected from the surveillance, the P5
system is our application domain used for demonstration and validation of our
proposed solution for the protection of private data. These include the implemen-
tation of privacy-aware access control model and system and the implementation
of privacy policy enforcement technique based on user access log observation.
This contribution was published in the 29th Annual International Federation
1Enterprise-Java-XACML is intent to fully implement OASIS XACML 2.0, and provide a high
performance and good usability that can be used in enterprise environment.
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for Information Processing (IFIP), WG 11.3 Working Conference on Data and
Applications Security and Privacy, Fairfax, VA, USA , 2015 [9].
1.5 Literature Survey Method: Survey Protocol and
Materials
The research method we have followed to collect and review papers is inspired by
the guidelines of Kitchenham et al [45]. However, our method deviates slightly from
Kichenham in that we leave out the detailed quantitative analysis to favour an in-
depth qualitative analysis. In this section, we begin with the presentation of the
survey protocol. It then details the survey (analysis) materials used to harvest data
systematically.
The survey protocol is divided into five main steps that go from the selection of
papers to their analysis. This process is depicted in Figure 1.4. Starting from the top
of the diagram the survey materials is composed of the whole set of papers, technical
reports and previous thesis that are collected and recorded in our databases. The
study of previous thesis is important because it provides us insight of what have been
done, which problems have and have not been addressed. The materials we collect
are based on the 21 materials provided by our advisor; and all the references in each
provided paper are examined and the papers that are relevant to our research are kept.
In addition to that some papers are searched from Internet based on our defined key
words (see phase 2, Figure 1.4).
The second step is filtering process during which papers are kept for a complete
review. The filtering is based on the search for the keywords in the papers and prelim-
inary review of the abstract and introduction of those papers. In essence, the papers
that are not related to our addressing issues are discarded.
The third step is the classification. Since protecting private data in distributed en-
vironment requires us to address di↵erent issues from requirements, access and usage
control to purpose management and enforcement, we need to classify the papers accord-
ing to their fields. We define five di↵erent categories. The first category is the access
and usage control requirements. The second category is the access and usage control
model and policy expression languages. The third category is the purpose management
and enforcement technique. The fourth category is usage control technology. The fifth
category is the distributed usage control architecture supporting purpose enforcement.
The fourth step is the complete review of each class of papers. The paper review
is splitted between the old and recent papers in order to be able to follow the progress
of the research in the area. Our final step is to analyse those papers to answer our
research questions.
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Figure 1.4: Survey protocol: dataflow
12
Our survey materials covers (1) research papers published in peer-reviewed work-
shops, conferences and journals, (2) thesis, books and other manuscripts, such as tech-
nical reports published by commercial or public institutions.
We consider three input sources for our survey. Firstly, we focus on the initial
set of papers proposed by our advisor and numbers of thesis that are relevant to our
addressing issue. Then, scanning the references section in each paper, a list of relevant
papers (papers’ titles) is extracted from the references section of those papers. After
having collected list of relevant papers, we start collecting those papers, by directly
contacting the authors of those papers or in some cases; we need to buy them from
the publishers. Secondly, IEEE, ACM, and Springer databases are also the sources of
our survey. We search through their databases by using our key words (see Figure 1.4,
phase 2) and select the most relevant papers to our problem. Third source is Internet,
with the help of Internet search engine, we are able to find number of interesting
research papers.
Figure 1.5: Thesis Map
1.6 Thesis’s Structure
Chapters are organised in layers, as shown in Figure 1.5. We group the chapters into
two main parts. The first two chapters are about the state of the art and the work
related to access control model, usage control technique and rights and access control
authorisation language. The second part, that covers the rest of the chapters, is the
contribution. Chapter 2 revisits the related work on access and usage control model
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where di↵erent access control models are presented; the advantages and disadvantages
are also listed (see the contributionC1 in Section 1.4). Then, we point out which access
and usage control model should be used in our context. From the access and usage
control model we chose, we start investigating the rights and access control expression
language (C2). Our main goal is to identify which rights and access authorisation
language is appropriate for expressing the access as well as usage control policy of
the model we identified. The thorough study of di↵erent commercial as well as open
standard rights and access authorisation language is conducted in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, we present the result of a systematic analysis on the existing us-
age control techniques and technologies (C2). We identified di↵erent usage control
techniques and technologies used for controlling the usage of data for both centralised
and distributed environment. Our findings show that although there are numbers of
usage control technologies (e.g. Digital Rights Management System (DRMs)), they
are designed to be used to protect mostly the commercial content, and none of them
are designed to address the protection of private data. This rules out the possibility of
using the existing technology to solve our addressing issues.
The contribution part covers the chapters 4-8. We start our contribution from
Chapter 4 where we discuss the needs for controlling the use of private data in dis-
tributed environment. This chapter focuses mostly on the private data protection
requirements (C1). These include the legal and technical requirements; for legal re-
quirement, we mainly focus on the EU Directive 95/46/EC. In addition to that, we
present the private data processing scenarios for distributed healthcare information
system. The requirements and scenarios for the processing of private data are also
presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 focuses on purpose modelling. In this chapter,
we provide the definition of purpose, purpose model and formal access control model
for system that uses workflows (C3).
From the purpose model presented in Chapter 5 and usage control requirements
presented in Chapter 4, we propose a method to enforce purpose of use/access for
privacy-aware policies for the system that uses workflows in Chapter 6 (C4). In our
approach, the access authorisation is based on the estimation of the level of certainty of
purpose achievement, which is determined by purpose achievement prediction module.
The prediction module is built using association rule learning method where user’s ac-
cess history and contextual information are used as the input data for rule analysis. We
argue that by using the combination of contextual information and purpose achieve-
ment prediction, we can get a reliable purpose enforcement technique. In Chapter 6,
we also discuss in detail the purpose achievement prediction algorithms and the access
control model for controlling the resources assigned for each task of the workflow.
To support our purpose enforcement technique, we need a usage control platform.
Chapter 7 looks into the design of usage control system architecture supporting pur-
pose enforcement (C5). The proposed architecture is designed to address the usage
control of private data for a system that uses workflows. Furthermore, to validate
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our purpose achievement prediction algorithms proposed in Chapter 6, we implement
the usage control system in Java and we use datasets and challenges as the valida-
tion and assessment method (C6). In addition that, we also validate our solution in
Privacy Preserving Perimeter Protection System (P5). P5 is the European research
project and its main objectives is to protect personal data of individual generated by
di↵erent surveillance tools (e.g. CCTV). We have contributed to the project ranging
from the design of global system architecture to the design of access control model and
their implementation. The solutions we invented are also used to address private data
protection in P5. The works concerning P5 are presented in Chapter 8.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes our research. We also discuss in this chapter the
remaining challenges, future work and our vision.
1.7 Publications Related to This Thesis
The research presented in this thesis reuses and extends publications of the author.
We list below all the papers the author published so far.
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Chapter 2
Access and Usage Control Model -
Rights and Access Control Policy
Expression Languages
In this chapter, we present the access and usage control models and access control
policy languages. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 talks
about the access and usage control models. We also provide the definitions of policy,
model and mechanism in this section. Section 2.2 mainly focuses on the standard rights
and access control policy languages; we introduce both the general languages used to
express di↵erent kind of policies for di↵erent types of digital content and dedicated
languages that are designed for specific digital content. Section 2.3 is the summary.
2.1 Access and Usage Control
Two controlling steps are required to ensure that protected data goes to the right peo-
ple and it is used in the right way: access and usage control. The main goal of access
control is to selectively determine who can access resources and what access is provided
exactly. Access control prevents unauthorised access to the resources of system and it
is implemented as a result of certain access control requirements, which are generally
in line with the institution’s policies.
Access Control is about defining and enforcing the rules to ensure that
only authorised users get access to resources in a system. Access control is
concerned with determining the allowed activities of legitimate users, me-
diating every attempt by a user to access a resource in the system, Vincent
C. Hu et al [82].
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In some systems, access is granted after successful authentication of the user, but
most systems require complex control. In addition to the authentication mechanism
(e.g. username and password), access control is concerned with how authorisations are
organised. In some cases, authorisation may reflex the structure of the organisation,
while in others it may be based on the sensitivity level of documents.
In general, access control is a fairly good technique for centralised system where
the data are processed within the boundary of a system. However, in the scope of
distributed environment where the data are shared between di↵erent entities in di↵erent
systems, the access control alone is not enough. Since to properly protect the data, we
need to know, not only who can access data, but also what will happen to data once
the access permission is granted. Therefore, usage control is required.
While access control concerns about who should or should not be allowed to access,
usage control concerns about what should and should not happen to data item once
the access permission is granted.
Usage control is a generalisation of access control that also addresses
how data is used after it is released, Alexander Pretschner [7].
Usage control generalises access control by controlling not only who may access
which data, but also how data may be used or distributed afterwards. In distributed
settings, usage control is generally a controlling process at client or consumer side
where data resides after access is granted. As presented in Figure 2.1, when data
consumers request data from data provider, they have to commit themselves to an
access and usage control. In general, access control happens at a time when data
consumers initiate request at server side and usage control happens when they start
processing data at client-side control domain. The dedicated usage control mechanism
can provide data provider a su cient amount of control over what data consumer can
do when data is out of the controlling environment of server-side control domain.
2.1.1 Policies, Models and Mechanisms
When designing an access or usage control system, we should be consider three abstrac-
tions : policies, models and mechanisms [82]. Access control policies are high-level re-
quirements that express how access is managed and who may access what information
in which situation. While access control policies can be application-specific, policies
are just as likely to relate to user actions within the context of an organisational unit
or across organisational boundaries. The access control policies within a hospital may
relate to privacy and skill (e.g., only cardiologist may prescribe medication for heart
treatment). Even within a specific business domain, policy will vary from institution
to institution. Moreover, access control policies are dynamic in nature, in that they
normally change over time in response to ever-evolving business factors, government
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Figure 2.1: High level overview of access and usage control. (Ob: Object).
regulations or laws.
At a high level, access control policies are enforced through a mechanism that
interprets a user’s access request. There are di↵erent mechanisms; for example, a table
lookup can be used to perform a grant or deny access. Although no standard yet exists
for determining their policy support, some access control mechanisms are the results
of the direct implementations of formal access control policy concepts [82].
A model is a formal presentation of the security policy enforced by the system. It
bridges a gap in abstraction between policy and mechanism. Access control mechanisms
can be designed to adhere to the properties of the model. Users see an access control
model as a detailed expression of access control requirements. System developers see
access control models as design and implementation requirements.
2.1.2 Access Control Models
In this section, we discuss the existing access control models. However, we detail only a
few models that have been widely implemented in the systems, such operating systems
or database management systems.
2.1.2.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Discretionary access control (DAC) [24], the restriction of access to objects is done
based on the identity of subjects. In other words, DAC leaves a certain amount of
access control to the discretion of the object’s owner or anyone else who is authorised
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to control the object. In DAC, it is the owner of the file who controls other users’
accesses to the file. Only users specified by the owner may have some rights of read,
write, execute, and other permissions to the file. One implementation of DAC is the
access control list (ACL) [24], which has been used widely in operating-, networking-
and database management system.
Although DAC policy is widely used, it is known to be relatively weak for two
reasons. Firstly, granting read access is transitive; for example, when David grants
Edward read access to a file, nothing stops Edward from copying the contents of David’s
file to an object that Edward controls. Edward may now grant any other user access to
the copy of David’s file without David’s knowledge. Secondly, DAC policy is vulnerable
to Trojan horse attacks; because programs inherit the identity of the invoking user.
Thus, generally, the drawbacks of DAC are as follows:
1. Information can be copied from one object to another; hence, the assurance on
the flow of information in a system is not possible.
2. No restrictions apply to the usage of information when the user has received it.
Thus, it can’t prevent information redistribution.
3. The rights for accessing objects are decided by the owner of the object, rather
than through a policy that reflects the organisation’s security requirements.
DAC is commonly discussed in contrast to mandatory access control (MAC). A
system as a whole is said to have ”discretionary” access control as a way of saying that
the system lacks mandatory access control. On the other hand, systems can be said
to implement both MAC and DAC simultaneously, where DAC refers to one category
of access controls that subjects can transfer among each other, and MAC refers to a
second category of access controls that enforces constraints upon the first.
2.1.2.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
Mandatory access control (MAC) [24] means that access control decisions are made by
a central authority, not by the individual owner of an object like DAC, and the owner
cannot change access rights. In MAC model, system constrains the ability of a subject
to access or perform some sort of actions to an object. Subjects and objects each carry
a set of security attributes and when a subject makes an attempt to access an object,
an authorisation rule controlled by the system examines these security attributes and
then the decision can be made based on the defined authorisation rule. To determine
if the operation on the object by a subject is allowed or not, those parameters will
be tested and validated against the set of the authorisation rules made by the policy
maker. MAC provides the central control of the security. Subject does not have rights
to assign or override the access policy unlike DAC, which allows the subject to make
decision or override the access policy. MAC supports more control level as both subject
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and object carry the secured attributes that need to be checked or tested by the system
for every access attempt.
The good example models that can be used to express MAC policy are Bell La-
Padula Model (BLP) [90] and Biba [46]. The BLP, also called the multi-level model, was
proposed by Bell and LaPadula for enforcing access control in government and military
applications. In such applications, subjects and objects are generally partitioned into
di↵erent security levels. A subject can only access objects at certain levels determined
by his security level. The Biba integrity model was published in 1977 [46] at the Mitre
Corporation. The Biba is created to address the integrity issue because BLP is able
to address only the confidentiality but not data integrity. Data integrity relates to
the accuracy and consistency of data over its entire life-cycle of data usage and it is
an important aspect to the design, implementation and usage of any system which
processes data.
The disadvantage of MAC exists in the complexity of the configuration, since for
each resource (e.g. application or data) and subjects must be determined, which access
authorisations are necessary. This tends to be very di cult for the system that works
with the large number of users and resources. In addition to that, MAC can unneces-
sarily over classify data through the high-water mark principle and hurt productivity
by limiting the ability to transfer information between systems and restricting user
control over data.
Figure 2.2: Basic RBAC model
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2.1.2.3 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
In this section we discuss a family of RBAC model, one of the well-known access control
models, implemented in wide range of information management system [24][20].
Basic RBAC model. In RBAC, access decisions are based on the roles that users
have as part of an organisation. Users carry on assigned roles (e.g. doctor, cardiologist,
etc.). Access rights are grouped by role name, and the use of resources is restricted to
individuals authorised to the associated role. For example, within a hospital system,
the role of cardiologist can include operations to perform a heart diagnosis, prescribe
medication for heart treatment and heart surgery. The use of roles to control access can
be an e↵ective means for developing and enforcing complex enterprise-specific security
policies and for facilitating the security management process.
Under RBAC, users are granted membership into roles based on their skills or pro-
fession and responsibilities in the organisation. The operations that a user is permitted
to perform are based on the user’s role. User membership into roles can be revoked
and new memberships established as job assignments happen. Role associations can be
established when new operations are created, and old operations can be withdrawn as
organisational functions change and evolve by time. This facilitates the administration
and management of rights; roles can be updated without updating the rights for every
user on an individual basis. When a user is assigned to a role, the user can have no
more rights than is necessary to perform the job.
Core RBAC consist of five administrative entities (see Figure 2.2): users, roles,
permissions, operations and objects, where permissions consist of operations applied
to objects. A role is a semantic construct around which access policy is formulated.
Permissions are associated with roles, and users are made members of roles; hence,
acquiring the roles’ permissions. A single user can be assigned to one or more roles,
and a single role can have one or more user members. This arrangement provides great
flexibility and granularity of role to user as well as role to permission assignment.
In RBAC, there are three primary rules:
• Role assignment: a subject can exercise permission only if the subject has been
assigned a role.
• Role authorisation: a subject’s active role must be authorised for the subject.
This rule ensures that users can have only roles for which they are authorised.
• Permission authorisation: a subject can exercise permission only if the permission
is authorised for the subject’s active role. This rule ensures that users can exercise
only permissions for which they are authorised.
In RBAC, role engineering can be a complex task. The challenge of RBAC is the
contention between strong security and easy administration. For strong security, it is
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good for each role to be more granular, thus having many roles per user. For easy
administration, it is better to have less number of roles to manage.
Given its weakness, the extensions of RBAC models have been introduced, such as
Privacy-aware RBAC, Conditional RBAC, Constraint-based and Hierarchical RBAC.
RBAC’s Extensions. There are number of extensions of basic RBAC model intend-
ing to solve di↵erent access control requirements for di↵erent systems environment.
Below are some of the well-known RBAC extensions.
Privacy-aware Role-Based Access Control: P-RBAC [20] is an extension of the
model RBAC. It provides complete support for expressing highly complex privacy
policies. Its focus is to protect personally identifiable information and as such privacy-
sensitive, taking into account characteristics such as purposes, conditions and obliga-
tions. P-RBAC extends the classical RBAC by adding three more privacy relevance
entities such as obligations, conditions and purposes. In P-RBAC, data permissions
are assigned to roles for a specific purpose. Conditions are the mechanisms to precisely
define the authority over data to a specific role; using condition, we can express di↵er-
ent access rights for user in the same role. For example, user in role “cardiologist” can
access patient’s heart record if and only if he has patient’s consent. Patient’s consent,
in this case, is considered as the condition. Obligations are the necessary actions to
be made before the actions on content can be exercised, for example, notifying data
owner every access to data.
Hierarchical RBAC [24]: under RBAC, roles can have overlapping responsibili-
ties and rights; that is, users belonging to di↵erent roles may need to perform common
operations. Some general operations may be performed by all users. In this situation,
it would be ine cient and administratively complex to specify repeatedly these general
operations for each role that gets created. Role hierarchies can be used to represent the
natural structure of an organisation. A role hierarchy defines roles that have unique
attributes and that may contain other roles; that is, one role may implicitly include
the permissions that are associated with another role. Role hierarchies are a natural
way of organising roles to reflect authority, responsibility, and skill of a group of users.
Constraint-based RBAC [24]: in Constraint-based RBAC, organisations can put
constraints on access either on subject, role or object. For example, constraints such
as patient’s consent or working-hour, can be placed on physician access so that only
the related records that are associated patient are accessible for the physician while he
is on duty. Another example concerning the access constraints put on data object, a
healthcare provider may decide that the role of Cardiologist must be constrained to
post only the results of certain tests concerning heart. In this example, type of data is
used as constraint to limit the access to data for posting for user in role cardiologist.
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2.1.2.4 Other Access Control Models
There are number of access control models that have been introduced in the research
literature. However, they were designed for specific system requirements and they have
not been implemented in any well-known information systems, unlike DAC, MAC or
RBAC.
OrBAC [2][33] allows expressing a variety of security policies based on the concept
of organisation. The main goal of OrBAC is to allow the policy designer to define
a security policy independently from the deployment. The solution to fulfil this goal
is the introduction of an abstract level in the model. OrBAC model is based on
three principles: organisation, concrete and abstract level and context. Like other
models, concrete authorisation in OrBAC relies on three entities, which are subject,
action and object. Subject is an interactive entity, user or application that requests
access on the organisation’s object. Action is an operation on the object. Object is
a resource requested by the subject. In OrBAC, a concrete authorisation is derived
from abstract permission, which consists of three entities such as role, activity and
view. Role represents a function or job title within the organisation. Activity groups
actions into an abstract set and view is a set of objects. Typically, a subject in concrete
level is mapped to a role in abstract level where an action is mapped to an activity
and an object is mapped to a view. OrBAC has many advantages, in addition to its
ability to express the permission; it can also express a mixed policy with permissions,
prohibitions and obligations. With OrBAC, security policies could take into account
delegation, hierarchy and context.
Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) [88] is an access control model where
the access right is decided based on a set of attributes associated with data or sub-
ject. Each attribute is a distinct discrete and possibly unrelated field. The access
authorisation is based on the comparison of the attributes value presented by user to
the predefined values in the system. Actually, the attributes that are used as the ac-
cess control parameters may come from di↵erent sources, such as temporal attributes,
spatial attributes, attributes related to data or subject. The good example of ABAC
implementation is the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [8].
Group-Based Access Control (GBAC) [16], the access permission is granted
based on a concept of group and all users under the assigned group can exercise the
same level of right. Conceptually, GBAC is similar to RBAC. The only di↵erence is that
in RBAC, role is a semantic construct around which access policy is formulated while
GBAC uses group as a semantic construct around which access policy is formulated.
In GBAC, users in the same group do not necessary have the same role.
History-Based Access Control (HBAC) [24] is another example of access con-
trol model that access permission is based on past access of user. However, this access
control model has the drawback that since new users do not have past access for back-
ground check, it needs a special control every first access attempt of new user. HBAC
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is generally used with other access control model to achieve a better security for highly
sensitive data.
Relation-Based Access Control (RelBAC) [24], the access permission in Rel-
BAC is based on the relationship between data owner and data subject. In RelBAC,
relationship between data owner and data requester is a semantic construct around
which the access permission is formulated. In other words, any users who have re-
lationship with data owner can access data. A good example of such access control
model is the Facebook’s “friends” and “friends of friends” concept. Anyone who is in
relationship as “friends” to the poster can have a right to see the post and perform
some allowed operations.
Figure 2.3: Basic UCON model
2.1.3 Usage Control Models
Usage Control (UCON), proposed by Jaehong Park and Ravi Sandhu [41], is a model
that encompasses traditional access control, trust management and digital rights man-
agement and goes beyond them in its definition and scope. UCON enables fine-grained
control over usage of digital objects than that of traditional access control model where
it considers only a priori control of data. UCON model consists of six components (see
Figure 2.3): subjects, rights, objects, conditions, authorisation rules and obligations.
Subjects are those who request access to data. Rights are the authorised action for sub-
jects to perform on objects. Objects refer to the digital objects that subjects want to
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access. Obligations are requirements (e.g. payment before listening a song) that have
to be fulfilled by subjects. Conditions are subject and object environmental constraints
(e.g. using data between 8AM to 5PM). Authorisation rules are the rules applied on
the rights of subject. In today highly dynamic, distributed environment, obligation
and conditions are also crucial decision factors for richer and finer controls on usage
of digital resources. UCON is designed to support the complex and fine-grain usage
control on digital resources. But UCON is a general usage control model and it is not
designed to specifically deal with private sensitive data. Thus, to make it suitable to
express privacy policy requires a ”purpose expression”. We propose an extension. The
details of it is presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6).
2.2 Rights and Access Control Policy Expression
Languages
In previous section, we discussed the access and usage control models. In this section,
we mainly focus on rights and access control policies languages, the existing standard
languages, which can be used to formally express the access and usage control policies
derived from the models we presented in Section 2.1.
2.2.1 What is a Rights Expression Language?
A Rights Expression Language (REL) [69] is a machine-readable language used in
Digital Rights Management (DRM) [71] systems that supports di↵erent aspects of the
digital access environment (e.g. licensing, payment, access and usage control). Most
RELs are expressible in XML format and embedded in form of metadata with digital
contents (e.g. video, song or eBook). However, some other formats are also used,
such RDF (Resource Description Framework) [69], which is embedded into HTML
file for web services. With the growth of the DRM technologies, many RELs are
developed ranging from a relatively simple expression of rights holders’ preferences
such as Creative Commons (CC) [69] to a highly complex expression for the secured
and trusted system environment, such as Open Digital Right Language (ODRL) [56]
or a more complex access control and authorisation language like XACML.
2.2.2 Goal of Rights Expression Language
In general, REL can be used for the following purposes: 1) statement of legal copyright,
2) expression of contractual language and 3) implementation of control.
1. Statement of Copyright
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The copyright law is a statement about ownership of intellectual works and the rights
of various parties, in particular the creators or the owners of the works. In general, the
copyright is attached with the agreement or contract stating the limited actions that
can be performed on the property. Creative Commons (CC) is an example of REL
that falls into this category.
2. Expression of Contract
In addition to copyright, the rights holder can extend copy and distribution rights
through the mechanism of contracts and licenses. These agreements can give more
rights to users of the copyrighted material than would be covered by copyright law.
Contracts are regarded as the agreements between an agent and specific individuals.
They can contain conditions and requirements that the parties agree on. ODRL is a
good example of the type of REL that falls into this category.
3. Control on digital content
Both copyright law and contracts cannot provide any actual control over the behaviour
of users on contents after giving access. Instead, they rely on the parties to act within
the stated agreement mentioned in contract. Because digital contents must be mediated
through software and hardware for use, it is possible to exercise a priori control over
access to and use of the contents through that technology. The nature of the control
may or may not also be expressed in a human-readable user license. There are two key
points in controlling the digital contents. The first one is to control the access on the
contents. It refers to the permission of the access and it is nothing to do after access
is granted. For example a permission to download the file, in this case after the file
is downloaded, we are no longer able to control it, user can copy or share file with
other users. The second one is the usage control that refers to the phenomenon after
the access is granted, in this case, the contents are periodically controlled during the
allowed usage session.
2.2.3 Standard Data Elements in Rights Expression Languages
REL is generally made up of resources, agents, rights, constraints and conditions.
Although these elements are considered nearly universal, the use of these standard
elements may vary from one to another rights language since di↵erent rights languages
may have di↵erent degrees of development based on their immediate and intended uses.
Agent represents the party or parties to the contract or license that the REL expresses.
Most languages use a fairly general agent data element that can represent any
number of di↵erent roles in the environment of the REL.
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Resources is the targeted object for the parties. Resource in REL is described in form
of metadata and the link indicated where the resource is located. The resource
can be a digital or non-digital format.
Rights expresses the allowed actions on resources (e.g. read, write, copy or transfer).
Constraints are the key elements that are used to put more restriction on the per-
mitted actions. Constraints can be anything that can logically be applied to
the action, but tend to be quantitative elements in actionable RELs (e.g. time,
geographical region, number of usage, etc.).
Conditions. In addition to constraints, which generally limit the rights assigned to
user, there may be specific conditions that must be fulfilled before user can ex-
ercise their rights, the most common of which is payment.
2.2.4 Rights Expression Languages
In this section we introduce in brief several languages that are widely used in com-
mercial digital content protection technologies. Details of the state of the art of rights
expression language can be found in our technical report [69].
2.2.4.1 Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL)
The Open Digital Right Language (ODRL) [56][19], created in 2000 by Renato Ianella
of IPR Labs in Australia, is a standardised W3C language to express the rights informa-
tion over digital content. The ODRL aims at providing the flexible and interoperable
mechanism to support the use of the digital resources in publishing and distributing of
the electronic publication, digital images, learning object, computer software and other
digital forms. Figure 2.4 shows the core model of ODRL 2.0 consisting of central entity
(policy) interconnecting with other entities such as permission, prohibition, duty, party
constraint and action.
Policy is a set of rules indicating the permissions or prohibitions for a user to per-
form actions on assets. ODRL 2.0 provides a number of possibilities for policy
expressions and can be used in the following usage scenarios: “Agreement” is a
form of contract stipulating all terms of usage and the parties involved. “O↵er
and request” express the terms of usage. “Privacy” expresses the terms of usage
over the personal data. “Ticket” expresses the terms of usage by any party who
holds the ticket in their possession.
Permission expresses the allowed rights on assets (e.g. permission to play a movie).
30
Figure 2.4: ODRL 2.0 Core Model, this figure is brought from [56].
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Prohibition expresses the prohibited actions on asset (e.g. prohibiting user from
transferring data to third party).
Action expresses the allowed execution rights on asset (e.g. action “read”, “write”
and “print”).
Duty expresses action that user (assignee) needs to fulfil before the permission or
rights can be granted or exercised (e.g. payment duty).
Constraint allows policy makers to create a fine grain control for complex policy.
Constraint puts more restriction on action performed on asset. For example,
user can access the assets when he is in a specific location or uses a specific
device to access (spatial constraint).
Relation is an associated class that is used to link the asset to permission, duty and
prohibition. This entity consists of an attribute called relation that describes the
relationship between the asset and the linked entities.
Role is an associated class that is used to link a party to permission, duty and pro-
hibition. It indicates which role the party takes in respect to those entities, for
instance, a role as consumer, or owner of content. In ODRL, a requester has
a role as “assignee” and the content owner has a role as “assigner”, these are
defined in the Common Vocabulary Specification of ODRL 2.0 [56].
2.2.4.2 Other Rights Expression Language
eXtensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) [69] is the XML-based rights language for
specifying rights and conditions to control the access to digital contents and services.
XrML has its roots in Xerox Palo Alto Research Centre and it was first introduced
in 1999. XrML was not actually built from the ground; it was derived from Digital
Property Rights Language (DPRL) introduced in 1996, which became XrML when the
meta-language was changed from a lisp-style meta-language [69] to XML.
Using XrML, content owner can determine (1) the parties allowed to use (2) those
resources, (3) the rights available to those parties and (4) the terms and conditions
under which those rights may be exercised. These four elements are the core of the
language. Since its creation, XrML has evolved through industry feedback, critical
review and product implementation. In late 2003, XrML was adopted by MPEG
community to be used in MPEG-21 REL. In early 2001, Creative Commons [69] had
settled on the approach of creating machine-readable licenses based on the World Wide
Web Consortiums, which is part of the W3C Semantic Web Activity. In 2002 the first
machine-readable licensed was unveiled and Creative Commons recommended that
publishers use the RDF syntax to express license properties in HTML.
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2.2.5 Access Control Authorisation Languages
Access Control Authorisation Languages is the standard language designed to express
security policies and access control to data in the system. We introduce two languages:
XACML and EPAL, since both languages are well-known and being used in many
applications1. Moreover, we have studied XACML and EPAL in great detail and some
of our works published in [14] relate to them. For more details of the state of the art
of access control authorisation languages, one can find it in our technical report [69].
2.2.5.1 eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
XACML [87], XML-based language, is OASIS2 standard describing policy languages
as well as access control decision and response languages. The policy language is used
to describe the general access control requirements while the access control decision
request/response languages are used to form a query to ask whether or not a given
action should be granted or denied.
XACML Policy Model
Figure 2.5: XACML Policy Model, this figure is brought from [87].
1http://xacmlinfo.org/2013/12/06/xacml-based-access-control-for-web-application/
2https://www.oasis-open.org
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The XACML policy model consists of three mains components: policy set, policy and
rule. Figure 2.5 shows the structure of the XACML policy.
Rule is the most elementary unit of policy. It defines the action that the party can
perform with the specific condition and the obligation that need to be fulfilled. In
XACML, rule is encapsulated in a policy. Rule consists of the following elements.
• Rule target defines a set of requests to which the rule is intended to apply. The
condition element may further refine the applicability established by the target.
For example, in role-based model, user to role assignment information can be
defined in target. This means that the rule applies to certain roles with certain
users. The target needs to be checked before going to the detail policy validation,
if the elements in the target are not valid, further validation is ignored.
• “E↵ect” indicates the rule-maker’s intention of a ”True” evaluation for the rule.
There are two possible values for e↵ect: ”Permit” and ”Deny”. “Permit” means
access permission is granted while “Deny” means otherwise.
• “Subject” represents a person or a group of people authorised to access resource.
• “Resource” represents the digital object that subject can access.
• “Action” is an allowed operation on resource.
• “Condition” represents a boolean expression that refines the applicability of the
rule beyond the predicates (required information) implied by its target. However,
it may be absent.
• “Obligation” indicates the duty that user needs to fulfil after or before access
permission is granted.
• “Advice” is similar to obligation. However, advice may be safely ignored while
obligation is all time compulsory.
Policy combines the rules to form a set of rules. Policy consists of four main elements:
policy target, rule-combining algorithm, rules and obligation and advice.
• Policy target, similar to the rule target, specifies the set of requests to which it
applies.
• Rule-combining algorithm specifies the procedure for combining all the results
of the rules. For example, “deny-override” is a function that returns “Deny
response” if one of the rules in the policy returns negative response.
• Obligation or advice in policy has similar function to that of rule.
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Policy Set groups policies together. It consists of four elements: target, policy-
combining algorithm, policies and obligation and advice. Policy set’s target has
the same functionality to that of rule and policy target.
• The policy-combining algorithm specifies the procedure for combining all the
results of the policies.
• Obligation and advice in policy has similar function to that of rule and policy.
The di↵erence is that they apply to a set of policies.
It is worth noting for the details of XACML policy expression and example, one can
find them in Chapter 4, Section 4.7.
2.2.5.2 Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL)
Since EPAL is designed for expressing access authorisation for private data and in the
early stage of our research we put significant e↵ort on it, we introduce it briefly in this
section. EPAL [27], developed by IBM research group, is a language for exchanging
privacy policy in a structured format between applications or enterprises. It is a formal
language for writing enterprise privacy policies to control data handling practices in IT
systems according to fine-grained positive and negative authorisation rights. It focus on
the core privacy authorisation while abstracting data models and user-authentication
from all deployment details such as data model or user-authentication.
EPAL Privacy Policy Model, EPAL policy (Figure 2.6) defines lists of hierar-
chies of data-categories, user-categories, purposes, actions, obligations and conditions.
User-categories are the entities that use collected data. Data-categories define di↵er-
ent categories of collected data that are handled di↵erently from a privacy perspective
(e.g. medical-records vs. contact-address). Purposes model the intended service for
which data are used. Actions model how the data are used (e.g. transfer vs. read).
Obligations define actions that must be taken by the environment of EPAL (e.g. delete
after 30 days). Conditions are boolean expressions that evaluate the context around
user and action.
The above-mentioned elements are then used to formulate privacy authorisation
rules that allow or deny actions on data-categories by user-categories for certain pur-
poses under certain conditions while enforcing certain obligations. It is worth noting
that EPAL only defines how each data-category is handled. It does not handle the
enforcement of policy. The enforcement of policy (e.g. implementation of obligation)
is the role of the application maker to develop according to their requirements. The
detailed EPAL profile 1 and policy expression for purpose validation policy, that we
1EPAL profile is the outline or description of EPAL’s functionalities and components in its core
model.
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Figure 2.6: High-level UML Overview of an EPAL policy [27].
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published in the 8th ACM International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Man-
agement and Communication, can be found in [14].
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed di↵erent access and usage control models, such as DAC,
MAC, RBAC and other models. The advantages and disadvantages of them were also
presented. Furthermore, we also discussed di↵erent rights and access control languages.
We presented some well-known languages such as ODRL, EPAL and XACML. However,
we focused largely on two languages: XACML and EPAL. According to our study
[69], we find that XACML is very suitable to be used for expressing complex privacy-
aware policies (see Chapter 4 for more details). XACML goes across many reviews,
implementations and regular updates. XACML research group has developed Java-
enterprise-XACML1, a Java-based engine that is able to validate XACML policies.
Java-enterprise-XACML is extensible and can be adjusted to our requirements (see
Chapter 4). EPAL is another good candidate and it is also designed to address the
access authorisation for private data. However, EPAL provides only the language for
expressing the privacy-aware access authorisation policies. Unlike XACML, EPAL does
not have policy validation engine, and anyone wants to use this language needs to build
their own engine. This is one of EPAL limitations. Moreover, EPAL does not provide
the solution for policy enforcement; it is the role of the developer to create their own
policy enforcement engine. Taking into accounts all the factors, we decided to use
XACML for our implementation. We have done a survey on di↵erent rights expression
languages. The detailed technical report can be found in [69].
It is worth noting that the information, concerning access and usage control models
and policy expression languages, provided in this chapter will be used as the knowledges
for access and usage control model selection, which will be presented in Chapter 4. We
compare each model to the requirements for processing private data we defined in
Chapter 4 and find out which model meets the defined requirements.
1https://code.google.com/p/enterprise-java-xacml/
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Chapter 3
Usage Control Techniques and
Technologies
In this chapter we present the state of the art of the existing techniques in usage
control. We also provide the comparison of di↵erent usage control techniques used in
di↵erent system environments and point out which technique is appropriate to which
environment. We also discuss the existing usage control technologies such as Digital
Rights Management. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.1
provides the definition of the usage control and enforcement techniques. Section 3.2
describes the general usage control and enforcement techniques. Section 3.3 presents
the existing Digital Rights Management technologies both for commercial and open
source systems. Section 4.3 is the summary of this chapter.
3.1 Usage Control Techniques and Technologies
A usage control technique [70] is a method or procedure used to enforce a usage control
policy. The usage control techniques are classified into two di↵erent types: less restric-
tive and highly restrictive. Less restrictive technique refers to any technique allowing
to observe the misuse of digital content, but not be able to prevent the misuse. This
technique, of course, discourages user from performing illegal act, but not being able
to prevent user from redistributing or misusing digital content. For example, the use of
watermark on digital content provides a means for content provider to trace the original
source of the illegal distribution, but watermark cannot be used to prevent user from
sharing or redistributing content. The second class, the highly restrictive technique,
refers to any technique allowing content owner to protect and control content usage at
any point in time during the usage session. In this technique, only an authorised user
can perform the authorised action on content. The use of sticky policy and logging in
combination with trusted client-side application [73], to support the usage control of
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content, is a good example of restrictive usage control enforcement technique.
Usage control technology [70], the application of usage control, is the collection of
techniques used in controlling the usage of digital content. Usage control technology
can be embedded in application softwares, machines, computers or devices, which can
be operated by individuals without detailed knowledge of the workings of such things.
Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology is one of the types of usage control
technology. For example, Windows Media DRM is embedded into Window Media
Player for controlling the usage rights on windows media contents. Window Media
DRM uses encryption and license as the techniques to control and enforce the usage of
video or audio content played on Window Media Player.
3.2 Usage Control and Enforcement Techniques
An enforcement Technique is a method used to enforce the usage restriction on content
either directly or indirectly. It provides a means to protect, secure, trace or detect
fraud. We present below some techniques used in the existing DRM technologies.
3.2.1 Watermarking and Steganography
Digital contents and documents are flying through cyberspace to consumers. Unfortu-
nately, along the way, individuals may choose to intervene and take those contents for
themselves. Digital watermarking and steganography technology can discourage this
practice by limiting or eliminating the ability of third party to redistribute the content
that he has taken.
Watermarking [22] is the process of embedding information into digital contents
(e.g. audio, pictures, video or text) in a way such that it is di cult to remove. Water-
mark can be used to trace the original source of content leakage. For example, when
consumer requests to view digital content, it can be watermarked with the identity of
consumer, in case, consumer shares content to third party or beyond, the embedded
information is a source used to trace the illegal distribution.
Steganography [22] is the practice of concealing a file, message, image, or video
within another file, message, image, or video. Generally, the hidden messages will
appear to be (or be part of) something else: images, articles, shopping lists, or some
other cover text. For example, the hidden message may be in invisible ink between the
visible lines of a private letter.
The advantage of steganography over cryptography alone is that the intended secret
message does not attract attention to itself as an object of scrutiny. Visible encrypted
messages arouse interest, and may in themselves be incriminating in countries where
encryption is banned. Thus, whereas cryptography provides the means to protect the
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contents of a message, steganography is about concealing the fact that a secret message
is being sent.
3.2.2 Encryption
Encryption [63] is used to protect digital content when it is shared or moved out of
the system coverage. With encrypted content, user can only access content if he has
valid decryption key. This ensures that content goes to the right person. However, this
technique has weaknesses when key is compromised, content can be shared without
any control. Encryption is generally used in conjunction with other techniques to make
tighter security in controlling the usage of content. For example, the combination of
encryption and watermark, encryption protects content from unauthorised user while
watermark allows tracing illegal content usage.
Figure 3.1: High level overview of sticky policy and usage log for usage control enforce-
ment.
3.2.3 Policy-based with the Support of Secured Client-side
Application
This technique requires content to be attached with a usage policy. When user requests
to use content, an application at client side triggers usage policy validation and decides
if usage can be granted or not. This technique requires a secure and trusted client
application that ensures the data integrity and accountability. Policy-based technique
[70] provides a fine-grain control on content usage.
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3.2.4 Fingerprint or Digital Signature
Fingerprint [55] refers to the characterisation of the content based on its representation
(signals or features). Fingerprinting is used to protect content against the alteration by
the third party. Fingerprinting is di↵erent from watermarking in that Fingerprinting
is a persistent output associated with content rather than an embedded entity. It also
does not alter content. A hashing function is used in the fingerprinting process. For
example, before being sent to consumer, a content is hashed and the hashing result is
attached with content sent to consumer. Upon receiving content and hashing result,
the application at consumer side hashes the received-content and then compares the
hashing result received from content provider and the hashing result at consumer side,
if the results are matched, it shows that content has not been altered. In general,
fingerprint is used in conjunction with other techniques to provide a tighter security in
protecting and controlling the use of digital content. This technique alone is primarily
used to solve the tamper resistant problem (or content alteration problem).
3.2.5 Usage Logging and Notification
Usage logging [70] is a method used to capture the usage information when consumer
gets access to content. It records all the necessary information before, during and after
the use of content. Then they are used to validate the content usage. Usage log can be
stored at client application or attached with content and goes along with it depending
on system specification. Attaching usage log with content provides an opportunity to
trace the circulation of content in the network.
Notification refers to the act of informing system every access to digital content. The
notification message consists of necessary information used to analyse the current state
of content usage (e.g. location, time of access or executed actions). The notification
can occur before, while using or after the content usage. Notification provides necessary
information for the server and based on that information it can make a future decision
whether to keep granting or to revoke the access to the content.
3.3 Digital Rights Management Technologies
DRM [71] is used to protect high-value digital content. DRM technologies are developed
to serve di↵erent business models [70] with di↵erent level of security requirements.
Some are device and platform dependent and some are designed to be interoperable
among devices and platforms. Digital Rights Management is generally complex and
extensible; it supports a diversity of devices, users, platforms, media types, content
types and a variety of system requirements. This section provides an overview of DRM
system and technologies.
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3.3.1 System Overview
DRM aims at supporting legal distribution of digital content while protecting appro-
priate property rights. DRM has two important aspects: digital rights management
and digital rights enforcement [48].
• Rights Management: the rights holders have to be able to manage and specify
the terms and conditions of content usage [36].
• Rights Enforcement: to ensure that content is only used as stipulated in the
terms and conditions associated with it [36].
These two aspects form basic security for digital content distribution. The core concept
of DRM is the use of digital license. Through digital licensing, content provider can
have more control over what consumer can do over content. The digital content and its
license can be attached or stored separately. Storing separately can provide a flexible
way for content providers to freely distribute the protected content among users and
license requests can take place later.
Figure 3.2: A typical DRM model, showing the principal components forming DRM
system and the interaction between client, content owner, and DRM components. This
figure is drawn by author based on the figure in [36]. Numbers in the figure represent
the processing order.
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3.3.2 Typical DRM Model
A typical DRM model (see Figure 3.2) provides a complete view of DRM system
and also the interaction processes between consumer, DRM system components, and
content owner. The system consists of the following components.
• Content Protection can be implemented in any way such that it provides con-
tent owner a way to upload and configure the usage rights of content in the DRM
system. In this phase, content is protected using data protection techniques,
such as encryption, watermark or fingerprint. The security protection during
this phase is important as the leakage of content related information can destroy
the whole process.
• Distributor is the place where submitted content resides. Once content is pro-
vided, it is stored in a secure environment in content repository. Content can
be stored in a plain or encrypted format depending on DRM specification. Note
that content issuer issues content through a particular preference media, it is
not limited to the Internet. It can be other kind of distribution channels (e.g.
wire-network, physical media (CD, DVD, USB), Mobile or PC).
• License Issuer is a place where license is securely stored. It issues licence
whenever there is request from DRM client.
• DRM Client refers to the trusted hardware or software, which is a proxy to user
(consumer). It is trusted in the sense that it would not allow the unauthorised
user to access content. It also reinforces the terms and conditions of usage. DRM
Client is responsible for initiating license as well as content request when there
is request from consumer.
• Content Owner is an entity providing digital contents.
• Client is a physical person consuming digital content by retrieving downloadable
or streaming content through distribution channel.
Figure 3.2: the interactive process between DRM’s components.
Content owner sends content to “content protection module” (1), then “content pro-
tection module” shields content with an appropriate security mechanism and returns
protected content with its associated license (2). After getting the protected content
and its associated license, “content owner” sends license to “license issuer” (3) and pro-
tected content to “content issuer” (4). Protected content and its associated license will
be sent out when there is request from DRM client. Client requests content through
DRM client (5). DRM client initiates request to “content issuer” (6) and “content
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issuer” returns the requested content (7). DRM client initiates request to “license is-
suer” (8) and “license issuer” returns the license (9). After getting the two objects (e.g.
content and its associated license) DRM client performs access authorisation process.
3.3.3 DRM Technologies
This section presents the existing DRM technologies that have been designed for dif-
ferent purposes and used in di↵erent systems environment and business models.
3.3.3.1 Windows Media DRM (WMDRM)
WMDRM [86], developed by Microsoft, provides the protection of audio and video
content. Its solution is based on Windows Media Player and server. WMDRM’s ar-
chitecture is not fixed; it o↵ers a set of software development tool kits that allow using
the core DRM services and combining them into various configurations. WMDRM
supports some media formats, such as Advanced Streaming Format (ASF), Windows
Media Audio (WMA) format and Windows Media Video (WMV) format. WMDRM
uses MPEG-21 REL [40] to express license on content. The main advantage of WM-
DRM is that Windows media format is widely used in the Internet and the Windows
media player has incorporated DRM support. This makes WMDRM popular and
adopted in many digital content distribution markets. For example, PressPlay [64],
a large online music service, adopts WMDRM technology to o↵er the digital music
from Sony and Universal studio. Although WMDRM has many advantages, it also
has some drawback concerning the control on usage, it does not have the ability to
trace the illegal distribution because of the absence of the watermark and other usage
enforcement techniques.
3.3.3.2 Open Mobile Alliance (OMA)
OMA [15] focuses on DRM for mobile devices for digital contents such ringtones, songs,
screensavers and backgrounds. In June 2004, OMA released a DRM Enabler, which
includes three types of functionality: Forward lock, combined delivery and separate
delivery. Forward lock: content is packaged in a special container format called DRM
message. Content is not encrypted and stays in the receiving device after reception;
content can be consumed without limitation. However, content is strictly attached
with device and it cannot be shared. This type of enabler can be used with low value
content such as daily newspaper in mobile service. Combined Delivery: this enabler
is an extension of the forward lock. In combined delivery, DRM message is divided
into two parts: the rights information and content. When the DRM message reaches
the client side, the rights object is extracted from the DRM message and used to
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monitor the usage of content. Separate Delivery: this enabler is derived from the
combined delivery. While in combined delivery content and rights object are packaged
in DRM message; in separated-delivery, content and rights objects are packaged and
sent separately to client’s device. With separate delivery, the content can be reused at
client’s device.
The security in OMA depends on one part of the security measure in rights issuer
and content distributor and other part on the DRM agent. In OMA, content is packaged
in DRM content format container. It is encrypted using a symmetric content encryption
key (CEK) and signed by content issuer. The security problem in data protection of
OMA is the encryption key. The key is content specific that can pose the risk if the
device that uses content is compromised.
3.3.3.3 MPEG-21
MPEG-21 [40] is an open standardised multimedia framework used in wide range of
networks and devices. The main concept of the MPEG-21 is the digital item that
system needs to distribute. Each item has it own digital identification, known as DII
(Digital Item Identification), and the declaration information, known as DID (Digital
Item Declaration). DII specifies a term and concept describing the relation between
items and DII specifies the unique identification of the item. In MPEG-21, digital
items are grouped and put in a single package, known as container. MPEG-21 can
support and work in many multimedia file types and platforms. It uses MPEG-21
REL to express license on digital item. The security in MPEG-21 depends on the
implementation, one part of the user component and other part on the core system
of MPEG-21. The core system will ensure the secure delivery of the content while
user part ensures the safe use of content. MPEG-21 does not specify the DRM client
component architecture, it considers DRM client as the independent component that
user can develop separately.
3.3.3.4 Adobe PDF Merchant/ Web Buy
Adobe PDF Merchant [3] is a server-based DRM technology that provides protection
to PDF content. It consists of two components: Adobe Merchant DRM that acts as
DRM server and Web Buy, that is integrated in Acrobat Reader, acts as client DRM.
Adobe PDF security depends solely on the encryption and authentication techniques
that allow protecting content when transferring it from server to client DRM and
when content resides at client’s device. Adobe PDF Merchant has also integrated
watermarking technique into their system that makes content to be traceable. This
DRM technology constraints with both, platform and file types, it is available only for
Windows and Macintosh platform and only PDF file is supported.
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3.3.3.5 Fairplay
FairPlay [39], developed by Apple, is used in QuickTime and the well-known iTunes
music store. FairPlay is considered a less restrictive DRM technology as it allows songs
to be copied to any number of the iPod devices and played on up to five authorised
devices. FairPlay’s digital item packed with MPEG-21 container. The encryption uses
AES asymmetric key with MD5 hashing function. FairPlay’s architecture and their
security protection techniques are not available in public, making it di cult to discuss
in details, however, the basic functionality can be described as following. FairPlay
allows user to copy the digital content from its store and listen in 5 di↵erent devices.
User needs to register their device and the number of permitted device reduces whenever
user registers a new device. User may use the license attached with content and view
the content o✏ine if the license is valid, otherwise DRM client needs to contact server
to acquire new license. FairPlay supports traceability and it is also a file type and
platform dependent system.
3.3.3.6 Other DRMs
Light Weight DRM (LWDRM) [25] provides less restriction on content usage. It
allows consumer to use content freely except the mass distribution (super distri-
bution). This feature provides LWDRM to be an application of fair-use principal
1. LWDRM uses two format files: Local Media File (LMF) and Signed Media
File (SMF). An LMF file is bound to a single device by a hardware driven key
but can be converted into SMF-format, which can be played in di↵erent devices
that support LWDRM. In LWDRM, the identification of the owner is embedded
in the content and if such file is found in the mass distributed, it is allowed to
find the source and the prosecution of the illegal distribution can be followed.
High Bandwidth Content Protection (HDCP) DRM [26], developed by Intel Sub-
sidiary Digital Content Protection, is a DRM technology standard that provides a
protection method for streaming encrypted audiovisual content between devices.
With HDCP, content provider can set a policy on content preventing content
from being stored, distributed or displayed on non-HDCP compliance devices.
AXMEDIS [77] is an open source interoperable DRM technology for the automatic
production and distribution of cross-media content over number of di↵erent distri-
bution channels such as networked PC, PDA, Mobile phone or I-TV. AXMEDIS
is designed to interact with web services. In AXMEDIS, the interoperability is
achieved by introducing a translation module into DRM component architecture.
The module functions as the right expression translator, which is responsible for
the translation of one DRM license to another.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair use
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Figure 3.3: Functionalities comparison between di↵erent DRM technologies. For more
details, refer to [71].
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Chillout [78] is an interoperable and software-based DRM technology. Most of its
components are based on MPEG-21. However, it also has its own distinctive
feature, which is the introduction of Domain Management Device (DMD) com-
ponent. This component is responsible for controlling all the devices used in
acquiring the digital content. Chillout is developed in Java platform, it can sup-
port di↵erent content formats and run on di↵erent platforms (e.g. Windows, Mac
and Linux).
OpenSDRM [79] is developed to address the possibility of adaptation to several busi-
ness models and di↵erent types of digital content, aiming at enabling business
involving multimedia content to function, by enforcing licensing agreements for
content usage and o↵ering business opportunities to the content owners and con-
tent providers. OpenSDRM deals with the rights management and not directly
with the copy protection. OpenSDRM’s architecture is developed based on some
existing standard specification such as MPEG-4.
InterTrust [80] o↵ers a solution for content packaging, distribution and rights man-
agement based on a packager program and rights server technology. This technol-
ogy supports, rentals, pay-per-use and try-before-buy business model. InterTrust
provides DRM client for varieties of devices such as PCs, mobile phone, and mu-
sic players. InterTrust also provides a development tool kit that allows content
provider to integrate InterTrust DRM into their service and products.
VideoGuard [49] provides end-to-end protection of an operator’s service, leveraging
the unique security capabilities of each individual platform for home TV net-
working services. VideoGuard is designed to help TV operators to extend their
pay-TV services to connected media devices. It enables the secure ingestion,
delivery and consumption of premium content over networks while maintaining
subscription privileges across devices. VideoGuard solution is also based on the
encryption and the management of the authentication key. For more details on
DRM technologies including the functionalities comparison, one can look at our
technical report of DRM technologies at [71].
3.4 Summary
In this chapter we addressed two important points: usage control enforcement tech-
niques and DRM technologies. We presented the techniques used to enforce usage
control on data. Concerning DRM, we presented a system overview and a standard
model of DRM systems. Then, a list of existing DRM technologies and their function-
alities comparison was provided (see Figure 3.3). Based on our study on the state of
49
the art of DRM technology [71], we concluded that the existing Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM) technologies cannot provide the security we need as required by laws
[28] for processing of private data. This is because the existing DRM technologies are
not specifically built for private data. They are built to protect commercial contents
(e.g. multimedia contents); they are content-specific and lack of generalness [66][71].
This rules out the possibility of using DRMs, without complement or extra support
functionalities to support the processing of private data in distributed environment.
Concerning the survey of DRM technologies [71], we focused on the functionalities
and security option provided by those technologies, then we compared what could be
provided by those technologies with the legal and technical requirements of private
data processing ( see Chapter 4). So far we are not aware of a complete solution (DRM
technology) that designs specifically for managing and enforcing privacy-aware usage
control policies in distributed healthcare, especially, the systems that use workflows.
Consequently, it would be best to design a dedicated system for distributed healthcare,
in such a way that addresses the requirements [10] in such system. Although the
existing DRM technologies could not be used to support the processing environment
of private data, the DRM scheme can be used as a model for controlling and enforcing
the private data in distributed environment. However, in order to support the security
requirements for processing of private data, we need to design a dedicated usage control
enforcement technique that is able to address those security requirements [10] (see also
Chapter 4). To build the dedicated usage control system, we need to have an e↵ective
usage control enforcement technique [71], we conclude that among those techniques,
policy-based with support of trusted client application (see Section 3.2.2) is the most
appropriate that can be used to control private data in distributed environment since it
provides more levels of control and granular policy expression; policy-based is flexible
and can be used to control complex usage control requirements of private data (see
Chapter 4).
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Chapter 4
Scenario and Requirements for
Managing the Processing of Private
Data
In this chapter, we discuss the scenario and requirements for managing the processing
of private data. We start with the introduction of the scenario in healthcare, a model
for the distributed processing of data. Then, we derive the requirements for managing
such data, including legal, contractual and technical requirements. Furthermore, we
compare the existing access and usage control models (presented in Chapter 2) against
those requirements. Finally, we propose a usage control model taking into account
the privacy aspect and the requirements for processing private data. The rest of this
chapter is organised as follows. We introduce a usage control of private data scenario
in Section 4.1 and discuss the involved parties and the details of the processes with
processing rules in Section 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, respectively. A model for distributed pro-
cessing of data is presented in Section 4.2. The legal and contractual aspects of private
data processing are discussed in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we analyse usage control
requirements for processing of private data (e.g. distributed healthcare), and based
on those requirements we define usage control model. In this section, we also present
the comparison between di↵erent access and usage control models based on our defined
requirements. Section 4.5 talks about the access and usage control model selection. We
introduce privacy-aware UCON in Section 4.6 and REL profile for access and usage
control model in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 is the summary.
4.1 Scenario - Distributed Processes in Health Care
Managing the processing of private data in distributed environment is required as
depicted by the following scenario. It is worth noting that our scenario is inspired by
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the Wallonie Healthcare Information System [54][85] while the hospital management
process is inspired by the work of Jean Herveg and Anne Rousseau [44] on management
process in hospitals in Belgium.
The scenario presents an informal distributed healthcare system where two hospitals
have cooperation and agree on sharing patient’s health records when needed. Each
hospital has its own usage policy and they agree that each hospital needs to respect
its defined usage policy of the sharing information when using them.
The scenario depicts the need to control the use of patient’s health records when
they are moved from one to another hospital. The scenario shows that it is necessary to
restrict the processing of the data by means of policies (rules) expressing permissions
and obligations, and each time before releasing the data, system needs to ensure that
user requesting to use data is the one who really has the rights to do so and for the
purpose he claims. Thus, predicting the purpose of using data declared by user before
releasing data is really important because it is a way to prevent mal-intended user from
unnecessarily accessing protected data with a fault-claim.
4.1.1 Involved Parties
We restate the informal private data processing scenario in distributed healthcare sys-
tem, presented in Chapter 1. We suppose that two hospitals, one in Paris, France
(Broussais) another in Namur, Belgium (CHR-Namur), have signed a cooperation
agreement on sharing their patients’ medical records. Under the agreement both hos-
pitals can share the medical records when needed. The processing of patient’s medical
records must be strictly controlled and must comply with the policies defined by data
owner. For example, if Broussais processes the medical records belonging to CHR-
Namur, Broussais must fully respect the data usage policy defined by CHR-Namur.
A Belgium citizen, named Edward, has registered in CHR-Namur hospital for the
heart treatment. All the medical records concerning his heart are managed by CHR-
Namur under the heart treatment purpose. This means, CHR-Namur can share his
medical records for such purpose and only for his treatment. Some time later, when
Edward visits Paris, he faces a heart disorder and he needs an emergency treatment
(surgery). Edward is hosted at Broussais hospital in Paris. Before performing heart
surgery, the cardiologist needs his past heart medical records for pre-surgery examina-
tion. The cardiologist acquires those medical records from CHR-Namur under CHR-
Namur-Broussais agreement. The medical records are transferred to Broussais and they
stay there for a limit period of time, to be precise, during the treatment of Edward.
During that period, cardiologist can examine Edward’s medical records given that the
usage policies defined by CHR-Namur are respected. With this informal example, we
have three parties involved in the process. The CHR-Namur, Broussais and Edward.
• CHR-Namur is the name of a hospital in Namur, Belgium. It is also a part
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of Wallonie Healthcare Network Information System. We use it in our informal
example as one involved party in our proposed healthcare information system.
• Broussais is another involved party in our informal example.
• Edward is a name of a patient who has registered himself in CHR-Namur.
4.1.2 Process
For our considerations we need a detailed overview of the processing of health records
as well as the usage policies issued by the hospital. In our informal health records
processing scenario, defined in Figure 4.1, the processing of health records is based on
the work of Jean Herveg and Anne Rousseau [44] and policies are based on the policies
defined in RSW information system [85]. Figure 4.1 depicts the processes that need
to be executed for a treatment of patient in emergency situation, the action-by-action
run-through of the processing and the data that are required for each process. The
steps depicted in the figure are:
Figure 4.1: Process Overview of patient’s medical treatment scenario. In the scenario,
Broussais is taking care a patient (Edward) who has previously registered at CHR-
Namur. Broussais needs some health records from CHR-Namur for Edward’s heart
treatment purpose.
1. Admission: with the admission of Edward as a patient of Broussais Hospital a
new health record is created by the hospital. However, in order to create new
record for Edward, hospital sta↵ may need to have some personal information
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of Edward, such as home address, contact information, insurance information,
etc. Admission is the first processing step of the workflow. At the beginning the
health record is empty. The create action is logged by the hospital. As part of
the admission the personal information of Edward is collected and stored in the
record. The record is stored on a file server of the hospital and is only accessible
by the hospital.
2. Medical Check: after admitting to the hospital, the next step of the process
is to perform the medical check for Edward. To do medical check, hospital sta↵
may need to access (read) some required health records of Edward, and as the
medical records of Edward are stored at CHR-Namur, Broussais’s sta↵ has to send
a request to CHR-Namur for permission. Then, if the permission is granted by
CHR-Namur, the requested data and its usage policy are transferred to Broussais
and stored temporarily in Edward newly created record at Broussais.
3. Medical Treatment: after performing medical check, the next step is to diag-
nose the patient. Patient diagnostic consists of number of sub processes where
medical treatment is one of them. Other processes, such as additional tests (e.g.
blood test, radio,...), expert advices, ..., are the supplementary processes that
need to be done if required. The detailed overview of the processing of patient
diagnostic is depicted in Figure 4.2. The data required for medical treatment
vary according to illness and it requires sub-processes (workflow) to handle it.
Figure 4.1 is the treatment process for heart surgery operation.
4. Patient Orientation: after medical treatment, patient orientation is needed.
There are two cases. Firstly, patient can be temporarily hospitalised. Secondly,
if there is something serious and the hospital is not capable to handle it, the
patient needs to be transferred to other hospital. In case of transfer, the patient’s
personal data may also need to be transferred and health records may also need
to be reused or re-accessed.
5. Billing and Closing: it is the final process that patient needs to clear when
the medical treatment is completed. The information required for this step is the
personal information of patient, such as contact address, insurance information
and other information used for payment if needed.
In Figure 4.1, we define other components as follows.
• Personal Information: we refer to the information related to individual patient.
That information is something like name, address, contact information, insurance
information, etc.
• Health Records of Patient: they are the data related to health history of patient.
Something like the records of illness (e.g. heart-attack, diabetes, blood’s type,...)
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• Usage Policy: it is the policy defined to control the usage of health records when
they are at remote client.
Figure 4.2: Flowchart, example of the general processing steps for patient treatment
in case of emergency service, Jean Herveg and Anne Rousseau [44] .
4.2 A Model for Processing Data: Physical Execu-
tion
Physical execution [72] is the execution of the data by the physical entities in the
workflow. It may involve, application, services, database management system, or Web
application. For example, in a Web environment, data is processed by Web services as
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Figure 4.3: An example of physical execution of a request for transfer and a request to
use Edward’s health records, which are originally stored at CHR-Namur.
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well as other Web applications (e.g. Web forms). As part of the workflow execution,
entities (services, applications, etc.) communicate and exchange data with other en-
tities. In this section, we present the physical execution of the data for two di↵erent
access scenarios: request to transfer data from hospital in Namur to Broussais hospital
in Paris and the request to use data by user at hospital in Broussais when the data
is temporarily stored at Broussais’s system. The physical execution model, shown in
Figure 4.3, is based on the process overview of patient’s medical treatment presented
in Figure 4.1.
Description of Physical Execution in Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3 depicts the physical execution of health record by di↵erent components of
the system. The figure shows the technical details of the snippet of the health record
processing steps. Figure 4.3 has two figures: Figure 4.3.1 and Figure 4.3.2. Figure
4.3.1 depicts the processes of transferring health record and usage control policy from
Namur hospital to Broussais hospital. Figure 4.3.1 depicts the processes of controlling
the usage of health record when it is temporarily stored at Broussais’s system.
Figure 4.3.1, the process starts during “medical check” processing step where Ed-
ward’s past health records are required to complete the medical check procedure. With
this reason, user (e.g. physician) who is responsible for this processing step needs to ac-
cess to Edward’s health records. To get the records which are currently stored at CHR-
Namur, they need to create an access request using “client application”. The client
application forwards the request to gateway service (call (1)). The gateway service is
responsible for providing secure communication between Broussais and CHR-Namur
system. After receiving an access request from client application, gateway service for-
wards the request to “access control server” situated in CHR-Namur (call (2)). Then,
“access control server” validates the request based on the applicable access control
policies in server storage (call (3)). If the access permission is granted, access control
server contacts database management system (call (4)) to retrieve the records as well
as its corresponding usage control policy (call (5)). The records and usage policy are
then sent to gateway service (call (6)). Finally, gateway service forwards the records
and usage policy to database server (call (7)) and the records and usage policy are
stored in database (call (8)).
Once Edward’s health records are transferred from CHR-Namur and temporarily
stored at Broussais, user at Broussais can use them. Figure 4.3.2 depicts the physical
execution of a request to use the records at Broussais.
First, by using client application for controlling the usage of records, user can create
a request to use the records. Then, client application sends the request to usage con-
trol server (call (1)); usage control application, which is a part of usage control server,
validates the request based on the usage control policy available in storage (call (2)).
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After validating the request and if the request is granted, usage control system con-
tacts database management system (call (3)) to retrieve the related records (call (4)).
4.3 Requirements for the Use of Private Data
Since private data is protected by laws, managing the processing of such data requires
the consideration of various legal, contractual, organisational and technical aspects.
For example, in the member states of the European Union, there are privacy laws,
implementing the EU Directive 95/46/EC [28], that limit the processing of sensitive
private data. Other law, such as Safe Harbor Framework [59], intends to manage
the processing of private data between the European Union, the United States and
Switzerland. Laws may cover only the general issue; hence, further rules for the usage
and protection of data are defined in contractual agreements concluded between the
involved parties. In this section, we discuss mainly about the legal requirements for
processing the private data in distributed environment. Mining requirements is impor-
tant because it is the first step before we can define a usage control model to be used
in such system.
4.3.1 Legal Requirements
Di↵erent countries have di↵erent privacy laws for regulating the processing of private
data. In Europe, Directive 95/46/EC are designed to control the processing of private
data between di↵erent countries in Europe. The laws specify rules for handling personal
data in general and privacy sensitive data in particular. The directives define objectives
for the legislation of the member states of the European Union and it is binding on the
Member States as to the result to be achieved but leaves them the choice of the form
and method they adopt to realise the community objectives within the framework of
their internal legal order. All EU Member States need to implant the EU Directive
into national legislation.
We have chosen the EU Directive 95/46/EC as starting point to derive legal re-
quirements for the distributed processing of private data. EU directive defines the
legal responsibility for data processor when processing private data and also the legal
rights for data subject. It also defines the procedure and regulation for data processor
when processing private data of individual. The Directive uses the terms “controller”,
“data subject” and “processing”. Article 2 defines the terms in the context of the
directive:
“Controller” shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency of any other body which alone or jointly with others determines
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the purposes and means of the processing of personal data, ...
“Data subject” is an identified or identifiable natural person, ...
“Processing” shall mean any operation or set of operations [...] whether
or not by automatic means, such as collection, [...] storage, adaption or
alteration, use, disclosure by transmission,....
Article 10 specifies the obligations of data controller when processing personal data.
Article 10 lists the following information that data controller must provide to data
subject.
• (a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
• (b) the purpose of the processing for which the data is intended;
• (c) any further information, such as the recipients or categories of recipients of
the data, ...
Article 10 and Article 11 describe the need for an information service attending to
the information rights of private persons. Such an information service can support the
process of notifying the data subject. In summary, from those articles, there are three
main requirements:
• Data controller needs to notify data subject when using data.
• Processing of private data is limited to the purpose for which data is intended;
excessive use is not allowed.
• Consent from data subject is required when processing personal data.
4.3.2 Contractual Requirements
The distribution of data does occur between di↵erent organisations. Contracts are the
agreements or rules for inter-organisational data processing and they are concluded
between the involved organisations and they di↵er depending on various aspects, such
as the involved organisations and the binding laws.
Contracts are not often publicly accessible. Only the general terms and conditions
of open available services are accessible. The contracts vary from organisation to
organisation, but through binding laws there is a common foundation. For example
the agreement of inter-organisational private data processing is built upon the privacy
law. Thus, we apply the legal aspects discussed before to the distributed processing of
private data and define the contractual requirements in the following section.
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4.3.3 Requirements for Processing Private Data
To manage the processing of private data, we need to derive the requirements for pro-
cessing such data. For the legal aspects, we can derive requirements from the Articles
10 and 11 of the EU Directive. For contractual aspect we derive from the Wallonie
Healthcare Network [54] and the work in [72]. It is worth noting that there are two
types of requirements listed below. The first set is the data processing requirements.
It describes the requirements that data processor need to do in order to comply with
laws [28]. What type of information should data processor provide to data subject
when processing private data. The security and confidentiality that data processor
needs to provide to data subject. The second set is the requirements for usage control
policy expression. It describe what should be in the policy and how the policy should
be expressed. It is important to note that these requirements are general and it can
be applied to any private data processing environment (EU only) since they are the
products of our study of EU Directive.
1. Requirements for data processor. These are the duties that data processor
should do when processing private data.
“Identifiability”: the information concerning the processing of private data
provided to data subject must be su cient to identify the entities process-
ing the data as well as the recipients and sources of personal data. The
di↵erence between non-distributed and distributed environments is that
not only one entity processes the data but many. The data processor must
provide a complete list of all involved entities and their clear identification.
“Accessibility”: the data processor must enable the data subject to access
information about the complete processing of his personal data at any time.
“Completeness”: the data processor must inform about which personal data
item is processed, how it is processed and why it is processed. If requested,
the given answer must be exhaustive. It must cover all processing steps
performed on the data. The answer must contain details of each processing
step and its intended purpose (e.g. research, marketing, etc.).
“Confidentiality”: the data processor must ensure that only the data con-
troller and data subject have access to information.
2. Policy expression and implementation requirements. These are the re-
quirements for policy expression and implementation.
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“Controllability”: the policy mechanism must apply the required policies to
anybody accessing the associated data. The concerned entity must check
whether a performed action complies with policies.
“Availability”: the information required by policy conditions must be avail-
able even if confidential parts of the data and of the source of information
stay hidden.
“Expressiveness”: policies must allow for conditions and obligation that data
accessor needs to fulfil. One must be able to depend permissions and re-
strictions on the history of the processing of data.
“Obligations”: policies must allow for specifying obligations and to decide
whether all active obligations can be met in the future. To comply with
contracts, entities must be able to fulfil future obligations. For example,
an obligation that data controller must notify data subject on every access
or the obligation that the system needs to delete all the data temporarily
stored in local device once the usage permission is expired.
“Level of Granularity for policy expression”: the policy language and
the model we choose must be able to express in detail the complex privacy
policies designed for private data (e.g. the performed actions, their actors,
their purposes and other contextual information).
The usage control requirements presented in the following section (see Section 4.4)
derive from the private data processing requirements discussed in this section.
4.4 Usage Control Requirements
In Section 4.3, we present the general requirements for processing private sensitive data.
In this section, we address particularly, the usage control requirements for distributed
healthcare information system. We have published our finding in 7th International
Conference on Health Informatics [10]. The proposed requirements are the result from
our study of Wallonie Healthcare Network information system [54] and EU Directive
95/46/EC (based on the work in Section 4.3.1). Furthermore, based on the identified
requirements, we propose a usage control model, which extends the traditional UCON
model [41]. We name it privacy-aware UCON. It is worth noting that we propose
the requirements in such a way so that they can be used to express the usage control
policy for private data taking into account the legal requirements presented in Section
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4.3.1. For example, in Figure 4.4, the data subject notification requirement is sug-
gested in response to the legal requirement in EU Directive (Article 10) that requires
data processor to notify data subject when data is used while the data subject’s con-
sent requirement is suggested in response to the article 11 of the EU Directive that
requires data subject’s consent before processing private data. The detail explanation
of each requirement is presented below. It is worth noting that the data collected for
requirements analysis are from the Wallonie Healthcare Network information system
and the study of EU Directive. There are two main requirements: Usage restrictions
Figure 4.4: Classification of di↵erent requirements for usage control di↵erentiates be-
tween usage restrictions and Obligations.
and Obligations, the details are illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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4.4.1 Usage Restriction
Usage restriction defines the circumstances under which the content can be viewed
and cannot be viewed. In this section, we present the usage restriction applied to
distributed healthcare in general.
Constraint on data subject’s consent refers to the permission granted by data
subject to a person or a group of people. With consent of data subject, data
processor can use data accordingly.
Action restriction refers to allowed or disallowed actions on patient’s record. For
example, “read”, “write”, “modify”, “play” or “print”.
Temporal usage restriction refers to time within which user is allowed to view
patient’s record. For example, user can view patient’s record within working
hours or during the treatment processes. It is important to note that, under
context of healthcare information system, the amount of time permitted to use
content must be su cient, but not over necessary.
Spatial usage restriction refers to the place/location where data is allowed to
be used, particularly, when data is moved out of its original location. It may
be a healthcare institution, a specific computer/hardware or network. Spatial
constraint allows policy designer to filter the unnecessary locations in the network
where the data is not required to be used.
Data usage restriction refers to the number of times allowed to use data when it
is stored at remote client. Restricting the number of times for data usage helps
preventing the problem concerning the illegal data distribution and unnecessary
data usage.
Usage situation restriction refers to user access situation. There are three main
usage situations [54]. Firstly, it is normal situation. For example, the routinely
check up of patient. Secondly, the critical situation, in this situation, hospital
sta↵ may bypass certain rules to ensure the proper treatment of patient. The last
situation is the emergency where hospital’s sta↵ can declare bleak-glass situation.
In this situation, all the rules are bypassed given the risk of patient’s life.
Usage purpose restriction, one of the most important constraints, ensures patient’s
record being used is in the right direction. It is important to note that usage
purpose should be continuously controlled during usage session.
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4.4.2 Obligations
Obligation refers to any duty that needs to be executed by user or system during the
usage session. For example, a ”delete” action is required to be performed after the
usage license is expired while ”notify” needs to be performed before and after the use
of data.
Deletion and Store “Delete” is an action that needs to be performed by user or
system when the usage policies or rights are expired. Other action is “store”.
In distributed setting, data is shared among di↵erent organisational entities in
the network. It is possible that data is temporarily stored at the destination
repository.
Notification is very important in order to keep patient informed about the use of his
record. Notification allows patient to know who uses his record at what time for
what purpose. Notification can take place before or after the usage of content.
Logging (usage log) is a way to capture the usage information when data is used
at remote client application. It records all necessary information before, during
and after the use of content. Then, it is used to verify or check the validity and
legality of the content usage. The information can be the actions executed on
content, user identity, time at which user uses content, location and device.
4.5 Access and Usage Control Model Selection
In this section, we present the summary of the access and usage control requirements
and then we point out which model is suitable to be used in our context. It is worth
noting that the description of each model including its weakness and strength was
presented in Chapter 2. This section is based largely on the information presented in
Chapter 2. The usage control requirements listed are the general requirements for ex-
pressing privacy-aware usage control policies. The usage control model that we choose
to be used in our context must be able to respond to all these requirements. For exam-
ple, we state the usage control policy taking from Wallonie Healthcare Network [54],
it says:
“any user in role cardiologist can read patient’s past heart record if
and only if they have patient’s consent, they are on-duty at the time of
usage and they use past heart record with the support of hospital’s de-
vices. Moreover, they are obliged to notify patient on every access. They
are also obliged to allow the system to log their activities during usage
session. In addition to that the usage of that record is eligible for heart-
treatment purpose only.”
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From that usage statement and the requirements in Figure 4.4, we can identify the
entities required in the model as presented below. The model that will be used to
express such policy must consists of these required entities.
1. User is an entity representing a person who uses the data. If we refer to policy
statement above. It corresponds to the term “any user”.
2. Role is an entity presenting a profession or job responsibility of an individual or
a group of user. If we refer to policy statement above. It corresponds to the term
“Cardiologist”.
3. Data is an entity representing the data or resource to be used by user. If we refer
to policy statement above. It corresponds to the term “past heart record”.
4. Action is an entity expressing the allowed action on data. If we refer to policy
statement above. It corresponds to the term “read”.
5. Condition is an entity that can be used to express any constraints on data usage.
For example, patient’s consent is considered as constraint on data usage.
6. Context is an entity used to express contextual information that need to be
valid during usage session. For example, time of use is considered as contextual
information that needs to be validated when using data. If we refer to policy
statement above. It corresponds to the term “using the record when they
are on-duty” and “using hospital’s device to access the record”.
7. Purpose is an entity used to express purpose of using data. It is an important
entity for expressing privacy aware policy. If we refer to policy statement above.
It corresponds to the term “heart-treatment”.
8. Obligation is an entity representing the duty that user needs to fulfil before or
after using data. For example, notifying data subject or accepting system to log
usage activities are the forms of obligation. If we refer to policy statement above.
It corresponds to the term “notify patient” and “log their activities”.
We will present in detail below the access and usage control model selection. We look at
each access and usage control model presented in Chapter 2 and compare their entities
(entities in the core model) against the required entities we listed above. Then, we
conclude our discussion and point out which access and usage control model should be
used in our case. The comparison between the required entities and the entities in the
core of the existing models is presented in Table 4.1.
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User Role Data Action Condition Context Purpose Obligation
DAC Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
MAC Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No
RBAC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
P-RBAC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
OrBAC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
ABAC Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
HBAC Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
GBAC Yes No Yes Yes No No No No
RelBAC Yes No yes Yes No No No No
UCON Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Table 4.1: The comparison between the required entities and the entities in the core
of the existing models.
1. DAC is a simple access control model where the data subject has the rights to
determine the access permission on data. DAC is the basic model where there
are only three entities in the model: user, data and action (see Table 4.1). DAC
is not able to support the complex privacy policy because of the absence of many
entities in its core model, such as the ability to express user’s role, purpose of
use, obligation and context. Consequently, it can not be used in our context.
2. MAC provides better control on data compared with DAC. In MAC model, sys-
tem constrains the ability of a subject to access or perform some sort of actions to
an object. Subjects and objects each carry a set of security attributes and when a
subject makes an attempt to access an object, an authorisation rule controlled by
the system examines these security attributes. The security attributes, in MAC,
are kind of conditions on user and data. Similar to DAC, MAC’s core model
does not provide the ability to express role, purpose and obligation (see Table
4.1) since the MAC’s core model supports only the expression of user, action,
data and condition on user and data. Thus, it can’t be used in our context.
3. RBAC is a well-known model where the access authorisation is formulated around
role of user. Users in the same role experience the same level of control. The
traditional RBAC model consists of four entities: user, role, data and action.
The use of roles to control access can be an e↵ective means for developing and
enforcing complex enterprise-specific security policies and for facilitating the se-
curity management process since it allows policy administrator to separate the
user management domaine from policy management domaine. Although RBAC
is better than DAC and MAC, it is still not su cient to be used in our context
because the absence of other entities allowing to express privacy policy such as,
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purpose, condition, obligation and context (see Table 4.1).
4. P-RBAC is an extension of RBAC model. The extension aims at making the
traditional RBAC to support the expression of privacy policies. Three entities,
such as Condition, Obligation and Purpose, were added to the core model of
RBAC. These entities allows for expressing complex and privacy-sensitive poli-
cies. P-RBAC supports nearly all our required entities (see Section 4.5), except,
it does not have the concept of “contextual information”.
5. OrBAC is a model where the access permission is formulated around an entity
called “organisation”. OrBAC has a concept of abstract and concrete level, which
make it di↵erent from other models. OrBAC has similar concept to that of RBAC
and provides also the ability to express complex policies. However, purpose and
obligation are not directly expressed in the core model (see Table 4.1).
6. ABAC is a logical model that is distinguishable from other models because it
controls access to objects by evaluating rules against the attributes of the en-
tities (subject and object) actions and the environment relevant to a request.
Attributes in ABAC are general concept and ABAC does not define them explic-
itly. The concept of role, purpose, obligation does not exist in ABAC (see Table
4.1) although those entities can be expressed informally as the attributes of user
or data. ABAC is general model to be used to express general access control
policy. It was not originally designed to address privacy policy. Hence, it lacks
some features to support our defined requirements (see Section 4.5).
7. HBAC is a model where the access authorisation is based on the access history
of user. The access permission is formulated around user, data, action and the
access history of user. This model is not specifically designed for addressing
access control to private data; hence, the entities such as purpose, obligation
and condition are absent in its core model (see Table 4.1). This rules out the
possibility of using this model in our context.
8. GBAC is a model where the access authorisation is formulated around group
where the user belongs. This model is similar to RBAC, the only di↵erent is that
RBAC formulates the policy based on role of user (represent the profession or
responsibility of user).
9. RelBAC is a model where access authorisation is based on the relationship be-
tween user and data owner. There are no concept of role, purpose or obligation
that are required to express privacy policy in RelBAC. Consequently, it can not
be used in our context.
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10. UCON is a usage control model proposed by [41]. It is designed to address the
control of usage of general data. That’s why there is no concept of purpose in
its core model. UCON does provide some features that can be used to express
privacy-aware usage control policies, such as condition and obligation. However,
it does not explicitly provide a way to express “purpose” in its core model (see
Table 4.1). Moreover, UCON permission assignment, based on “subject” not
“role”, which makes it di cult to be used in distribute environment.
Discussion. Based on our study the properties of each access and usage control
model and the comparison of entities of each model as shown in Table 4.1, we
conclude that for access control model, we can use P-RBAC, since this model was
originally designed for controlling the access to private data. P-RBAC is able to
express not only highly complex access control policy, but also the access control
to private data. The present of the entities, such as “Purpose”, “Obligation”
and “Condition” in the core model are for that objective. While P-RBAC is
our choice for access control, UCON fits with our requirements of usage control,
but the extension is required since the original UCON model does not provide
su cient features to support the expression of privacy-aware usage control policy.
For example, the absence of the entity “purpose” in the model. Consequently,
we propose an extension of UCON model we term as “Privacy-Aware UCON”,
which will be presented in detail in Section 4.6.
4.6 Usage Control Model: Privacy-Aware UCON.
With the usage control requirements we listed in Section 4.5, we see the need to have a
usage control model that is able to address those requirements, the most important of
which are the obligation, purpose and condition. These three entities are the driving
force, allowing for the expression of complex and fine-grain privacy-aware usage control
policies. According to our study published in 7th International Conference on Health
Informatic [11][10] (see also Section 4.5 and Table 4.1), we conclude that UCON, pro-
posed by Jaehong Park and Ravi Sandhu [41], is the suitable one. However, some
extensions are required for the traditional UCON to support the requirements we have
identified. We introduce below the existing UCON and the extended one.
4.6.1 UCON Model
UCON encompasses traditional access control, trust management, and digital rights
management and goes beyond them in its definition and scope. UCON enables fine-
grained control over usage of digital objects than that of traditional access control
policies and model. UCON model consists of six components (see Figure 4.6), such as
subjects, rights, objects, conditions, authorisation rules and obligations.
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1. Subjects are entities associated with attributes, and hold and exercise certain
rights on object. The attributes are properties of subjects that can be used in
authorisation process. For example, subject’s identification.
2. Objects are entities that subjects hold rights on. Objects can be anything, such
as multimedia contents or system resources. In general, objects are associated
with attributes that can be used in the authorisation process like those of subjects.
3. Rights are privileges that subjects can hold on an object. Rights consist of a
set of usage functions that enable a subject’s access to object. Rights associates
subjects and objects. In general, rights can be viewed as the usage actions allowed
to perform on object, such as view, modify, copy or transfer. UCON rights can
be divided into many functional categories as presented above. The two most
fundamental rights categories might be a view and a modification. They are
denoted as V and M respectively so we write R = {V, M}. Modification includes
change to an existing digital object and creation of a new object that reuses an
original digital object.
4. Authorisation rules are set of requirements that should be satisfied before
allowing subjects access to objects or use of objects. There are two types of
authorisation rules: Rights-related Authorisation Rules (RAR) and Obligation-
related Authorisation Rules (OAR).
• The RAR is used to check if a subject has valid privilege to exercise certain
rights on a digital object. Examples include identities or roles verification,
capabilities or properties checking, proof of payments, etc.
• OAR is used to check if subject has fulfilled or agreed to fulfil their obliga-
tion, for instance, notify to patient or agreed on logging the usage activities.
5. Conditions are set of decision factors that the system should verify at authori-
sation process along with authorisation rules before allowing the use of data.
6. Obligations are mandatory requirements that subject has to perform before or
after exercising rights on an object. There exist two possible obligations, namely,
pre-obligation and post-obligation.
• Pre-obligation refers to any actions that need to be performed before the
usage session starts (e.g. in e-health, subject may have to notify patient
before using patient’s record).
• Post-obligation refers to any actions that need to be performed after the
use of content (e.g. delete patient’s record after using it).
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Figure 4.5: Traditional and extended UCON model components with purposes and
roles extension [41].
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4.6.2 Extended UCON: Privacy-aware UCON
UCON is a general usage control model that is not designed to particularly address
the control of sensitive private data (see Section 4.5 and Table 4.1 for the requirements
and comparison between di↵erent models). Thus, for our consideration, we propose
to extend it by adding “purposes” (see Figure 4.6) component into the model to
make it suitable to express the privacy-aware policies. Furthermore, to facilitate policy
management, we propose a second adjustment. We add “roles” (see Figure 4.6) entity
to the model. Instead of assigning the usage permission directly to the users (or
subjects), we propose to assign usage permission to an abstract entity called ”roles”.
Roles, in an organisational structure, generally refer to profession, job title or the
responsibility of an individual or a group of people. For example, administrator,
marketing manager or receptionist.
With this modification, subjects are assigned to roles (see the requirements in Section
4.5 and Table 4.1) and everyone in the same role has the same level of usage rights.
Assigning a usage permission to a group of users instead of individual user allows
policy maker to minimise user management issue. When data with its usage policy
are moved to another system away from the source system, in general, only users
stipulated in usage policy could use data if a direct user to data permission assignment
method is used. Using direct assignment between user and data permission in context
of distributed environment can pose a burden for user as well as policy management
since every system in the network needs to have a full list of users, not only the users
in their system, but also the lists of users of other systems in the network. Any change
in user management structure in a system, other systems in the network need also
to update it; this causes the management overload. Seeing the di culties more than
the eases, we propose to use “role to data permission assignment” instead of “user to
data permission assignment”. Using role allows system engineer to separate the user
management domain and the management can be done internally, only “role” needs to
be managed globally.
To adjust to the change of the entity in the core UCON model, we introduce another
type of authorisation rules over the two existing rules ( RAR and OAR). We term it
as ”PAR: Purpose-related Authorisation Rules”.
PAR is used to check if the purpose claimed by subject (or user) is valid. The
validation of PAR depends on type of purpose. For example, if the purpose is
to perform “heart surgery”. What we need to validate is that user really uses
the data for “heart surgery” and not for other purpose. In this example, a good
source of information to validate the “heart surgery” purpose is the operation
room since user can not claim that he uses data for heart surgery purpose if
he has not reserved the operation room. Operation room reservation is a good
justification or a proof for “heart surgery” purpose.
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4.6.3 Privacy-aware UCON Model Expression
In the privacy-aware UCON in Figure 4.6, we have the following entities.
• Subjects (S); Role of subject (R); Objects (O); Rights on object (Ri);
• Conditions (C); Obligations (OB); Purposes (P);
In traditional UCON the authorisation is done based on the individual subject, there
is no concept of role. However, the the privacy-aware UCON, the concept of role is
introduced. Thus, the right on object is no longer assigned to individual subject, but
to the role representing the profession of subjects. The role to subject assignment
(RA) is the function that assigns a user to a particular role. The subject to role
assignment is expressed as (S,R). Example, RA(David, Physician): David is a “subject”
and “physician” is a role.
In privacy-aware UCON, authorisation process can be done through role based on
the authorisation rules (AR) (RAR, OAR and PAR). Ri(R,O) means a set of authorised
rights for role R on object O. The authorisation can be done in di↵erent ways.
• Ri(R, O)= AR(At(S), At(O)); authorisation is done by checking certain authori-
sation rules based on subjects’ attributes (At(S)) and objects’ attributes (At(O)).
• Ri(R, O)= AR(At(S), At(O), C); authorisation is done by checking certain au-
thorisation rule based on subjects’s attributes, objects’ attributes and certain
conditions.
• Ri(R, O)= AR(At(S), At(O), C, P); authorisation is done by checking certain
authorisation rule based on subjects’ attributes, objects’ attributes, certain con-
ditions and purpose of use.
• Ri(R, O)= AR(At(S), At(O), C, OB, P); authorisation is done by checking cer-
tain authorisation rule based on subjects’ attributes, objects’ attributes, certain
conditions, obligations and the purpose of use.
For example, a usage policy for medical records sates that “user in role physician is
allowed to read blood-test records for purpose of diagnosis” if and only if the physician
is on duty and he needs to notify to system when he starts usage session. Then, based
on the formulation above, we can express the above policy as follows.
Read(physician, blood-test)=AR(on-duty, notify, diagnose) Supposing that the policy
wants to limit the access for only user David in role “physician” for the blood-test of
Dara, then we can formulate the following role.
Read(physician, blood-test)=AR(At(physician)=David, At(blood-test)=Dara, on-duty,
notify, diagnose)
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4.7 REL Profile for Access Control Models
In Section 4.5, we discussed the usage control requirements and we identified the re-
quired entities for expressing privacy policies. In Section 4.6 we discussed the selection
of access and usage control model based on the requirements in Section 4.5. In this
section, we present ODRL and XACML profiles1 for di↵erent access control models
presented in Chapter 2 and the model selection presented in Section 4.6. We point
out which rights expression languages can be used to express access control policy of
which access control model. The main goal of this section is to select a standard policy
language given the selected model presented in Section 4.6. In order to do so, we need
to study the core model of each policy language and then compare the entities in its
core model to those of the access and usage control models we presented in Section
4.6. Although several rights and access control authorisation languages were presented
in Chapter 2, we focus only on two languages in this section: ODRL and XACML.
For other languages beyond ODRL and XACML, one can refer to our technical report
at [69]. Furthermore, the technical reports concerning ODRL profile for PRBAC and
XACML profile for RBAC can also be found at [19] and [8], respectively.
ODRL XACML
RBAC Yes Yes
P-RBAC Yes Yes
OrBAC No Yes
ABAC Yes Yes
HBAC Yes Yes
GBAC Yes Yes
RelBAC Yes Yes
UCON Yes Yes
Table 4.2: The list of access and usage control model and the policy languages. “Yes”
means the language can be used to express the policy of that model, “No” means
otherwise.
4.7.1 ODRL
Given its well-designed core model and its rich vocabularies, ODRL 2.0 can be used to
express di↵erent types of access control policies of the following models.
1REL Profile is the outline or description of the functionalities and components in REL’s core
model.
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RBAC: the classical RBAC grants access based on the role of user, every user in the
same role experiences the same degree of control over asset. The core model of
the classical RBAC consists of four entities, which are User, Role, Data (asset)
and Action. By comparing the entity model of RBAC and the core ODRL 2.0
model (see Figure 2.4), we found that, ODRL can be used to express the RBAC
policy by using some entities in its core model, such as party, associate class role,
asset, action and permission. In addition, ODRL can also express the context-
aware RBAC policy by using others entities in the core model such as constraint
or duty.
RBAC’s entities ODRL’s entities
User Party
Role Associate class role
Action Action
Data Asset
Table 4.3: The table mapping the entities of RBAC to those of ODRL. For more details
about ODRL, refer to Section 2.2.4.1 and Figure 2.4.
P-RBAC: P-RBAC is an extension of a classical model RBAC provides complete
support for expressing highly complex privacy-aware policies. Its focus is to pro-
tect the data containing personally identifiable information and as such privacy-
sensitive, taking into account characteristics such as purposes, conditions and
obligations. These three entities allow for the expression of highly complex
privacy-related policy. Using the ODRL to express the P-RBAC access control
model is a good match because all the entities required in P-RBAC are available
in core ODRL 2.0 model. Beside of the entities such as subject (party in ODRL),
role, action and object (asset in ODRL), ODRL introduces others entities such
as duty and constraint where duty can be mapped to obligation in P-RBAC and
Constraint can be mapped to Condition and Purpose. For more details, one can
go to our technical report “ODRL profile for PRBAC” at [19].
OrBAC: OrBAC model is based on three principles: organisation, concrete and ab-
stract level and context. Like other access control models, concrete authorisation
in OrBAC relies on three entities, which are subject, action and object. Typi-
cally, subject in concrete level is mapped to a role in abstract level where action
is mapped to activity and object is mapped to view (see Section 2.1.2.4 for more
details). By comparing the data model of ODRL 2.0 and the core model of Or-
BAC, we found that ODRL can partially be used to express the access policy in
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OrBAC model. However, it is not able to cover all requirements and use case
scenarios in OrBAC. For example, in OrBAC, there is a possibility to express a
separate rule for the obligation (known as duty entity in ODRL). In ODRL, there
is no direct link between policy entity and duty. Duty is considered as a part
of permission. Thus, it is hard to express a duty as a separate rule in ODRL.
For permission and prohibition, they can easily be expressed in ODRL 2.0. One
more obstacle is the concept of abstract and concrete authorisation introduced
in OrBAC, as ODRL does not have this concept, it is not possible to use ODRL
to express both levels of authorisation together. However, ODRL can be used to
express the abstract authorisation in OrBAC.
P-RBAC’s entities ODRL’s entities
User Party
Role Associate class role
Action Action
Data Asset
Condition Constraint
Purpose Constraint
Obligation Duty
Table 4.4: The table mapping the entities of P-RBAC to those of ODRL. For more
details about ODRL, refer to Section 2.2.4.1 and Figure 2.4.
ABAC: ABAC is an access control model where the access right is decided by a set
of the attributes associated with user. Each attribute is a distinct discrete and
possibly unrelated field. The access authorisation is based on the comparison
between the attributes’ values presented by user to the predefined values in the
system. Given the characteristic of ABAC, we found that ODRL can be used to
express the access policy of ABAC model by considering all the entities such as
party, role, asset, duty and constraints as the separate attributes.
GBAC: GBAC is a classical access control model that has been deployed in various
application and system. In GBAC, access is granted based on group, and users
under the assigned group can exercise the same level of right. GBAC can be
expressed by using ODRL, associate class “role” in ODRL 2.0 contains an at-
tribute called “scope”, which have two possible values: “individual” and “group”.
“Individual” indicates that the policy set is for an individual person while group
indicates the policy for a group of people. With this feature, we can use ODRL
to express the GBAC model. It is important to note that the entities of GBAC
are the same as those of RBAC.
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P-RBAC’s entities XACML’s entities
User Subject
Role Subject
Action Action
Data Resource
Condition Condition
Purpose Condition
Obligation Obligation
Table 4.5: The table mapping the entities of P-RBAC to those of XACML. For more
details about XACML, refer to Section 2.2.5.1.
4.7.2 XACML
Although XACML is designed primarily for attribute-based access control policy, it can
be used to express number of other access control models, such as RBAC, P-RBAC
and OrBAC.
RBAC, GBAC and P-RBAC: XACML can be used to expresses both RBAC and
PRBAC’s policies. The elements in both access control models can be mapped
to the elements of XACML policy model (see Table 4.5). Moreover, XACML
provides also a way to express obligation, which is a perfect match to PRBAC
requirements. Condition expression is also available in XACML. The XACML
profile for RBAC and P-RBAC can be found at [8]. In XACML [87], roles are
expressed as XACML Subject Attributes. The action is expressed “action tag”
in XACML while data is expressed in “resource tag”. Condition and purpose can
be expressed in “Condition” while obligation can be expressed in “Obligation
tag”. Table 4.5 provides a mapping information between the entities of P-RBAC
to those of XACML.
ABAC: rule in XACML is a combination of subject, action, condition, obligation
and purpose. These attributes can be related or unrelated to each other and
they are considered as separate elements in the rule evaluation process. Given
a characteristic of ABAC and the XACML profile, we found that XACML is a
good match for ABAC model. XACML controls access based on the policy set
defined in the system; request to resource must be complied with the rules defined
in the policy set. XACML allows policy-writer to write complex access control
policies in di↵erent contextual environment by exploiting some of its entities in
the core policy language model such as condition purpose and obligation. It is
worth noting that XACML is the attribute-based access control language.
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Figure 4.6: Subjects to role assignment policy in XACML: Dara is assigned to role
“Physician”.
4.7.3 XACML Profile for Privacy-aware UCON
In this section, we define XACML profile for privacy-aware UCON. This specification
defines a profile for the use of the OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) to meet the requirements for privacy-aware UCON. Use of this Profile re-
quires no changes or extensions to standard XACML Versions 1.0 [87]. We assumes
that reader is somewhat familiar with XACML. A brief overview su cient to under-
stand these examples is available at [87]. It is worth noting that this specification is
important for the implementation of our usage control and enforcement system, which
will be presented in Chapter 7.
Role and Subjects, in this specification, roles are expressed as XACML Subject At-
tributes in usage control policy. There is one exception: in a Role Assignment
< Policy >, the role appears as a Resource Attribute while the “subjects” ap-
pears as subject attributes in XACML (see Figure 4.7).
Objects, in this specification, objects are expressed as XACML Resource Attributes
in usage control policy.
Authorisation rules contains the actual permissions associated with a given role.
It contains < Policy > elements and < Rules > that describe the resources
77
(objects) and rights that subjects are permitted to use resources, along with
any further conditions, obligations and purposes of using objects. The rights (in
privacy-aware UCON) are expressed as < Actions > in XACML.
Conditions, Obligations and Purposes, these three elements in privacy-aware UCON
are expressed as < Conditions > in XACML policy.
We provide a privacy-aware UCON policy (example from Section 4.6.3) expressed in
XACML in Figure 4.6 and 4.7. Figure 4.6 is the policy expressing subjects to role
assignment where user “Dara” is assigned to role “physician”. Figure 4.7 is the autho-
risation rule that describes the resources “blood-test” and rights “read” that subjects
in role “Physician” are permitted to use resources, along with condition “user must be
on-duty”, the purpose must be for “diagnose” and user is obliged to “notify” system
every access.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a model for processing of private data applied to dis-
tributed healthcare. In that, we presented an execution models: physical execution.
The presented execution model is based on data processing scenario in healthcare in-
formation system where two healthcare institutions share their patient’s health records
based on a contractual agreement between both parties. The execution models (see
Figure 4.3) are for two di↵erent scenarios. Firstly, data transfer scenario, it happens
when one healthcare institution needs patient’s health records from their counterpart
for a particular purpose and those health records need to be transferred and temporar-
ily stored on requester’s local storage. Secondly, it is the usage scenario where users
(e.g. physicians) request to use the records recently transferred. As processing private
data requires consideration of various legal, contractual, organisational and technical
aspects, we studied di↵erent requirements for controlling such data. We presented three
requirements, included legal-, contractual- and technical requirements. As the result
from our study, we proposed the general usage control requirements for distributed
healthcare system. We published this result in 7th International Conference on Health
Informatics, Barcelona, Spain and the original manuscript can be found in [10]. Based
on the identified usage control requirements, we proposed a usage control model taking
into account the aspects of roles and purposes. We termed that model as privacy-aware
usage control model or Privacy-aware UCON. We published Privacy-aware UCON in
7th International Conference on Health Informatics, Barcelona, Spain and its original
manuscript can be found in [11].
Moreover, we also presented the analysis of access and usage control models based
on our defined requirements. We compare each model against a set of requirements we
defined and find out which model is best to fit our case. From our study (see Section
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Figure 4.7: Authorisation rule or permission rule in XACML: users in role “physician”
can read blood-test records if and only if he is on-duty and every time he accesses
to data, he needs to notify the system. Moreover, the permission is for patient’s
“diagnose” purpose only.
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4.5) we see that most of access control models (like DAC and MAC) fail to respond to
the access control requirements (see Section 4.4) of such systems [10] since such systems
generally have very complex access control policies (see our study published in [13]).
The basic RBAC model, where access policy is formulated primarily around role, is not
also su cient. Other models, like OrBAC provides more expressing power. However,
it is not specifically designed for privacy-aware system. Based on our study published
in [13], we conclude that P-RBAC is the best candidate to be used in such system since
in that model the concept of purpose and obligation have been introduced and they
are well formulated. The two entities (purpose and obligation) (see Section 4.3 and
4.4) are indeed the most important elements required for expressing privacy policies.
The result of our survey on access control model for healthcare information system has
been published in the Fourth International Conference on eHealth, Telemedicine, and
Social Medicine [20].
While P-RBAC is our choice for access control, UCON is our choice as usage control
model (see Section 4.5). However, the extension is required in order to make basic
UCON to be su cient to express the usage control policy for private sensitive data.
This is because in basic UCON model [41], there is no concept of purpose, which
is important for privacy policies. We propose to extend UCON to support purpose
expression by introducing purpose as one of the core model components. Finally, in
this chapter, we also presented the REL Profile for Access Control Models and the
detailed XACML profile for privacy-aware UCON.
80
Chapter 5
Purpose Modelling
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, we presented the role of purpose in privacy policy and
the need to limit the usage of private data to only the purpose it intends for. In
this chapter, we mainly discuss the purpose definition and the modelling of purpose
as workflow. We also present the resources management and assignment for task in
workflow and the access control model for the system that use workflows. This chapter
is organised as follows. Section 5.1 is about purpose definition and purpose model is
discussed in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the modelling of purpose as workflow.
The access control for resources in workflow is discussed in Section 5.4. Finally, Section
5.5 is the summary of this chapter.
5.1 Purpose Definition
The goal of this section is to study the meaning of purpose. We aim at providing
formal definitions suitable for the enforcement of purpose restrictions. Based on our
work published in [11], we find that planning is central to the meaning of purpose [76].
We see the role of purpose in the definition of the sense of the word “planning” most
relevant to our work in [58].
Planning is the process of thinking about and organising the activities
or tasks required to achieve a desired goal [58].
We see also the role of planning in the definition of the sense of the word “purpose”
most relevant to our work [76].
Purpose is the object for which anything is done or made, or for which
it exists; the result or e↵ect intended or sought, a goal or an aim [76].
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Similarly, in dictionary [57], purpose is defined as the object towards which
one strives or for which something exists, an aim or a goal. By observing
the definition of the sense of the words “planning” and “purpose”, we see the similari-
ties. They are all about reaching a goal. Taking into account the meaning of “purpose”
and “planning”, it shows that purpose can be represented by a planning of tasks. In
order words, we can say that purpose refers to a goal behind executing a set of tasks.
For example, we withdraw money for purpose of shopping. To achieve shopping goal,
we may have to complete some intermediate tasks, such as going to withdraw money
from bank, driving a car, finding a parking lot, choosing items, paying, etc. Only after
completing those tasks, we can say we achieve our goal that is shopping.
Figure 5.1: Example of task graph containing 3 purposes : Heart treatment, Diagnostic
and Brain-treatment. Heart treatment is represented by a set of tasks: a, b, c, d, e,
f and h. Brain treatment is consisted of tasks: a, b, c, d, e, g and i. Diagnostic is
represented by “a, b, c, d and e”.
5.2 Purpose Model
“Purpose” is abstractedly modelled as a planning of tasks. It is defined by a set of
tasks and the relationships among them. The tasks are linked together in the form
of network of relationships that capture the intention, or more precisely, the purpose
of executing tasks. We call such network of relationships as a “plan”. The abstract
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model of purpose is then expressed in the form of task graph. This is the fundamental
assumption that forms the basis of our purpose model in this thesis. Figure 5.1 is a
task graph representing three purposes. This graph is based on the general procedure
for healthcare processing in hospital in Belgium elicited from the book written by Jean
Herveg and Anne Rousseau [44].
A task represents a single unit of work that needs to be executed within
a workflow definition. Task can be an automatically executable method
(background task) or it can need a user (physical person) to execute it.
5.2.1 Task Graph
Task graph (TG) is a graph in which each node represents a task to be performed. We
define task graph as an abstract model to capture a planning of tasks with only one
types of relationships: “Future task relation”, which is represented by the letter “F”
for simplicity.
Task graph is a directed graph with one sets of edges corresponding to one type
of relationship as discussed above. It is defined as TG = (T, F) in which T is set of
vertices each of which corresponds to a task. F is subsets of T ⇥ T, and respectively
correspond to F-relationships. The task graph satisfies the following condition:
• TG is a directed acyclic graph. It forbids circularity in the graph.
“Future task relation”, a task is a future task of another tasks if and only if it is
a following task that needs to be executed. For example in Figure 5.1, “e” is a future
task of “c”.
Definition 5.1: Path
A path is a list of nodes (n1, n2, ..., nk) such that there is an arc from each node to the
next, that is vi ! vi+1 for i= 1, 2, ..., k-1. The length of path is k-1. For example, in
Figure 5.1, a path represented P1 consists of 7 nodes, that are a, b, c, d, e, f and h.
Generally, a purpose is represented by a complete set of tasks, in which there is a path
from the first node (start node) to the last node (end node).
Definition 5.2: Task purpose mapping
Let ST be a set of tasks. A purpose (P) is mapped to a set of tasks and it is denoted
by the mapping Set-of-Task-Purpose: ST 7! P. For example, Figure 5.1, (a, b, c, d, e,
f, h ) 7! P1.
83
It is important to note that since our purpose modelling allows a task to be part of
more than one set of tasks representing di↵erent purposes, it implies that there are
relationships between purposes. We discuss purpose relationship in next section.
Figure 5.2: A purpose graph derived from Figure 5.1 showing the relationship between
P1, P2 and P3. Dashed line represents the partial relationship while solid line indicates
full relationship.
5.2.2 Purpose Graph
Purpose graph (PG), that expresses the relationships between purposes, is a labelled
graph with two sets of edges, each corresponding to one type of relationship. It is
defined as PG = (P, Pa, Fu) in which P is the set of vertices each of which corresponds
to a purpose, and Pa and Fu are subsets of P ⇥ P, and respectively correspond to Pa-
and Fu-relationships. Pa-relationship indicates that a purpose is partially related to
other purpose while Fu-relationship indicates that a purpose is fully related to other
purpose.
1. “Fully related”, a purpose is fully related to another purpose if and only if a
set of tasks representing that purpose is a subset of tasks representing the other
purpose. In Figure 5.1 and 5.2, P3 is fully related to P1 and P2. This is because
P3 is represented by a set of tasks (a, b, c, d, e) that is a subset of a larger set
of tasks, which is (a, b, c, d, e, f, h) representing purpose P1 and (a, b, c, d, e,
g, i) representing P2.
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Definition 5.3: Purpose relationship (fully related)
Let P1 and P2 be two di↵erent purposes. ST1 and ST2 are two sets of tasks where
ST1 and ST2 are mapped to P1 and P2, respectively. P1 is fully related to P2, if
and only if ST1 ⇢ ST2.
2. “partially related”, this relationship indicates that there is at least one task
being shared by the two or more purposes. For example, in Figure 5.1, P1 and
P2 are partially related because both purposes have common tasks, which are:
a, b, c, d and e.
Definition 5.4: Purpose relationship (partially related)
Let P3 and P4 be two di↵erent purposes. ST3 and ST4 are two sets of tasks
where ST3 and ST4 are mapped to P3 and P4, respectively. Let ti be a task
where i2 N and N is the set of integers. P3 is partially related to P4, if and only
if ST3 \ ST4 6= 0.
Definition 5.5: Relations between Purpose
Let Pi and Pj are two di↵erent purposes. Let Pa and Fu be two di↵erent relations for
partial and full relationship respectively. Then, we have.
• (pi, Pa, pj), read as, pj is partially related to pi.
• (pi, Fu, pj), read as, pi is fully related to pj.
It is worth noting that we define purpose graph to be used in the “purpose validation
process”. This is because we argue that, in some cases, we can validate the claimed
purpose1 of access by looking at other purposes having relationship with the claimed
purpose. The purpose for an action a↵ects other purposes having relationship with it.
5.3 Purpose as Workflow
In this section we discuss the reason why we use workflow to model the purpose, which
is abstractedly modelled early in the form of a planning of tasks in task graph. We
1Claimed purpose is a purpose of accessing data.
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Figure 5.3: Example of workflow representing heart treatment purpose (P1). Figure
5.3 is derived from Figure 5.1.
also introduce the workflow definition and some of its properties.
5.3.1 Modelling Purpose with Workflow
A workflow [1] is a representation of an organisational or a business process in which
documents, information or tasks are passed from one participant to another in a way
that is controlled by rules or policies. A workflow separates the various activities of an
organisational process into a set of well-defined tasks. Hence, generally, a workflow is
specified as a set of tasks and a set of dependencies among the tasks, and the sequencing
of these tasks is also important. The tasks in a workflow are usually executed by several
users in accordance with organisational rules relating to the process represented by the
workflow. Given the property of workflow, we see that it matches to our modelling
of purpose in task graph. Workflow can accurately represent the abstract model of
purpose as the planning of task represented in the form of task graph.
An assumed purpose may lead to bindings of future action. For instance, if Edward
withdraws money from an account for purpose of buying a book, this implies that
at a later time, he should buy some books and should not spend money otherwise.
These future obligations are in perfect match with the workflow management model
wherein execution of a task can only lead to specific future tasks. The importance of
relationship between tasks in realising a purpose has also been pointed out in Section
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5.2. The representation of a business process using a workflow involves a number of
organisational rules or policies. Within the scope of security for resources management
in workflow, access control policies play a key role, and hence defining and enforcing
access control requirements becomes a key function of a Workflow Management System.
5.3.2 Resources Management in Workflow
A resource [53] is an entity assigned to a task and is requested at runtime to perform
work in order to complete the task. The assignment of resources to task is performed
based on the resource management rule. In general, resource is not limited to digital
resources (e.g. digital files); it can be anything. For example, if the task is to buy a
table, then the resource can be money. However, in this thesis, we focus mainly on the
management of digital resources, other than that is not in the scope of our work.
Resources assignment policies: a dynamic perspective on the resources involved
in workflow execution is the handling of the resource assignment to task of the workflow
at runtime. There are three di↵erent concepts for resources assignment in workflow
[53]: direct designation, assignment by role and assignment by formal expression.
1. Direct designation: a task is assigned to the resources directly. At run-time,
the workflow-engine can directly retrieve these resources in the repository and
place them on its work-lists. This kind of assignment is easy to handle for the
workflow administrator, because he is concerned with a single entity type: the
workflow executor. If a task is to be made available to a group of users, all
members of the group have to be assigned to the task one by one. The direct
assignment concept provides no independence of workflow model and organisa-
tional model. Therefore, the direct assignment mechanism is not a good choice in
industrial practice given the dynamic nature of the organisational or structural
change in such environment.
2. Assignment by role: most workflow management systems provide workflow
modellers with a role entity type [53]. Within this domain, one role entity is used
as a synonym for one or more resource entities. For example, “Cardiologist” de-
fines a role of users within an application system that inherit a common set of
access rights to resources. The main objective of the role model is the separation
of workflow and resource model, where changes of the organisational structure
do not a↵ect the workflow model directly. The use of roles instead of a direct
assignment also provides means of indirect workload balancing, because all mem-
bers of an authorised role to the task are notified about the pending work-item,
but only one member of this group needs to perform the activity.
3. Assignment by formal expression: the third form of resource assignment
is called the assignment by formal expression. In this case, not only the entity
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types of the resource model have to be known to the workflow creator but also
the relationship between these entity types and possible functions depending on
the workflow execution history. The attributes used in such formal expression
can either be dependent on the workflow instance, such as the information about
the workflow executor’s last activity or other contextual information such as time
allowed for task execution.
Based on the issues we outlined in Section 4.1.1 and the resources management require-
ments presented in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3), we adopt the third resource assignment
concept: assignment by formal expression. The detailed formal resource access control
model is presented in Section 5.4. The reasons to choose the third concept are: for
direct designation, this method can create administration burden because administra-
tor needs to assign each user to the resource. This can pose the problem when there
is an organisational change, when there is a change, administrator needs to redo the
assignment. For assigning by role, although this method can provide indirect workload
balancing because all the members of an authorised role to the task are notified about
the pending work-item, but only one member of this group needs to perform the activ-
ity, this method provides no granular control on resource since users in the same role
can exercise the same level of rights.
Figure 5.4: State machine representing di↵erent states of workflow execution.
5.3.3 Workflow Statuses
We use workflow system to enforce the purpose of access. When a workflow instance1 is
created, a unique identification is assigned to it. Then, that unique identification is used
as reference for controlling the execution of tasks that are parts of the workflow. The
information concerning the creation of workflow and the execution of the corresponding
1A workflow instance is a running instance of a workflow definition. Once a workflow instance has
been started, it can not be changed.
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tasks are logged into access history for later use. Once a workflow instance is created,
there are three possible statuses: achieved, interrupted or on-going. These statuses
indicate di↵erent states of workflow execution (see Figure 5.4).
1. Achieved indicates that the workflow instance is completed successfully. In
order words, the claimed purpose has been achieved because all the tasks of the
workflow representing that purpose have been executed successfully.
2. Interrupted indicates that the workflow instance is broken and the purpose is
not achieved. We model purpose as a sequence of tasks; hence, it is possible that
the execution of tasks may be interrupted. The interruption of the task execution
can result in the broken workflow instance (see Definition 5.6).
3. On-going indicates that the workflow instance is in active mode. In other words,
there are tasks that need to be executed and the times allowed for the execution
of those tasks are not expired yet (see Definition 5.6). It is worth noting that the
“on-going” can be changed to “interrupted”, if the immediate next tasks are not
executed on time.
By default when a workflow instance is created, “on-going” status is assigned to indicate
that the created workflow instance is in progress. Then, the workflow status can be
changed from “on-going” to “interrupted” or to “achieved” depending on the execution
of tasks belonging to that workflow. To change the workflow status, we need two “status
change” modules that analyse access-log and update the status accordingly. Below are
the two status change algorithms.
• On-going to Achieved: every time a task is completed, “status change” module
is activated. This module looks at the last executed task, workflow definition and
workflow to purpose mapping. If the executed task is the last task of the workflow
and this task is completed successfully, the “status change” module updates in
access-log the status of this particular workflow to “achieved”; otherwise, the
status is still in “on-going” state.
• On-going to Interrupted: every task or workflow has an allowed execution
time. The workflow’s lifetime indicates the maximum time allowed to complete
all the tasks in the workflow while the task’s lifetime indicates the maximum
time allowed to complete a task. To change the status from “On-going” to “In-
terrupted”, a “status change” module is activated periodically to analyse the
access-log for all the workflows with “On-going” status. Firstly, this “status
change” module selects from access-log all the information concerning the work-
flows with “On-going” status. Then, it examines one-by-one the lifetime of the
workflow and its corresponding last executed task. If the lifetime of the workflow
is not yet expired, it goes further to look at the expiration time of last executed
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task. If the task’s lifetime is expired, the status of workflow is updated to “In-
terrupted”; otherwise, “On-going” status is maintained. It is worth noting that,
either workflow’s lifetime is expired or task’s lifetime is expired, the workflow
status is updated to “Interrupted”.
5.4 Access Control for Resources in Workflow
As mentioned in previous section, we use the “assignment by formal expression” as the
resources assignment policy. Thus, in this section, we discuss mainly about the access
control model for controlling access to resources for each task of the workflow.
A workflow management system contains a set of workflow description W,
W = {W1,W2, ...,Wn}
each of which consists of a set of tasks, T = {T1, T2, ..., Tn}. Every task is carried out by
some actors on a set of resources and it is controlled and enforced by an access control
policy or resources assignment policies (for short policy). The authorised actors for
task and some access constraints are specified in access control policy. The assignment
of access control policy to the task is specified by the mapping function:
Policy-task: T1 7! policy
that maps each task to an applicable policy (see Figure 5.3). In summary, the workflow
description (1) is defined as a triple containing hT,E, SetPoliciesi, where E is a set of
arcs E ✓ T ⇥T . A purpose corresponding to each workflow is denoted by the mapping
Purpose-OF: W1 7! p.
In general, each workflow instance has limited execution time. Each task of the work-
flow has also a limited execution time. The workflow instance or task, that spends
more than allowed execution time, is considered as interrupted.
Definition 5.6: task and workflow instance execution time
Let L be an execution time variable of task or workflow instance. Then, we can define
the following functions.
LT: t 7! L is a function that maps a task to an allowed execution time.
LW: W ji 7! L is a function that maps a workflow instance to an allowed execution
time. Where “i” is the workflow definition number and “j” is the workflow instance
number.
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Figure 5.5: Access control model for resource (data) in workflow.
Access Control Model for Resources in Workflow
Every user u 2 U is assigned to a set of roles denoted by ROLE OF (u) and every task is
assigned to a policy. We use rule-centric as our policy model. Rule-centric policy [1] has
a complex form compared with data-centric policy [1] where data item are associated
with a set of intended purposes. Let RP be a set of policies, RP ✓ R⇥G⇥D⇥C⇥O⇥P
where:
• R is a set of user’s roles (r) where r 2 R. Role refer to a profession or the respon-
sibility of an individual person or a group of people, for instance, cardiologist,
radiologist, etc.
• G is a set of riGhts (g) where g 2 G. “Right” refers to the permitted operation on
data. The rights, such as “read”, “write”, “delete”, “transfer”, “modify”, “copy”
are the general operations on digital data performed by user. For example, user in
role of cardiologist can “read” past health records of patient, “read” is considered
as “cardiologist’s right ” on patient’s health records.
• D is a set of data (d) where d 2 D. Data is the digital resource that user needs
in order to execute a task of a workflow.
91
• C is a set of conditions (c) where c 2 C. Condition is a required constraint that
needs to be satisfied before allowing user to access data.
• O is a set of obligations (o) where o 2 O. Obligation is a duty that user needs
to fulfil before or after accessing data. For example, a duty to pay before down-
loading music.
• P is a set of purposes (p) where p 2 P . Purpose is a final goal of using data.
Then, we formulate our privacy-sensitive policy as follows.
1. The set of Data Permission DP = {(g, d) | g 2 G, d 2 D}
2. The set of Privacy-sensitive Data Permission PDP = {((dp, p), c, o) | dp 2
DP, p 2 P, c 2 C, o 2 O}
3. Privacy-sensitive Data Permission to role Assignment: PDPA ✓ R ⇥ PDP , a
many-to-many mapping of privacy-sensitive data permission to role.
4. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task Assignment: PTA ✓ T ⇥ PDPA, a many-
to-many mapping of privacy-sensitive policy to tasks (T).
Definition 5.7: condition expression
Let C be a set of conditions (c), where c 2 C. “c” has the finite domain of possible
values, denoted as DC where dc 2 DC. “c” is equipped with the relational operators
(Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of c has the form (c opr dc).
let c1 and c2 are two variables in the form of the atomic condition. Then, (c1 ^ c2)
or (c1 _ c2) is also condition. For example, using working-hour of user as variable, if
user’s working-hour is between 8am and 5pm, we can express: working-hour   8am ^
working-hour  5pm.
Definition 5.8: obligation expression
Let O be a set of obligation variables (o), where o 2 O . “o” has the finite domain
of possible values, denoted as B where b 2 B. “o” is equipped with the relational
operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of “o” has the form (o opr b). For
example, a payment obligation has the form: payment   50$.
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Example: 5.1: Access control policies for resources assigned to the tasks of purpose
“Heart treatment”.
Suppose that there is a set of policies applied to tasks “a, b, c, d, e, f, h” (see Figure
5.3) for purpose of “heart treatment”. We have the following rules.
1. For task “a, b and c”, the rule states “users in the role PHYSICIAN can READ
David’s blood records if they are on duty (between 8 AM to 5PM) and every time they
access this information, they need to notify David. Moreover, David’s consent to user
is required”.
Suppose that we have the following variables: Time (u) is a variable expressing the
time. Consent (u) is a variable expressing a consent of David to user “u”. Consent
(u) has two possible values: “Yes, means user is consented by patient and No, means
otherwise”. Notify (David) is a variable expressing the notification obligation. No-
tify (David) has two possible values: Yes, means it is required to notify; No, means
otherwise. With above information, we can formulate policy expression as follows.
1. PDPA to role “PHYSICIAN”:
PDPA= (PHYSICIAN, ((READ, blood records), heart treatment), ((Time (u) 
8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
2. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “a” Assignment:
PTA = a 7! (PHYSICIAN, ((READ, blood records), heart treatment), ((Time
(u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
3. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “b” Assignment:
PTA = b 7! (PHYSICIAN, ((READ, blood records), heart treatment), ((Time
(u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
4. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “c” Assignment:
PTA = c 7! (PHYSICIAN, ((READ, blood records), heart treatment), ((Time
(u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
2. For tasks “d, e, f, and h”, the rule states “users in the role CARDIOLOGIST
can READ David’s past heart records if they are on duty (between 8 AM to 5PM)
and every time they access this information, they need to notify David. Moreover,
David’s consent to user is required”. With above information, we can formulate policy
expression as follows.
1. PDPA to role “CARDIOLOGIST”:
PDPA= (CARDIOLOGIST, ((READ, past heart records), heart treatment),
((Time (u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
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2. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “d” Assignment:
PTA = d 7! (CARDIOLOGIST, ((READ, past heart records), heart treatment),
((Time (u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
3. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “e” Assignment:
PTA = e 7! (CARDIOLOGIST,, ((READ, past heart records), heart treatment),
((Time (u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
4. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “f” Assignment:
PTA = f 7! (CARDIOLOGIST,, ((READ, past heart records), heart treatment),
((Time (u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
5. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task “h” Assignment:
PTA = h 7! (CARDIOLOGIST,, ((READ, past heart records), heart treatment),
((Time (u)  8am ^ Time (u)  5pm) ^ Consent (u)=yes), Notify (David)=yes)
5.5 Summary
We presented in this chapter, the definition of purpose. We defined the abstract model
of purpose as a planning of tasks [11]. It is defined by a set of tasks and the relationships
among them. The abstract model of purpose is then expressed in the form of directed
task graph (see Section 5.2.1). Given that the property of task graph has something in
common with workflow, finally, we use workflow as a formal representation of purpose.
Workflow is generally specified as a set of tasks and a set of dependencies among the
tasks, and the sequencing of these tasks is also important. This property matches well
to the meaning of purpose we defined. Since workflow is used as a formal presentation of
purpose, in this chapter, we briefly introduced the workflow model where the workflow
definition and some of its properties were presented. In that, we presented the resources
management rules and workflow statuses. It is worth noting that since our main
addressing issue is to control the access to resources when user executes a particular
task of the workflow, our work mainly connects to resource management rule. In
workflow, the resources, which are attached to each task, are not limited to digital
resources (e.g. digital files); they can be anything. However, in this thesis, we focus
only on the management of the digital resources, other than that is not in the scope
of our work. To formally model resource management policy in workflow, we proposed
an access control model for resources in workflow, where each task of the workflow
is mapped onto a policy. In policy, each permission on resources is assigned to role
and access authorisation is further enforced with conditions and obligations. To ensure
that user uses resources for the purpose he claims, we need an access control policy
enforcement. The enforcement technique will be presented in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Enforcing Purpose for
Privacy-aware Policies
In Chapter 5, we introduced the purpose modelling and access control model. In this
chapter, we address the issue of purpose enforcement for privacy-aware policies based
on the purpose model and access control model presented in Chapter 5. We propose
an approach to enforce purpose of access in access control system that uses workflows.
In our approach, the access authorisation is based on the estimation of the level of
certainty of purpose1 achievement, which is determined by purpose achievement pre-
diction 2 module. The prediction module is built using association rule learning method
where user’s access history and contextual information are used as the input data for
rule analysis. We argue that by using the combination of contextual information and
purpose achievement prediction, we can get a reliable purpose enforcement technique.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. We discuss the privacy-aware policy
enforcement in Section 6.1 in which we outline the purpose enforcement issues. The
result from our survey on di↵erent prediction and forecasting methods is also presented
in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 dedicates to purpose enforcement techniques. Section 6.3 is
about purpose achievement prediction and prediction value estimation. Section 6.4 is
about related work. Finally, Section 6.4 is the summary.
6.1 Enforcing Purpose for Privacy-aware Policies
In this section, we discuss the issues of privacy policy enforcement and the related
work.
1Purpose here refers to claimed purpose, which is the purpose of accessing data.
2Purpose achievement prediction is a probabilistic system estimating how likely user can reach his
claimed purpose after access permission is granted.
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6.1.1 Issues
Enforcing purpose of access has been a subject of study in many research literatures
[42][75][89][6][35] that address the issues of security and privacy protection for systems
dealing with sensitive private data such as healthcare information system [7].
In general, enforcing purpose of access means to ensure that user uses requested data
complying with claimed purpose and the data is not further used for other unauthorised
purposes. There are two main parts for purpose enforcement [42].
1. “Verification” is a process to prove that user has the right to use data for the
purpose he claims.
2. “Validation” refers to a process to prove that user can really achieve the purpose
he claims once access permission is granted.
Purpose enforcement is a complicated task. The intuition behind this is that in most
situations, it is not possible to get 100 percent certainty for purpose validation. This
is because purpose is similar to the future goal that user claims to achieve. Normally,
we do not know for sure, at the time of request, whether user uses data complying
with claimed purpose or not once access permission is granted. It is possible that user
claims to access the data for a purpose, but after permission is granted, he actually
uses those data for other unauthorised purposes. With above illustration, we can see
clearly the necessity to have a technique being able to predict the future achievement of
claimed purpose. Given that, we propose a purpose achievement prediction technique
built using the association rule learning [4] method. This technique is able to tell how
likely that user can reach his claimed purpose given current contextual information and
user’s past access history as background check. In section 6.1.3, we provide a survey of
di↵erent prediction and forecasting methods and a reason why we use association rule
learning, but not other methods.
6.1.2 Survey of Di↵erent Prediction Methods
Before arriving at the conclusion of using association rule learning method for analysing
the access log of user, we have studied di↵erent prediction and forecasting methods,
such as Markov Decision Process [65], Naive Bayes [34], Logistic Regression [47], k-
nearest neighbor algorithm [21] and Decision Tree [67]. However, we find that among
them, some can be used in our context: Markov Decision Process, Decision Tree,
Association Rule Learning and Naive Bayes, but with di↵erent degree of e↵ectiveness.
We discuss them in detail below. We will point out their advantages and disadvantages
when used in our context. We illustrate their weakness through example. Other
methods like Logistic Regression and k-nearest algorithms do not fit to our context
given our problem formulation and the data type and structure.
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6.1.2.1 Markov Decision Process
Markov decision processes (MDPs) [65] MDPS o↵ers a mathematical framework in
order to model the decision making in cases where outcomes are partly under the
control of a decision maker and partly random. MDPS is a discrete time stochastic
control process. In MDPS, at each time step, when the process is in some state “s” the
decision maker can choose any action “a” that is available in state “s”. At the next
time step, the process reacts by randomly moving into a new state “s’ ”, and it gives a
corresponding reward Ra(s, s0) to the decision maker. The probability that the process
Figure 6.1: Example of MDP with 4 states and 3 actions.
moves into its new state “s’ ” is influenced by the chosen action and it is given by the
state transition function Pa(s, s0). Thus, the state “s’ ” depends on the current state
“s” and the action “a” chosen by the decision maker. Markov decision processes are
an extension of Markov chains; the di↵erence is the present of actions (allowing choice)
and rewards (giving motivation). Conversely, if only one action exists for each state
and all rewards are the same (or reward is zero), a Markov decision process reduces to
a Markov chain [51].
The main problem of MDPs is to find a ”policy” for the decision maker: a function
⇡ that specifies the action ⇡(s) that the decision maker will choose when in state s.
The goal is to choose a policy ⇡ that will maximise some cumulative function of
the random rewards: P1
t=0  
tRat(st, st+1)
where we choose at = ⇡(st) and   is the discount factor and satisfies 0    < 1. For
example,   = 1/(1 + r) when the discount rate is r.   is typically close to 1.
How to apply MDP in our case. We can model workflow as MDP process where
task represents the state in MDP and actions allowed in each task represent the actions
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in MDP. The transition probability from one state to the others can be calculated us-
ing user’s past access history. In other words, the MDP model is built using the past
access of user as the trained data for the model.
When a user requests to execute a task for a particular purpose, we can consider the
requested task as the initial state of MDP and the last task in a set of tasks representing
the purpose as the ending state. What we want to determine is the “policy 1” for the
decision maker: a function ⇡ that specifies the action that the decision maker will
choose when in state s. ⇡(s) must contain all the tasks and actions that need to be
executed in order to reach the claimed purpose. In other words, ⇡(s) should be matched
to the workflow definition representing the claimed purpose.
In general, MDP policy ⇡(s) contains a set of actions and states that policy maker
needs to choose in order to reach a goal. What is in the policy is the optimal path
or the best choice given by MDP. Considering in our case where a task is a part of
di↵erent purposes (see Figure 5.1), user may execute that task for di↵erent purposes
with di↵erent frequency. If we use MDP, the policy always points to the purpose that
user executes more often and if we use MDP as the only decision factor, it may provide
the wrong answer. In order words, when user requests access to less frequent executed
purpose, the system will always reject the request because MDP always considers
optional path (the most visited path) as a choice.
MDP can be used in conjunction with other model such as association rule learning
to re-enforce the decision, but it could not be used as the single decision factor for
access authorisation to address our problem. Other drawback of MDP is the perfor-
mance, MDP requires significant processing time since in order for MDP to function,
we need to have the transition probability. The transition probability, in our case,
are calculated based on user’s past access history. The time required to perform the
transition probability calculation increases proportionately to the size of the access log
and the complexity of the workflow. This means that the bigger access log the longer
time required to calculate the transition probability. According to our experimental
work [23], we find that MDP needs significantly more processing time compared with
that of association rule learning method.
6.1.2.2 Decision Tree Learning
Decision tree learning [67] is a method, used in data mining, to create a model that
predicts the value of a target variable based on a set of input variables. Decision tree
learning uses a decision tree as a predictive model which maps observations about an
item or a set of items to conclusions about the item’s target value. In the tree struc-
tures, leaves represent class labels and branches represent conjunctions of features that
lead to those class labels. In decision analysis, a decision tree can be used to represent
1Policy, here, refers to a set of states and actions that user needs to follow and execute in order
to reach a given state.
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Figure 6.2: Example of decision tree with 4 purposes.
decisions and decision making. An example is shown Figure 6.2. Each interior node
corresponds to one of the input variables; there are edges to children for each of the
possible values of that input variable. Each leaf represents a value of the target variable
given the values of the input variables represented by the path from the root to the
leaf. There are three types of leaf: Interrupted, On-going and Achieved.
The decision tree can be formulated as:
(X, Y ) = (x1, x2, x3, ..., xk, Y )
Where the dependent variable, Y, is the target variable that we want to understand or
classify. The vector X is composed of the input variables, x1, x2, x3, x4 etc., they are
used for that task.
Apply Decision Tree. We consider a vector X= {Username, Role, Task, Right, Data,
Purpose} representing the features that need to be classified and the “workflow status”
is considered as the target variable we want to understand. What we want to determine
is the probability of Achieved, On-going and Interrupted given X (see Figure 6.2). The
tree is constructed based on the past access history of user for a specific period of time.
Decision tree can be used in our case, however, with large access history and highly
complex workflow, the construction and analysis of decision tree is a challenge.
6.1.2.3 Naive Bayes
Naive Bayes [34] is a method for constructing classifiers. Naive Bayes classifiers assume
that the value of a particular feature is independent of the value of any other feature,
given the class variable. For example, a fruit may be considered to be a banana if
it is yellow and has a length about 20 CM. A naive Bayes classifier considers each of
these features to contribute independently to the probability that this fruit is a banana,
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regardless of any possible correlations between the colour and length. Naive Bayes is
a conditional probability model: given a problem instance to be classified, represented
by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) representing some n features, it assigns to this instance
probabilities p(Ck|x1, . . . , xn), for each of k possible classes.
p(Ck|x) = p(Ck) p(x|Ck)p(x) (1)
The naive Bayes classifier combines this model with a decision rule. One common
rule is to choose the hypothesis that is most probable; this is known as the maximum
posteriori decision rule. A Bayes classifier is the function that assigns a class label
yˆ = Ck for some k classes as follows:
yˆ = argmaxk2{1,...,K} p(Ck)
nY
i=1
p(xi|Ck) (2)
Apply Naive Bayes. We consider a vector X= {Username, Role, Task, Right, Data,
Purpose} representing the features that need to be classified. It is worth noting that
X is actually the user’s request query (see Section 6.2.1). The workflow statuses (Ck)
(Achieved, Interrupted and On-going) are the classifiers. Given X and Ck, we can
define the following Bayes functions.
yˆAchieved = p(Achieved)
nY
i=1
p(xi|Achieved).
yˆInterrupted = p(Interrupted)
nY
i=1
p(xi|Interrupted).
yˆOn going = p(On  going)
nY
i=1
p(xi|On  going).
We need to find the argmax1(yˆAchieved, yˆInterrupted, yˆOn going). The access is authorised
if and only if argmax(yˆAchieved, yˆInterrupted, yˆOn going) = yˆAchieved. In order words, the
user’s request X is classified as “Achieved”.
According to our study in [23], Naive Bayes classifiers is similar to association rule
learning since both methods are built based on the basic probability concept [74].
However, in our context, association rule learning is more suitable. This is because
Naive Bayes classifiers assume that the value of a particular feature is independent of
the value of any other feature. This is not the case since in our model where user is
related to role, a user may have di↵erent roles and each role may contain many users;
a task can be a part of di↵erent purposes; a data can be accessible for di↵erent task.
1Argmax is the set of points of the given argument for which the given function attains its maxi-
mum value.
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This shows that the features are somewhat dependent. This special characteristic can
cause Naive Bayes to provide the result which is di↵erent from what we intend since
Naive Bayes classifier considers each of these features to contribute independently to
the probability while association rule learning considers these features to contribute
dependently to the probability. Moreover, in some cases, Naive Bayes provides wrong
answer. In order words, the answer is di↵erent from the result we expected. We prove
our claim by an example in discussion section (see Section 6.1.3.4). It is important to
note that Naive Bayes can be used in our case if we classify our data set into subsets
of features. That subset contains the features, which are dependent. Doing so, Naive
Bayes produces the same result as that of association rule.
Figure 6.3: Example database with 4 items and 5 transactions
6.1.2.4 Association Rule Learning
Association rule learning is a method for discovering relations between variables in
databases. It aims to identify the relationship rules discovered in databases using
di↵erent measures of interestingness. Based on the concept of strong rules [62], Rakesh
Agrawal [4] introduced association rules for finding the regularities between products
in large-scale transaction databases. For example, the rule {butter, bread} ) {milk}
found in the sales data of a supermarket would mean that if a customer buys butter
and bread together, he is likely to also buy milk. Such information can be used as
the basis for decisions about marketing activities such as, e.g., promotional pricing
or product arrangement. An association rule has two parts, an antecedent (if) and a
consequent (then). An antecedent is an item found in the data. A consequent is an
item found in combination with the antecedent.
Association rules are created by analyzing data for frequency if/then patterns and
using the criteria support and confidence to identify the most important relationships.
Support is the frequencies of appearance of the items in the databases. Confidence
represents the number of times the if/then statements have been found to be true.
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Definition. The problem of association rule mining is defined as: Let I={i1, i2, . . . , in
} be a set of n items. Let DI = {t1, t2, . . . , tm} be a set of transactions. Each trans-
action in DI has a unique transaction identification (ID) and contains a subset of the
items in I. A rule is defined as an implication of the form X ) Y where X, Y ✓ I and
X \ Y = ;. The sets of items (for short itemsets) X and Y are called antecedent (left-
hand-side or LHS) and consequent (right-hand-side or RHS) of the rule respectively.
Concepts. The confidence of a rule is defined as:
conf(X ) Y ) = supp(X[Y )supp(X) (3)
The support supp(X) of an itemset X is defined as the proportion of transactions
in the data set which contain the itemset. An example in Figure 6.3, the itemset
{milk, bread, butter} has a support of 1/5=0.2 since it occurs in 1 out of 5 transactions.
To illustrate the concepts, we use a small example from the supermarket domain. The
set of items is I={ milk, bread, butter, beer} (1 codes presence and 0 absence of an item
in a transaction) is shown in Figure 6.3. An example rule for the supermarket could
be {butter, bread}) {milk} meaning that if butter and bread are bought, customers
also buy milk. For example, the rule {butter, bread} ) {milk} has a confidence of
0.2/0.2=1.0 in the database, which means that for 100% of the transactions containing
butter and bread the rule is correct (100% of the times a customer buys butter and
bread, milk is bought as well). Confidence can be interpreted as an estimate of the
probability P(Y|X), the probability of finding the RHS of the rule in transactions under
the condition that these transactions also contain the LHS.
Apply association rule learning. We consider a vector X= {Username, Role,
Task, Right, Data, Purpose} representing the itemset. The workflow statuses (Ck)
(Achieved, Interrupted and On-going) is another itemset. What we want to determine
is the relation between X and Ck. Given X and Ck, we can define the following rule
confidence.
conf(X ) Achieved) = supp(X[Achieved)supp(X)
conf(X ) Interrupted) = supp(X[Interrupted)supp(X)
conf(X ) On  going) = supp(X[On going)supp(X)
We need to find the argmax(conf(X ) Achieved), conf(X ) Interrupted), conf(X )
On going)). The first access authorisation step is considered as successful if and only
if argmax(conf(X ) Achieved), conf(X ) Interrupted), conf(X ) On   going)) =
conf(X ) Achieved). The argmax equals confident of “achieved” means that the
vector X is classified as “Achieved”. After finding that X is related to “Achieved”,
we need to compare the confidence of conf(X ) Achieved) to the required confidence
value defined in access control policy. If it is greater or equal, the access request is
authorised, otherwise, the access request is rejected.
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Figure 6.4: Example database (access history) with 7 items and 9 transactions.
6.1.2.5 Discussion: Naive Bayes and Association Rule Learning
We claim that association rule learning is better than Naive Bayes classifier if we
do not classify our data set into subsets of features that are dependent as discussed
in Section 6.1.2.2. We prove by example in this section. Suppose that we have the
database recording the user’s activities when he executes workflow (see Figure 6.4).
The database contains 8 items: workflow instance id, name of user, role of user, task,
right on data object, object, purpose of access and the workflow status. Workflow
status has three possible values: “Achieved”, “Interrupted” and “On-going”. In that
database, there are 9 records.
At some point in time, user “David” in role “Physician” requests to execute task
“b” and perform an right “Read” on data “D1” for purpose “Heart treatment”. The
provided information forms a user’s access request “X”.
X={David, Physician, b, Read, D1, Heart Treatment}
Y={Achieved, Interrupted, On-going}
For simplification we use the following abbreviation: David= Da, Physcian= Ph,
Read= Re, Heart Treatment= HT, Achieved= Ac, Interrupted=In and On-going=On.
With this information, what we want to find out is the decision (permit or deny
access) that system makes: (1) in case Naive Bayes is used and (2) the association rule
is used.
103
Naive Bayes. Based on equation (2), we can define the following Naive Bayes
functions.
yˆAc = p(Ac)(Da|Ac)p(Ph|Ac)p(b|Ac)p(Re|Ac)p(D1|Ac)p(HT |Ac)
yˆIn = p(In)p(Da|In)p(Ph|In)p(b|In)p(Re|In)p(D1|In)p(HT |In)
yˆOn = p(On)p(Da|On)p(Ph|On)p(b|On)p(Re|On)p(D1|On)p(HT |On)
Based on the database in Figure 6.4, we can calculate the values of yˆAc, yˆIn and yˆOn,
as follows.
yˆAc =
7
9(
7
7 ⇤ 77 ⇤ 37 ⇤ 37 ⇤ 27 ⇤ 37) = 0.0074
yˆIn =
1
9(
1
1 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11) = 0.1111
yˆOn =
1
9(
1
1 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11 ⇤ 11) = 0.1111
argmax(0.0047, 0.1111, 0.1111) = 0.1111, thus, the request X is classified as either
“Interrupted” or ”On-going”, the access is rejected.
Association Rule Learning. Based on equation (3), we can define the following
rule confidence.
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) Ac) = supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT}[Ac)supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT})
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) In) = supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT}[In)supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT})
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) On) = supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT}[On)supp({Da,Ph,b,Re,D1,HT})
Based on the database in Figure 6.4, we can calculate the following rule confidences.
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) Ac) = 294
9
= 24 = 0.50
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) In) = 194
9
= 14 = 0.25
conf({Da, Ph, b, Re,D1, HT}) On) = 194
9
= 14 = 0.25
argmax(0.25, 0.50, 0.25) = 0.50, thus, the request X is classified as “achieved”, the
access is granted.
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From that example, we can see clearly that Naive Bayes and Association Rule
provide contradicting decision. According to Naive Bayes, the access request is rejected
while association rule provides positive response. But, in our context, which method
is suitable to be used? According to the information provided in database (see Figure
6.4), the access request “X” should be granted since among 4 workflow instances (1, 2, 3
and 4) that David has executed, two of them were completed successfully. This implies
that the success rate is relatively higher compared with Interrupted and On-going.
Naive Bayes provides negative response because Naive Bayes classifier considers each
of these features (X) to contribute independently to the probability and since David has
achieved other purposes more frequently with some of the features in X, this contributes
negatively to the probability. Other drawback of Naive Bayes is the processing time.
Naive Bayes has the complexity of O(K*(N-1)), where N is the number of features and
K is the number of records in database. Association Rule has the complexity of O(K),
where K is the number of records in database.
Naive Bayes could provide the same conclusive result to that of associa-
tion rule if we classify the data set into subset of dependent features. How-
ever, classifying the data into subsets of features requires a pre-processing
of data; hence, it is a time consuming process. This can result into a big-
ger processing time compared with association rule. For Decision Tree, it
bears the same challenge to that of Nave Bayes since in order for decision
tree to work we need to construct the three. With large access history and
highly complex workflow, the construction and analysis of decision tree is
a time consuming process. Thus, we conclude to use Association Rule for
analysing the user’s past access log over Naive Bayes and Decision Tree
since Association Rule is a simple process. Association Rule discovers the
relationship between features in database by counting frequency and then
calculating the confident of that relationship based on the frequency that
relationship appears in database.
6.2 Purpose Enforcement
In this section, we focus on access authorisation and purpose enforcement expression.
6.2.1 Concept: access request, authorisation and policy en-
forcement
User request: in workflow information system, when a user wants to execute a task
for a particular purpose, he needs to provide the following information: username,
role, task, right, data, purpose (see Section 5.4.1). This information forms the user’s
request. With the provided information in user’s request, system validates the request
105
Figure 6.5: Example of workflow representing heart treatment purpose (P1). Figure
6.5 is derived from Figure 5.1.
based on the access control policy (see Section 5.4.1) applied to the requested task
of the workflow. If the request is valid, user is granted access to data. There are
two processing steps when validating an access request (see Section 6.1.1): verification
and validation. In Figure 6.6, in verification process, system matches the information
provided in user request to that of access control policy applied to the requested task
of the workflow. User must be in role authorised to execute the task. The task must be
a part of the workflow definition representing the purpose user claims. The requested
data must be a part of the resources allocated to the task. Finally, the requested right
(or operation) must be the one, which is authorised to perform on requested data. If
all the attributes are matched, the system proceeds to purpose validation.
Purpose validation: as mentioned earlier, we use two types of information to enforce
the access control to data: contextual information related to task and purpose and
the purpose achievement prediction. The contextual information related to task and
purpose defined in access control policy must be valid at the time of access. For
example, if working-hour is a contextual information, user is authorised to execute the
task only during his working-hour. Once contextual information is valid, system needs
to calculate the purpose achievement prediction value using user’s past access history.
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Figure 6.6: Access control policy verification and validation process.
6.2.2 Purpose Enforcement Expression
The purpose achievement prediction module, a probabilistic system, estimates how
likely it is that user can achieve their claimed purpose. The estimation is done by using
association rule learning method [4] with the support of user’s past access history. The
required prediction value, a probabilistic value, is expressed as condition in policy by
policy-maker. Then, during policy validation, the estimated value defined in policy
is compared with the value generated by purpose prediction module at the time of
request. For example, if the policy requires 0.9 of certainties, the access is allowed if
and only if the estimated value provided by purpose prediction module, at the time
of request, is greater or equal 0.9. The second purpose enforcement parameter is the
contextual information. Each task or purpose is associated with a set of contextual
variables. When user requests to execute a task for a particular purpose, the contextual
information for the requested task and claimed purpose need to be validated. The
contextual variables are also expressed as conditions in policy.
6.2.2.1 Contextual Information
Contextual data [84] are the information surrounding user, data, task and purpose.
Contextual data can be anything, such as user’s personal data, location, time or other
environment information. For example, in Figure 6.7, the physical location of user
can be considered as contextual information. Each purpose or task has its own set of
contextual variables that are determined based on specific system’s requirements.
Definition 6.1: Contextual variables to task and purpose mapping
Let “p” be a purpose. Let V be a set of contextual variables (v) where v 2 V . Let “t”
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Figure 6.7: Example of contextual information for task “Admission”, refer to Figure
6.5 for more details.
be a task. Then, we can define the following functions.
PF: p 7! V is a function that maps a set of contextual variables V to purpose “p”.
TF: t 7! V is a function that maps a set of contextual variables V to task “t”.
Basic language for expressing the contextual variables (LC)
In this section, we include a simple language for expressing contextual variables in
policy. As mentioned earlier, the contextual variables are expressed as conditions in
access control policy (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4).
Definition 6.2: Language for expressing V
Let v be a contextual variable where v 2 V . “v” has the possible values, denoted as
Dv. “v” is equipped with the relational operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and , ”. The
condition of v has the form (v opr dv), where dv 2 Dv and opr 2 Oprs. For example,
suppose that payment-amount is the contextual variable and the payment needs to be
greater or equal 20$, we can write as follows. payment-amount   20$.
let v1 and v2 be two contextual variables in the form of the atomic condition. Then,
(v1 ^ v2) or (v1 _ v2) is also condition.
Contextual information mining for task and purpose. Normally, contextual
variables vary depending on the nature of task or purpose. Finding the contextual
variables is a case-by-case study basic. However, a rule of thumb is, firstly, to de-
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fine the meaning of task or purpose. Then, we find the requirements that need to be
checked when executing it. An example in Figure 6.7, “admission” consists of three
contextual variables: physical location of user (e.g. physician), physical location of
patient and information about insurance. Those contextual variables are important in
order to execute the task “admission”; without such information, the task cannot be
executed. For more details, one can refer to [84].
Figure 6.8: Example database (access history) with 7 items and 7 transactions.
6.2.2.2 Purpose Achievement Prediction
The objective of purpose achievement prediction module is to say, given user’s past
access history, how likely it is that he would achieve his claimed purpose when he
requests to execute a particular task for that purpose. An example in Figure 6.8, if
cardiologist “David” requests to execute task “medical check” for patient “Edward”,
for purpose of heart treatment; then, the prediction module should tell, after analysing
David’s past access history, the probability that David could complete heart treatment
after executing task “medical check”.
Definition 6.3: purpose achievement prediction expression
Let PA be a purpose achievement prediction variable. PA has possible values, denoted
as DPA; where DPA = [0, 1]. PA is equipped with the relational operators (Oprs)
“ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of PA has the form (PA opr dPA), where dPA 2 DPA
and opr 2 Oprs. For example, PA is greater or equal 0.70 (PA   0.70).
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There are two issues:
1. How to compute PA’s value? When user requests to execute a task for a purpose,
system needs to compute PA. The PA’s value, which is computed at the time of
request, is then compared to the threshold (PA) defined in policy.
2. How to determine the threshold of PA? How policy maker know which PA’s value
is good for their system?
The two issues are presented in detail in Section 6.3.
6.2.3 Example: Access Policy Expression with PA
We use the example from Figure 6.5. Suppose that there is an access control policy for
purpose HEART-TREATMENT (P1) at task “medical check (b)”. The rule states that
every user in role CARDIOLOGIST can READ a patient’s HEART TREATMENT
HISTORY for purpose of P1, if and only if user is present in the hospital at the time of
access and the required purpose achievement prediction is greater than or equal to 0.95.
Moreover, each time CARDIOLOGIST requests access, patient needs to be notified.
Suppose that “user-location” is the contextual variable representing the location
of cardiologist and PA is the variable representing the estimated value of purpose
achievement prediction. “Notify” is the obligation that user needs to fulfil. Then, we
can define the following policy (see Section 5.4 for policy expression).
1. PDPA to role “CARDIOLOGIST”:
PDPA= (CARDIOLOGIST, ((READ, HEART TREATMENT HISTORY), HEART-
TREATMENT)), (user-location= in-hospital ^PA   0.95), Notify)
2. The Privacy sensitive policy to Task Assignment:
PTA = b 7! (CARDIOLOGIST, ((READ, HEART TREATMENT HISTORY),
HEART-TREATMENT), (user-location= in-hospital ^PA   0.95), Notify)
It is worth noting that the bigger value of PA, the higher workflow succeeded rate of
the system. The required value of PA is generally defined in policy by policy-maker
and how to define that value will be presented in Section 6.3.4.
6.3 Calculating PA Value
In this section we present in detail how the system calculates the value of PA at the
time of request and how policy maker define PA’s value in policy (determining PA’s
threshold).
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6.3.1 Apply Association Rule Learning
Based on our study in Section 6.1.3, we conclude that Association Rule Learning
method is suitable to be used in our context. Thus, in this section, we present in
detail how we apply association rule to predict the purpose achievement. Since we use
access history of user in a system that uses workflows as inputs for rule analysis, we
introduce access-log structure defined specifically to be used in our system context.
6.3.1.1 User Access History Structure and Data Items
When user requests to execute a task for a particular purpose, system needs to log
the necessary information for later use. Based on our modelling of purpose and the
policy definition (see Section 5.4), the data items, that system needs to record in access
history, are: the unique identification of workflow instance (i), user, role, task, right,
data, purpose and workflow instance status.
Definition 6.4: access history structure
We define the following data items in access history: (i, u, r, t, g, d, p, s), where “t”
is a task, “s” refers to the status of workflow. (u, r, g, d, p) are the elements of policy
we defined in Section 5.4. “i” is a workflow instance identification number.
6.3.1.2 PA value Calculation based on Association Rule Learning
The PA value (see Definition 6.3) is actually the value of rule confidence, the confidence
of the relationship between the data provided by user in access request with the status
of the workflow instances that user has executed in the past.
Let J={u, r, t, g, d, p, s} be a set of items. Let H={i1, i2, . . . , im} be a set of
workflow instance identifications. Each identification, in H, contains a subset of the
items in J. What we want to find is the confidence of the following rule.
conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) Achieved)
conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) On  going)
conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) Interrupted)
In order for the system to grant access for a particular access request, the con-
fidence of the rule, {u, r, t, g, d, p} ) Achieved, must be bigger than that of
conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) On  going) and conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) Interrupted). More-
over, the confidence of the rule, conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) Achieved), must be greater or
equal to the PA’s value defined in policy.
111
Figure 6.9: Log Structure.
For example (see Figure 6.8), David, in role cardiologist, requests to execute task
“b”, a right “Read” on data “D1”, for purpose of heart treatment. Suppose that M is a
set of items containing {David, Cardiologist, b, Read, D1, Heart-treatment} (this data
set is actually David’s request query (see Section 5.4.2)). Then, based on the database
in Figure 6.8, we can calculate the confidence of the rule.
conf(M ) Achieved)= supp(M[Achieved)supp(M) = 2/72/7 = 1
conf(M ) Achieved)= supp(M[On going)supp(M) = 0/72/7 = 0
conf(M ) Achieved)= supp(M[Interrupted)supp(M) = 0/72/7 = 0
This means that the rule conf(M ) Achieved) is 100% true since every time M
appears in the databases, “Achieved” is also appeared. In other words, every time
David requests access to data for that purpose, the claimed purpose is achieved. In this
example, confidence of the rule conf(M ) On going) and conf(M ) Interrupted),
both are zero because, in database (see Figure 6.8), M does not appear with either
“On-going” or “Interrupted”.
6.3.1.3 Algorithm: Calculate Support and Rule Confidence
In this section we introduce an algorithm for calculating the support “supp()” and the
confidence of the rule.
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Terminology. DS is the data sequence. A-log is the access-log. Minimum sup-
port (for short min-supp(M)) is the required minimum number of M appearing in the
database [5] .
In order to calculate the confidence of the rule, conf(X ) Y ), we need to calcu-
late the support supp(X [ Y ) and supp(X) (see Section 6.1.3.3).
Definition 6.5: Data Sequence in access-log
Let DS be the data sequence containing the following data items: {i, u, r, t, g, d, p,
s}. Let DS-1, DS-2, DS-3 and DS-4 be the sub-sequences of DS where DS-1= {i, u},
DS-2={u, r, t, g, d, p}, DS-3={u, r, t, g, d, p, s} and DS-4={s}.
The algorithm: we split the problem of mining the support and calculating the rule
confidence into the following phases:
1. Sort Phase: A-log is sorted, with user-id (u) as major key and workflow instance
identification (i) as the minor key. The DS-1 is used in this case. This step
implicitly converts the global access-log into an access-log of user (AU).
2. Mining support DS-2 Phase: counting the number of occurrences of DS-2 in
AU. The support of a data sequence is defined as the fraction of transactions in
which a data sequence is present.
3. Mining support DS-3 Phase: counting the number of occurrences of DS-3 in
AU.
4. Rule confidence Phase: calculating the rule confidence based on the informa-
tion in Phase 2 and 3 and the defined min-supp. If number support of DS-3 is
less than min-supp, the rule confidence conf(DS-2 )DS-4) is invalid (or zero).
If number of supp(DS-3) is greater or equal min-supp, the rule conf(DS-2)DS-
4)= supp(DS-3)/supp(DS-2).
The algorithm 1 provides the detailed calculation of the support of data sequence and
rule confidence.
Remark: Association Rule with non-existing data.
As user’s past access activities are used as the input data for rule analysis, there is a
drawback if we calculate PA’s value based entirely on association rule. This is because
association rule fails in case of new user who does not have any access history or new
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data that user has never accessed. Taking an example in healthcare information sys-
tem, suppose that there is a new patient admitted to the hospital for the first time, a
physician is assigned to this new patient, but he has never treated this new patient;
hence, physician does not have any past access to the health records of the patient. If
physician requests access to this patient’s health records, the system will always deny
his request; this is because patient’s health records does not appear in access log of
physician. How to solve this problem? We address this problem in Section 6.3.2. We
developed a method with the support of association rule learning to solve the problem
we described above.
Algorithm 1 Calculating support and rule confidence conf(DS-2)DS-4)
Inputs: A-log, min-supp, DS, DS-1, DS-2, DS-3, DS-4
Outputs: Rule-conf // rule confidence
Variables: AU // access-log of a user (U).
Rule-conf  0
// Begin sorting phase
while Not the end of A-log do
Search A-log and select data from A-log using DS-1 as key (see Definition 7.5).
Insert the selected data to AU
end while
// End sorting phase
//Begin calculating support DS-2 and DS-3
while Rule-conf==0 and not the end of AU do
Count supp(DS-2)
Count supp(DS-3)
end while
// End calculating support DS-2 and DS-3
// Begin calculating rule confidence
if if supp(DS-3) >= min-supp then
Rule-conf  DS-3/DS-2
end if
//End calculating rule confidence
Return Rule-conf
6.3.2 PA’s Value Calculation
According to Definition 6.4, PA’s value is given by a function that analyses the past
access history of user using association rule learning method, based on past access
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analysis variables. Past access variables are the units of data used for analysing the
access history of user.
6.3.2.1 Past Access Analysis Variables
We define four past access analysis variables.
• Past access of user for claimed purpose with requested data object
(PAV-1): this past access variable is used to find out if user has ever accessed
the requested data for the claimed purpose or not. If he did, was the claimed
purpose achieved? The confidence of the rule, conf({u, r, t, g, d, p}) Achieved),
is calculated. If he has never accessed requested data with claimed purpose or the
confidence of the rule is below the expected value defined in policy, we proceed
to second variable; otherwise system returns the “valid” response with the rule
confidence value.
• Past access of user for claimed purpose with other data (PAV-2): this
past access variable allows us to observe the past access of user indirectly (not
with the data being requested). For example, a patient (Charlie) comes to hos-
pital for heart-treatment. A cardiologist (David) is assigned for Charlie. Then,
before treatment, David requests access to Charlie’s health records for heart-
treatment purpose. David has never treated Charlie; hence, no past access records
to Charlie’s health records. However, David has experiences with other patients
with the heart-treatment purpose. We consider his credits with other patients
for the heart treatment purpose and take it into account. Again we need to cal-
culate the confidence of the rule (claimed purpose with other data) and if the
confidence of the rule is below minimum requirement, we proceed to the next
variable; otherwise system returns the “valid” response with the rule confidence
value.
• Past access of user for other purpose (having relationship with the
claimed purpose) with requested data object (PAV-3): this past access
variable allows us to observe the past access of user indirectly, particularly the ob-
servation based on the relationship between claimed purpose and other purposes.
In our modelling, a purpose may be a subset of other purpose. For example,
Figure 5.1, “brain surgery preparation” may be considered as a subset of “brain
surgery”. If user requests access for “brain surgery” and he has good records
for purpose “brain surgery preparation”, it is highly likely that he would achieve
“brain surgery” purpose. Like other past access variable, the confidence of the
rule is calculated. If the confidence of the rule is below the minimum requirement,
we proceed to the next variable; otherwise system returns the “valid” response
with the rule confidence value.
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• Past access of user for other purpose with other data object (PAV-4):
this variable is for purpose of verifying if user is a new user or the old one. The
result from this analysis does not provide the conclusive response since it does
not relate to the object and the purpose user claims. However, it can tell the
past activities of user working with the system. The confidence of the rule, the
rule that contains neither requested object nor claimed purpose, is calculated.
If the rule is below the minimum requirement, the system returns the “invalid”
response; otherwise system provides the valid response with precaution. Any
response with precaution may need extra control.
6.3.2.2 PA’s Value Calculation and Validation Algorithm
The detailed procedure for calculating the value of PA is presented in Figure.6.9. Sup-
pose that we have a set of items {u, r, t, g, d, p} as antecedent (left-hand-side or LHS)
and {status (s)} as consequent (right-hand-side or RHS) of the rule respectively.
• N is an integer representing the number of past access analysis variables. In this
case, we define N=4.
• RPA is a required value of PA defined in Policy.
• VPA is a PA’s value that system estimates at the time of request.
• Di↵From(k) is a function that returns the value that is di↵erent from k. For
example, Di↵From(p) returns the purposes that are di↵erent from p.
• A-log is the access-log.
• p is purpose of access.
• R-d is the requested data (d) that user wants to access.
• Relationship(p) is a function returning the purposes having relationship with p.
Based on the definition of the four past access analysis variables defined in Section
6.3.2.1, we can define the following rules for the four past access analysis variables:
1. PAV-1: {u, r, t, g, R-d, p} ) Achieved
2. PAV-2: {u, r, t, g, Di↵From(R-d), p} ) Achieved
3. PAV-3: {u, r, t, g, R-d, Relationship(p)} ) Achieved
4. PAV-4: {u, r, t, g, Di↵From(R-d), Di↵From(p)} ) Achieved
The algorithm 2 shows the detailed procedures for calculating and validating PA’s
value.
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Figure 6.10: Flowchart: PA’s value calculation and Validation
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Algorithm 2 Calculating and validating PA’s value
Inputs: p, A-log, RPA, R-d, PAV.
Outputs: Response
Variables: VPA
Response Invalid
V PA 0
i 1
while Response==Invalid and i<=N do
Calculate the rule confidence of PAV(i) using algorithm 1 and see also PAV’s rule
structure in Section 6.3.2.2.
V PA Confidence(PAV (i))
if if VPA >= RPA then
Response V alid
Exist the loop.
end if
i i+1
end while
Return Response
6.3.3 Example: PA’s Value Calculation
In this section we provide an example on how to calculate the PA’s value. Suppose that
a workflow definition (a, b, c, d, e, g and i) (see Figure 5.1) represents “brain treatment”
purpose. The policy mapped to task “a” is: PTA = a 7! (Physician, ((modify, D3),
brain-treatment), PA   0.75). John (physician) wants to execute task “a” in order to
modify data (D3) for purpose of “brain-treatment”. According to the policy, John is
permitted to access if and only if after analysing his past access records, the system
returns the PA’s value being greater or equal 0.75.
Suppose that we have the past access records (databases) like in Figure 6.8. Then,
based on the algorithm 1 and 2 in Section 6.3.2, we can calculate PA’s value as follows.
1. Past access of user with claimed purpose and requested data (PAV-1). Suppose
that we have a set G={John, Physician, a, Modify, D3, Brain-treatment}. We
need to find the confidence of the rule conf(G) Achieved).
conf(G) Achieved)= supp(G[Achieved)supp(G) = 1/72/7 = 1/2.
conf(G) On  going)= supp(G[On going)supp(G) = 0/72/7 = 0.
conf(G) Interrupted)= supp(G[Interrupted)supp(G) = 1/72/7 = 1/2.
With 0.5 rule confidence, it is not possible because the policy requires 0.75 con-
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fidences. Thus, we need to proceed to the next past access variable (PAV-2).
2. Past access of user for the claimed purpose with other data (PAV-2). G={John,
Physician, a, modify, Di↵From(D3), Brain-treatment} conf(G ) Achieved)=
supp(G[Achieved)
supp(G) =
3/7
4/7 = 3/4 = 0.75. With 0.75 rule confidence, John is permitted
to access and further verification of other past access variables (PAV-3 and PAV-
4) is not required.
6.3.4 Determining Threshold Value of PA
PA’s threshold value, that policy maker uses as condition in policy, is determined based
on the long time observation and learning of the system’s access-log. As mentioned
earlier, in access-log, each workflow is marked with three possible statuses: On-going,
Interrupted or Achieved. The PA’s threshold value is basically the number of achieved
within a defined periods of observation. It is important to note that the observation
time must be long enough and observation should be repeated number of times to have
a correct PA’s value. For example, within one-month observation of access-log, among
1000 workflow instances, there are 900 Achieved, 20 Interrupted and 80 On-going.
Thus, the PA’s threshold value is set to 900/1000= 0.90. The PA’s threshold value
may vary from time to time depending on users’ activities in the system, hence, the
adjustment should be done accordingly.
PA’s threshold value depends on two factors: Interrupted and On-going. If the
number of Interrupted and On-going increases more than the observed threshold for a
particular user, system does not authorise user to access and auditing may need to be
done in order to find the cause.
• The increase of interrupted workflows : there are two possible explanations. Firstly,
the workflows are interrupted because of the change of procedure and user does
not have bad intention to do so. For example, a doctor may wrongly diagnose
patient and needs to change from one to another purpose. The first workflow
instance execution may be marked as interrupted. Secondly, user creates many
workflow instances in order to get access to data for an illegal purpose. He created
many workflow instances, but he has never completed them.
• The increase of on-going workflows. there are also two possible explanations.
Firstly, there are the increases of activities in the system. For example, the
increased number of patient visiting doctors in hospital; hence, there are many on-
going dossiers, which are being processed. Secondly, user creates many workflow
instances in order to illegally access to data.
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6.4 Related Work
Many purpose enforcement techniques have been proposed [38][68] [17][20]. However,
they do not provide satisfactory solution to cope with many important issues in purpose
enforcement. One of which is how to ensure that users use data complied with the
purpose it intends for. Below are some works having direct connection with ours.
Byun et al [17][20] proposed a purpose-based access control of private data, a model
that relies on the well-known RBAC [24] access control model. They use user’s role
as the condition to enforce purpose of access by mapping roles to purposes. However,
this method is not so reliable and it is criticised to be ine cient in capturing purpose
of an action since roles and purposes are not always aligned and members of the same
organisational role may practice di↵erent purposes in their actions. For example, a
user in role administrator can access customer’s data for purpose of marketing and
planning.
Carl et al [81] proposed an automated method for enforcing privacy policies. The
authors modelled purpose as a planning of actions and they used a modified version of
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)1 to determine if the requested action is really for
claimed purpose. They argue that an action is for a purpose if and only if that action
is part of a plan for optimising the satisfaction of that purpose under the MDP model.
The proposed technique is for auditing. Auditing may be able to detect policy violations
after-the-fact, but it cannot prevent unauthorised access. Thus, this technique is not
suitable for controlling the highly sensitive data, such as health records. The di↵erence
between the author’s work and our work is that we focus on pre-enforcement of purpose
(a priori control of access), not a posteriori control (auditing).
Jafari et al [42] models purpose as the inter-related actions, which are expressed in
the form of action graph. The action (proposed by Jafari et al) has similar meaning
to “task” in our purpose modelling. In their method, the enforcement of purpose is
achieved by looking at the actions having relationship with requested action. The
authors argue that the purpose of an action is determined by its situation among other
inter-related actions. For example, in Figure 5.1, if a cardiologist requests to execute
the action “heart surgery preparation” for purpose of heart surgery, it is important to
check other actions that need to be executed before “heart surgery preparation”; in this
example “patient’s diagnostic” needs to be executed first. The proposed technique does
make sense, but it has many drawbacks. One of which is that it does not guarantee that
user could achieve the claimed purpose (use data for the purpose he claims) after the
permission is granted. It has no way to predict the future activities of user. User may
have executed the previous tasks correctly, but he may now have the bad intention for
the requested task and after the access permission is granted; he would never complete
the next tasks in order to achieve claimed purpose. To complement the work of Jafari
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov decision process
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et al, we introduce the purpose achievement prediction and contextual information as
other dimensions to enforce the purpose of access.
The closest work to ours is the one proposed by Jafari et al [1] [6] that is similar
to the work in [42]. They proposed an approach to enforce purpose in access control
systems that use workflows. They proposed to encode purposes as properties of work-
flow; a purpose is mapped to a sequence of tasks. In the proposed technique, the access
authorisation bases solely on the mapping between user’s role and action in workflow.
However, this method cannot work e↵ectively with the model where one action is a
part of the actions that can lead to di↵erent purposes. This is because we cannot
predict the future action of user since purpose of access is the future action; user with
bad intention can change their mind after permission is granted to execute other tasks
that are not part of a sequence of tasks representing the purpose that user claimed
earlier. Thus, similar to the work in [42], we complement their work with our purpose
enforcement technique.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we mainly discussed about purpose enforcement technique for privacy-
aware access control policies. The enforcement of purpose is achieved by means of pur-
pose achievement prediction, which is built based on association rule learning method
with the support of user’s access history and contextual information. The algorithms
on how to calculate the predictive value were also presented in this chapter. The pro-
posed purpose enforcement technique has significant improvement compared with the
existing techniques [17][42] (see Section 6.1.4). One of the improvements is the ability
to predict the purpose achievement of user based on the observation of user’s past access
history and contextual information. We argue that our proposed technique is better
than the existing techniques. Firstly, the existing techniques are not able to predict the
achievement of user’s claimed purpose. Secondly, all the proposed techniques simply
use role or simple workflow to enforce the purpose of access and they work under the
assumption that all users in the system are the trusted entities; we assume otherwise.
The use of those simple constraints (role or workflow control) to enforce the purpose
is not su cient as illustrated in Section 6.4.
In order to show the usefulness of our proposed purpose enforcement technique,
we use a simple internal attack (internal intruder) scenario in healthcare information
system and illustrate that while our technique can detect and prevent access to data
in such scenario, the existing techniques [17][42] fail to do so.
Scenario: the data in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.8 are used in this scenario. Suppose
that David and John are in roles “Cardiologist” and “Physician”, respectively. David
and John have a bad intention to collect the health records concerning heart of pa-
tients and sell them to an insurance company. Such act is not authorised according to
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hospital’s policy. Suppose that we have three di↵erent access control policies for the
three purpose enforcement techniques.
1. Byun et al [17] uses role as purpose enforcement constraint. The policy states
that all users in role physician can admit patients to hospital while users in role
cardiologist can access patients’ health records concerning heart.
2. Jafari et al [1] uses workflow to enforce purpose of use. The policy states that
every user in role physician can execute task “ a to d (see Figure 6.5)” while role
“cardiologist” can execute task “e”, “f” and “h” for purpose of heart treatment.
3. In our technique, we use workflow and the result of the purpose achievement
prediction as the access authorisation constraints. The policy states that any user
in role “physician” can execute tasks “a” to “d” and user in role “cardiologist”
can execute tasks “e”, “f” and “h” if and only if the purpose prediction module
indicates that user could achieve their claimed purpose with 0.90 of certainty (or
PA=0.90).
Now David and John design a plot to illegally collect patients’ health records concerning
heart. The first technique by Byun et al [17] cannot prevent both of them from accessing
data since David and John are in the roles authorized to access those data. Both of
them can collect data as much as they want.
Second technique, Jafari et al [1], David can tell John to create many fake work-
flow instances, as John has rights to admit patients to hospital. John has rights to
execute task “a” according to the policy. Then, David with the role as cardiologist
executes tasks “e” or “f” to collect required patients’ health records. The workflows
created by John have never been completed; hence, purposes have never been achieved.
Again, David and John can collect data as much as they want since there are no other
constraints on access authorisation. For both techniques, auditing may be a choice to
further enforce the policy, but not without drawback. Auditing may be able to detect
policy violations after-the-fact, but it cannot prevent unauthorised access.
For our proposed technique, John can create many fake workflow instances and each
time he creates it, it is marked as ”On-going” if the remaining tasks have not been
executed. The more John has workflow instances with “On-going” status, the more
it a↵ects purpose prediction’s value since the prediction module takes into account
all the three statuses: “Achieved”, “Interrupted” and “On-going”. The increase of
either “Interrupted” or “On-going” workflows will impact on the confidence of the rule
conf(G) Achieved), which is the value of purpose prediction. When the confidence of
the rule goes down to below 0.90, the system blocks the access for John. Consequently,
limit the ability of John and David from accessing data.
With above example, we can see clearly that our technique is able to not only
detect the unusual behavior of user, but also prevent unauthorised access and minimise
damage to the system.
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Chapter 7
Usage Control Architecture and
Implementation
We concluded in Chapter 2 that we use a policy-based with the support of trusted
client application as a mechanism to control and enforce the usage of private data in
distributed environment. In Chapter 6, we introduced a privacy-aware policy enforce-
ment technique. In this chapter, we propose a usage control architecture supporting
purpose enforcement technique and the prototype implementation of such system in
the healthcare information system environment. The validation of the purpose enforce-
ment algorithms based on di↵erent data usage scenarios in healthcare system is also
presented in this chapter. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.1
presents a general concept of usage control and enforcement. Section 7.2 is about usage
control architecture. Section 7.3 presents in detail the prototype and implementation
of the usage control architecture. Section 7.4 is about the validation and performance
test of the proposed purpose enforcement mechanise. Finally, Section 7.5 dedicates to
the summary of this chapter.
7.1 Usage Control and Enforcement
A data provider gives sensitive data to a data consumer with conditions, which latter
become the requirements that restrict the future usage of data. When data provider
releases data, he would like to have a mechanisms on the consumer’s side to enforce his
requirements. He would also like to check consistency of policies, and if mechanisms
are capable of enforcing them. In general, usage control requirements are negotiated
between data provider and consumer, and enforced using consumer-side mechanisms;
upon successful negotiation, data is transferred from the provider to consumer and the
usage control requirements are activated. From this point onward, mechanisms on the
consumer’s side will enforce the requirements (which is, in general, not fully possible
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for all requirements, e.g. taking photographs of a monitor will always be an option).
We assume the consumer possesses a secure data storage and that, prior to usage, data
is routed through usage control mechanisms whenever it leaves the store. Figure 7.1
shows a general usage control state transaction.
Figure 7.1: A general usage control state transaction.
7.2 Usage Control Architecture
We provide the functional and service architecture, for usage control supporting pur-
pose enforcement, which is used as the control platform at client side control domain.
As illustrated in Figure 7.2, system consists of three main parts: Workflow Manage-
ment System, Policy Enforcement Point and Usage Control and Decision Point. Each
part contains a set of components that are detailed in the following sections.
1. User is a Man Machine Interface acting as the intermediate layer between system
and physical person.
2. Resource is the digital resource that is securely stored at the client side appli-
cation domain.
3. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) handles request from user and forwards it
to usage control and decision and workflow management system. If the usage
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Figure 7.2: Usage control architecture supporting purpose enforcement for system using
workflows.
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request is granted by usage control and decision module, PEP allows user to
access resource, otherwise, the access is blocked.
4. Workflow Reference Monitor (WRM) handles request from PEP for work-
flow validation process. It checks if the task and purpose requested by user are
matched or not. It also checks the past executed tasks performed by the user for
the requested workflow instance. WRM’s functions include: checking user’s role,
subject’s attributes or object’s attributes. It also checks the validity of task and
purpose. WRM contains the following modules.
• Workflow definition defines sequence of tasks representing purpose.
• Workflow-purposes mappings provides mapping information between
workflows and purposes. It tells which workflow corresponds to which pur-
pose.
• Tasks-policy mappings provides information concerning the assignment
of usage policies to each task.
• Attribute Authority (AA) is responsible for providing information re-
quired to be used in workflow validation process.
• Role-user mapping provides the information concerning the role of user.
• Workflow Execution History provides information concerning the exe-
cution history of every workflow instance. The state (e.g. ongoing, inter-
rupted or achieved) of each workflow instance is also provided.
5. Usage Control and Decision Point (UCDP) is responsible for controlling
the usage session and also deciding the usage permission. This module consists
of session management point and policy decision point.
• Session Management Point (SMP) manages individual usage session. It also
performs some other functions such as requesting decision to usage control
decision module for each state of usage control session (see Figure 7.1). SMP
also monitors continuously user, object and environment attributes, as well
as any further actions requested by user. Based on decision received from
usage decision point module, SMP either revokes or permits the ongoing
usage session. In case of revoke, the ongoing usage session needs to be
terminated immediately. The SMP validates each usage session based on
the usage session management policy. The usage management policy can
be expressed in a separate file or embedded in usage control policy.
126
• Usage Decision Point (UDP) is responsible for validating the usage control
policy. Its role is to tell whether the access can be granted or not based on
the analysis of all concern variables.
6. Usage Decision Point consists of three main components: Contextual Variable
Validation, Purpose Prediction Module and Obligation Definition Function.
• Contextual Variables Validation (CVV) is responsible for the valida-
tion of all contextual variables of tasks and purposes.
• Purpose Prediction Module (PPM) is responsible for examining access
history of user and estimating the level of certainty that user could achieve
his claimed purpose. It takes the inputs from two di↵erent modules.
– “Past access analysis variables ” provides a list of variables used for
analysing past access history.
– “Past access records” provides the information concerning the access
history of user.
• Obligation Definition Function (ODF) is responsible for validation the
obligation of user or system if any. For example, an obligation of notifying
user during usage session.
7. Usage policy is the usage control policy expressing how user should use data.
Explanation of the data flow in Figure 7.2
Figure 7.2 depicts the architecture of usage control system supporting purpose enforce-
ment mechanism presented in Chapter 6. We explain the data flow between di↵erent
components of the system. We start with the creation of workflow instance. Once
workflow instance is created, users who are supposed to be part of workflow execution
process can request access to use any resource assigned to a particular task in the cre-
ated workflow instance (call (1)). The access request (containing the right, task and
purpose) is passed to policy enforcement point (PEP) where a preliminary verification
and validation is performed. PEP sends a workflow validation request to workflow
reference monitor (WRM) where the relationship between right, task and purpose are
checked (call (2)). If the requested task do not belong to a workflow presenting the
claimed purpose, the system provides the deny message to user. Otherwise, further
verification is required such as checking the past executed tasks of the workflow (call
(3) and (4)). After performing workflow validation request, WRM sends a response
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to PEP (call (5)). If the response is positive, PEP proceeds to the next step by re-
questing to usage control and decision point. PEP sends a request directly to session
management point (SMP) (call (6)). SMP further contacts policy decision point (call
(7)). After validating the usage policy, policy decision point sends the decision response
back to SMP (call (12)). SMP forwards the decision response to PEP (call (13)) and
then PEP forwards it to user (call (14)). If the response is positive, client application
allows user to use resource.
Policy Decision Point (PDP) validates a usage request based on usage policy. There
are three important modules in PDP: CVV, PPM and ODF. CCV is responsible for
validating the contextual variables required in usage policy (call (8) and (9)). PPM is
responsible for calculating the purpose prediction value (call (10) and (11)) and ODF
is responsible for validating the obligation requirement.
Remark: the modules that are responsible for purpose enforcement in Figure 7.2
In Figure 7.2, the enforcement of purpose of use is achieved at two levels. The first
level is at workflow management system where the requested task and claimed purpose
are verified. The idea is to ensure that the task being requested is authorised for the
purpose being claimed by user. Moreover, the past executed tasks of the workflow
need also to be checked to ensure that the sequence of the workflow is respected. The
second enforcement level is at policy decision point where contextual variables and the
likelihood of purpose achievement are checked.
7.3 Prototype and Implementation
In order to test our concept, we need to implement and validate it. A prototype of
usage control system supporting purpose enforcement using our functional and service
architecture in Figure 7.2 is built. The implementations include the workflow reference
monitor and usage control and decision point. In usage control decision point, we
focus on the implementation of purpose prediction module. The prediction module is
built using our proposed enforcement technique presented in Chapter 6. We use Java
as our implementation language and XML as the format for communication messages
between di↵erent modules in the system. We have XACML version 2 [87] as the format
for access control requests, responses and policies. We also make use of Java Enterprise
XACML library 1 as the policy decision point engine.
1https://code.google.com/p/enterprise-java-xacml/
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Figure 7.3: Overview of essential components and use case scenario.
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7.3.1 Architecture
Figure 7.3 shows the essential components of our integrated toolset as well as a typical
usage scenario. All the elements under workflow management, workflow reference mon-
itor (WRM), policy enforcement point (PEP) and usage control and decision engine
are Java-based application. The newly developed usage control and decision engine
are the extension of the standard XACML [87], a Java-based access control and au-
thorisation engine. For clarity, we discuss the workflow management and validation
and usage control and decision. Then, we elaborate on purpose enforcement technique
and explain how purpose prediction is achieved. We furthermore explain the com-
munication protocol between di↵erent components of the system and also the storage
structure. Actually, workflow management system and usage control system are two
independent modules. They are connected by workflow reference monitor and policy
enforcement point module. In order words, the system engineers are free to separate
the management domain of the two modules.
Figure 7.3 shows three di↵erent processing phases: workflow creation and manage-
ment, usage request and usage control and decision.
7.3.1.1 Workflow Creation and Management Phase
Figure 7.3 shows the essential components of workflow creation and management phase.
The design of workflow is the first activity that needs to be done (call (1)). Workflow
specification is defined using XML based on the defined task graph (see Section 5.2.1).
Basically, the workflow specification contains the description of the necessary tasks that
need to be executed and the sequencing order of those tasks. Moreover, the execution
expiration time of each task and that of workflow are also defined in the workflow
specification. Once the workflow is defined, it is stored in the workflow repository.
The following activity is to assign the defined workflow to a purpose (call (2)). Then,
the mapping information of purpose and workflow is stored in the workflow-purpose
mapping repository for later use (e.g. during purpose validation phase). The next
activity is the resource assignment rule (call (3)). In general, each task of the workflow
is mapped to (or allocated to) a set of resources required for task execution. However,
to ensure that the task performer use resources correctly, we need to have a resource
assignment and management rule. The resource management rule defines the resource
access policy for every task of the workflow. Once workflow specification is created,
user can start a workflow instantiating from created workflow specification (call (4)).
Each workflow instance is stored in session and process management repository. After
workflow instance is created, system starts monitoring the execution of each task of
that workflow instance (call (5)) according to the defined workflow specification. In
general, the information concerning the task execution (e.g. on-going or interrupted
task) is stored in workflow execution repository for later use.
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7.3.1.2 Usage Request Phase
Figure 7.3, user interface for usage control is the Human Machine Interface (HMI)
that allows physical person to interact with usage control system. In order to form a
usage request, user needs to choose the following data: workflow instance, data user
wants to access, right user wants to perform on data, task of the workflow and purpose.
With that information, HMI produces a request query (call (1)). Then, the request
query is sent by HMI to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) engine where the preliminary
validation is required. The first module in PEP that the request is validated is the
workflow validation (call (2)). A module in PEP coordinates the workflow validation.
Workflow validation looks at the past executed tasks of a requested workflow instance
and other information such as workflow to purpose mapping and task to policy mapping
(see Figure 7.3, WRM Engine). If the previous tasks have not been executed and
they are required to be executed before requested task, the system rejects the request
immediately and deny message is sent to HMI. Otherwise, the request is forwarded
further to usage control and decision engine (call (3)).
7.3.1.3 Usage Control and Decision Phase
After receiving usage request forwarded by PEP engine, usage control and decision
engine starts its task (call (4)). Usage session management (USM) starts a new usage
session, but it is in inactive mode. Then, USM forwards the usage request to usage
policy validation module (call (5)) where the usage request is validated against the
usage policies in policy storage. All the values of the attributes in usage policy need
to be validated: purpose achievement prediction (call (6)), obligation verification (call
(7)) and contextual data validation (call (8)). Once the usage validation is completed,
a response is sent to usage session management. If the request is granted, the usage
session is activated. From that point onward, user can use the requested data. The
usage session management periodically controls user’s activity during the usage session.
The usage right can be revoked if usage policy violation occurs. In case of negative
response from usage decision point, a deny message is sent to usage session management
point. With deny message, usage session management point removes the session that
has been created. The deny message is forwarded further to PEP, and then to HMI.
7.3.1.4 User Management
The actual assignment of user to a role is done trough a separate module for user
creation and management. Once the user to role assignment is done, assignment infor-
mation, expressed in XML format, is stored in “user-role assignment repository” (see
Figure 7.3). In our model, each task is assigned to a resource usage policy. Resource
usage policy is assigned to role, not directly to user. Thus, at runtime, when user logs
in, he can only access and start the tasks that have been assigned to roles that he
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belongs. Every time user starts a task, a resource usage policy is applied and enforced.
The user ID is part of the data that is communicated to user management system and
workflow reference monitor engine for role validation. Assigning role to a task instead
of user provides system engineer an easy way to manage user since system engineer
needs only to maintain the user to role relation. For example, if a user is no longer in
role to execute a particular task of the workflow, system engineer simply takes him out
of the role he currently holds.
7.3.1.5 Repository Management and Implementation
Figure 7.3 shows the essential components of system, among which there are the repos-
itories used to store the information for workflow validation, user management as well
as usage control and decision. To simplify our implementation, we use XML and text
file to store those information. The user-role assignment, workflow-purpose mapping,
task-policy mapping are expressed in XML-based documents. Workflow definition is
defined in XML-based workflow 1. The access log data is stored in text file format. The
past access analysis variable and contextual data are expressed in XML. For access-log
data, at first, we used the access-log defined in Java Enterprise XACML. Java-XACML
has its own access-log that records all user activities. However, since we need to have
large enough log-data to test the performance of our purpose prediction module and it
is di cult to manually making user’s request with java-XACML, we decided to build
our own access-log generator module that is able to create million lines of record. The
access-log generator module generates the log-data having structure like in Figure 6.8.
7.3.2 Validation and Performance Test
Validation is an important component of algorithm development. Validation is the
process by which developers confirm that a given algorithm meets acceptable levels of
accuracy and performance. Achieving e↵ective validation requires a dataset with known
input and output parameters, whereby algorithm outputs can be directly compared
against the already established output values. To validate and assess our purpose
achievement prediction algorithm (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4), we use datasets and
challenges as the validation and assessment method. Di↵erent sizes of access-log are
created and tested against di↵erent set of usage control policies.
Since our main focus is the usage control enforcement, to be precise the purpose
prediction model, we focus our implementation on this module in this Chapter. The
input data in Figure 7.4 are used for validation and testing.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XPDL
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7.3.2.1 Access-log Generator
The structure of the access-log, that is used as input data for association rule learning
method, consists of the following elements: workflow-instance-id, user, user-role, task,
right, data, purpose and status (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4 for the definition of each
element). However, the real raw access-log data do not contain only those elements;
hence, we need to create a data mining module that mines only the required data
elements from the raw access-log. The objective of the mining is to simplify the input
data for association rule learning method. There are two steps for access-log generation.
Firstly, we generate the raw access-log containing similar log structure to that of JAVA-
XACML. Second step is to mine the raw access-log. The final product is the access-log
containing the data elements as presented in Figure 6.7. To create an access-log, we
need to have workflow definition, workflow to purpose mappings, access policies applied
to each task, user, user’s role and request query. The user’s request query, that contains
user, task, right, data and purpose, is constructed randomly. Each element of the user’s
request query is chosen randomly from our predefined sets of those elements.
Figure 7.4: Experiments’ inputs.
7.3.2.2 Testing Input Data
In order to test and validate the performance of our implemented prototype, we have
done 8 experiments with di↵erent workflow complexity and size of access log. We used
the input data as presented in Figure 7.4.
Workflow Complexity. We defined 4 di↵erent levels of workflow complexity. The
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complexity of the workflow is represented by the number of workflows, number
of tasks for each workflow and relationship between tasks in the workflow.
• Level 1, there are at most 20 workflow definitions and each workflow has
at most 5 tasks.
• Level 2, there are at most 50 workflow definitions and each workflow has
at most 10 tasks.
• Level 3, there are at most 100 workflow definitions and each workflow has
at most 15 tasks.
• Level 4, there are at most 100 workflow definitions and each workflow has
at most 20 tasks.
Size of access log. There are two ways to represent the size of access log: (1) by the
number of workflow instances or (2) the size of access log in MB (Mega Byte). It
is worth noting that the size of access, in Figure 7.4, is calculated based on one
year system activities.
Workflow instance creation rate is the number of workflows created per day.
7.3.2.3 Requirements and Scenarios
We defined two access scenarios in healthcare information system for validation. Our
main objective is to find out how good our purpose prediction achievement module is.
Could purpose prediction module predict the future achievement of purpose and capture
the mal-intended user as expected? Since access-log involves in decision process, does
the size of access-log a↵ect the general performance of the system?
First scenario: David (physician) requests to execute task “T1” for purpose of
heart-treatment (P0). David wants to read data (D1). David is in hospital at the time
of request. We use in this scenario the access-log as presented in Figure 7.4 (experiment
1-8). There are two separate tests in this scenario. Firstly, we test with the given
data set in Figure 7.4 . Secondly, we manually change some access-log parameters for
David, such as increasing the number of Interrupted 1% and On-going 1% to simulate
the unusual activities of David and keep the same required PA’s value (0.90) in policy.
Second scenario: in general, when the access-log becomes larger and larger, the
time required to analyse the log becomes important. To find out the impact of the size
of access-log on the general performance of system, we use the access-log in Figure 7.4.
The same user’s request information used in scenario 1 is also used in scenario 2.
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Figure 7.5: Experiment results. (Y) axis represents the purpose validation time in
milliseconds while (X) axis represents the experiment number (see Figure 7.4).
7.3.2.4 Performance Analysis
We developed and tested our java packages in Eclipse Standard/SDK (version Kepler)
installed on Macbook air OS version 10.8.4, processor 1.3 Ghz Intel Core i5 with
memory 8GB DDR3.
First scenario: the system validated the rule
“conf({David, Physician, T1, read,D2, P0}) Achieved)” using the experiment data
in Figure 7.4. For each experiment data set, we repeated the test with di↵erent set
of access-log data, but keep relatively the same access-log’s size. We found that if
the access history of David maintains 90% of achieved and other 10% for Interrupted
and On-going, the system always provides positive response. For the second test, we
manually modified the access-log by increasing the number of Interrupted and On-going
by 1%. We modified the access-log record-by-record for “Achieved” and “On-going” till
they reached 1% change. We observed the result for each change. We found that with
the large access records, the slightly change of the number of Interrupted or On-going
does not a↵ect the decision, only after it reaches a certain threshold, the a↵ect starts
to take place. This implies that policy maker must be careful when defining the value
of PA; the value of PA must represent the current system’s activities.
Second scenario: the aim of the second scenario is to find out how the rule
validation time a↵ects the general performance of the system when access-log grows
larger and larger. We did 8 experiments with di↵erent levels of workflow complexity.
We started with a small access log with the size of a few MBs to hundred MBs (see
Figure 7.4). The results of the 8 experiments are presented in Figure 7.5. We see that
the time required to validate a request increases in relation with the size of the access-
135
log. This is as expected. In case of loaded system, this issue can be a big challenge.
However, there are two possible ways for reducing the request validation time: the first
option is to minimise the size of the access-log; another is to increase the computation
power of the system (e.g. parallel computing).
To minimise the size of access-log, we need to minimise the size of observation in-
terval. One solution is to divide a large observation interval into many smaller intervals
(equal size). Then, we define the PA’s value of each interval. The final PA’s threshold
value, which is used in access policy, is an average of the values (PA) from the smaller
intervals. With this method, the size of the access-log used to valid the rule is the size
of the access-log for one interval (the most recent access-log), not the entire log. For
example, instead of using one-year access-log data, we can use a month access-log to
validate the rule. However the PA’s threshold value is defined based on the observation
of one-year interval.
7.4 Summary
This chapter brought together the contributions of Chapter 4-5-6 into a usage control
system supporting purpose enforcement. Our ambition is to design the usage control
architecture supporting purpose enforcement and to demonstrate that our proposed
purpose enforcement technique works. For implementation and validation, we devel-
oped di↵erent modules of the proposed usage control architecture (see Figure 7.2 and
7.3). These include: the usage control interface, usage control and decision point and
workflow reference monitor. In addition to that, since we use datasets and challenges
as the validation and assessment method for proving our purpose enforcement algo-
rithms, we need large datasets for access-log. To achieve this goal we built an access-log
generator module that is able to simulate access log for di↵erent workflow complexity.
Finally, we did 8 experiments with di↵erent level of workflow complexity and di↵erent
access log size. We concluded our finding in performance analysis section (see Section
7.4.4).
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Chapter 8
Protecting Personal Data in
Privacy-Preserving Perimeter
Protection System
In Chapter 1(Section 1.3), we listed two application domains for the implementation of
our finding. The first application domain is distributed healthcare where we presented
the prototype of such system in Chapter 7. The second application domain is the
privacy preserving perimeter protection system. Since 2013, we have been participating
in a European research project, the Privacy Preserving Perimeter Protection Project
(P5). The goal of the P5 is an intelligent perimeter proactive surveillance system that
works robustly under a wide range of weather and lighting conditions and that has
strong privacy preserving features. P5’s research has similar in goal to that of our
thesis. The main of objective of P5 is to protect personal data of individual generated
by di↵erent surveillance tools (e.g. CCTV). We have contributed to the project ranging
from the design of a global system architecture to the design of access control model
and its implementation. Given its similarity to our doctoral research, some part of
our work have been used as a platform for the design and implementation of access
control system for P5. This chapter dedicates to the work done in P5. The rest of the
chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.1 is the introduction. Section 8.2 is about
the motivation and the description of P5 project. Section 8.3 introduces the privacy-
aware access control and Trusted Third Party (TTP) module. Section 8.4 is about
privacy-aware access control model. Section 8.5 presents the access control scenarios
and policies definition for P5 system. Section 8.6 talks about access control architecture
and implementation. Section 8.7 is related work and contributions while Section 8.8 is
summary.
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8.1 Introduction
Critical buildings and infrastructures (e.g. nuclear power plants, military operation
zones, governmental or private institutions) require strong and unlikely breakable phys-
ical security protection from physical or forceful attacks. To protect such infrastruc-
tures beyond the use of conventional methods such as fence, they normally use di↵erent
surveillance tools, such as visual cameras, thermal cameras or radars, to observe and
detect activities around the protected infrastructures. In most of the cases, the surveil-
lance covers only the private zones belonging to the institution, but sometimes it goes
beyond by covering a larger area, for instance public area, in order to have an early
warning and enough time to react in case of attack. However, including the public
area into the surveillance perimeter poses challenges for personal data protection since
surveilling the public areas, especially people moving around the areas are not permit-
ted in some countries like in EU or USA. EU Directive 95/46/EC [28] does not allow
any government or private organisation to do surveillance in public area without the
approval from concern government authority.
There are issues related to privacy when covering the public areas, such as roads or
residential areas [28] [54]. For residential area, it can pose threat to people living in
that area because one can observe the daily life of a given person or a group of people
by analysing the data generated from surveillance tools. Thus, when designing perime-
ter protection system, one needs to take into account the data protection aspect.
In general, there are two data protection phases.
1. Firstly, protecting real-time data streamed from sensors around facility, one needs
to ensure that data streamed from sensors are well protected and they have not
been altered before they arrive at the control room. Furthermore, one needs to
filter out all privacy-related information before showing them to guards1 in the
control room. For example blurring the face of people.
2. Secondly, protecting data in the storage, in some cases, data generated from
sensors need to be stored for a while for forensic purposes. For example, if there
is the criminal scene in the coverage area, the authorities may require getting
access to those data for investigation.
Given all above illustration, we can see clearly the need to protect personal data in such
system. We introduce, in this chapter, an access control system designed particularly
for managing and controlling access to private data in perimeter protection system. The
proposed access control system is to ensure that personal data are properly protected
and only authorised people can use those data for purpose they intend for. As it is
1Guards refer to those who are working in control room or surveillance room.
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required by laws [28] that only the authorised entity is allowed to process personal
data, we also introduce the concept of Trusted Third Party (TTP)1.
8.2 Motivation and P5 Project
In this section we present the motivation and the introduction of P5 project, which is
the driving force behind our work presented in this chapter.
8.2.1 Motivation
Using conventional methods such as fences with the support of guards to protect the
critical buildings and infrastructures is no longer enough given the sophisticated tools
and technologies that we have nowadays. Skilful attackers can exploit the use of such
advanced tools and technologies for their advantages to break the security barrier. To
provide a reliable security protection to such area, one needs to use a more advanced
surveillance system, with the support of the tools such as visual or thermal camera.
The existing perimeter protection systems [61][29][30] assume that surveillance should
take place only inside the private protected area; hence, the privacy concern can be
ignored since the surveillance is limited within the private area. This is because within
the perimeter of facility, facility manager has the right to do surveillance on their
employees and the guests visiting the facility. They normally use information boards
or signs informing the guests or employees about the surveillance. However, ignoring
privacy issue is no longer possible when the surveillance perimeter includes the area
beyond the private area (e.g. covering the public area). The privacy issue must be
taken into account in such case and facility manager is bound by laws [28] to ensure
that data are properly protected. There are good reasons to extend the surveilling
area. One of which is that it gives facility guards enough time to react if the attack is
to occur. With conventional system where the surveillance covers the area not farther
than the fences or the boundary of the protected area, it may be too late for security
guards to react if there is an attack with the sophisticated tools (e.g. missiles or high
speed vehicles). Thus, securing the facility and at the same time protecting personal
data of people a↵ected by the surveillance are the main motivations.
8.2.2 P5 Project
P5, the Privacy Preserving Perimeter Protection Project, is the European and FP7
FUNDED (http://www.foi.se/p5) project for the protection of critical infrastructures
to benefit the sustainability of society and future well-being of the European Citizens.
1TTP is an entity outside the protected facility and it is responsible for authorising the access to
personal data.
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The goal of the P5 project is an intelligent perimeter proactive surveillance system
that works robustly under a wide range of weather and lighting conditions and that
has strong privacy preserving features. The system will monitor the region outside
the security area of critical buildings and infrastructures, and give early warning if
terrestrial or airborne threats are detected. The system will support, rather than
replace, a human operator. A low false alarm rate due to animals or other innocuous
events, combined with high threat detection sensitivity and privacy standards, are
the central ambition of this project. To achieve these goals, a multispectral sensor
suite comprising both passive and active sensor is envisaged (e.g. a system based
on radar, visual and thermal sensors). The sensor suite will be complemented with
advanced algorithms for information fusion, object detection and classification, privacy
preservation and high level modeling of intent and behavior analysis.
Figure 8.1: Privacy preserving perimeter protection system architecture
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8.2.2.1 P5 System Architecture
In this section we present the global architecture of P5. We provide a brief description
of each component and the details of three components that we address in this chapter:
privacy-aware access control module, privacy-aware filter and TTP.
P5’s team designed global system architecture for P5 (see Figure 8.1) where di↵erent
layers of system components are introduced. The lowest layer hosts the sensors that
provide di↵erent data types to the upper layer modules. Sensors can be managed and
calibrated remotely through “man machine interface” module. The data from sensors
are provided to the “attributes analysis” module where data are processed. Data from
di↵erent sensors are detected by a module called “detection/localisation” where data
are tagged with their location identification and privacy concern level.
After “attributes analysis and detection/localisation” does its job, data are passed
to a module called “multi-source heterogeneous data fusion” where the data from three
di↵erent sensors (e.g. radar, thermal and visual camera), at the same location, are fused
together. The main idea of fusing data from di↵erent types of sensor is to increase the
detection precision for di↵erent surveillance conditions. For example, visual cameras
may have bad visibility during the bad weather (e.g. raining or snowing) and at
night. While visual cameras have such drawbacks, thermal cameras do well in such
conditions. In some situations, using visual or thermal camera could not help us to
detect and separate the objects that are in front of camera and are positioned in series
closed to each other. Both visual and thermal cameras may detect as single object.
With this reason, radar is used as complement for object detection since radar can
provide precise position of every single object.
After performing data fusion at “multi-source heterogeneous data fusion”, the fused
data are passed to “object classification, tracking and behaviour and intents recogni-
tion” and then to “early warning module” (see Figure 8.1). The “object classification”
module is responsible for identifying the objects (e.g. people, animals or vehicles). Af-
ter classifying the objects, the tracking module plays a role, it follows up any suspicious
object. Both, “object classification and tracking” modules pass data to “behaviour and
intents recognition module” where the movement or activities of the object is analysed.
If the movement pattern is considered as threat (e.g. object moving fast close to fence),
a warning message is generated.
The “fault/aggression detection isolation and recovery” module provides the procedure
on how to tackle the attack and how to recover. “Network supervision and manage-
ment” module is responsible for monitoring the entire system (e.g. network and con-
nectivity). “Information management, storage, database and online learning” module
is responsible for storing and retrieving data for later use.
There are three more modules, in the proposed architecture, which ensure privacy
preservation and personal data protection: “Privacy-aware Filter (PF)”, “Privacy-
aware Access Control Module (PACM)” and “TTP”. The details of the three modules
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are presented in next section.
8.2.2.2 PF, PACM and TTP
In P5, privacy issues happen when people in the control room at protected facility
want to view raw data1 bearing privacy-related information directly from sensors in
real-time or access past raw data from storage. Any access to raw data needs a special
control to ensure that data are not used excessively. With this reason, we propose to
insert two modules for controlling access to raw data and for filtering privacy-related
information (see Figure 8.1).
1. Privacy-aware access control module (PACM) is responsible for controlling access
to raw data. This module is responsible also for enforcing access control policies.
The access control policies are generally defined by the Trusted Third Party
(TTP). The idea of using TTP to define privacy-aware access control policies
instead of allowing people in facility to do the work is to avoid the uncontrolled
data manipulation by those people. The details of TTP will be discussed in the
following section.
2. Privacy-aware filter is responsible for filtering the privacy-related information
(e.g. a car’s license plate or person’s face). In general, the data filtering module
performs based on object-masking policy, which defines masking procedure and
criteria for di↵erent type of objects. The details of privacy-aware filter are pre-
sented in Figure 8.2. Privacy-aware filter takes two inputs. The first input is from
the object classification module and the second input is from object masking pol-
icy. Object classification identifies di↵erent kinds of objects while object-masking
policy tells which object needed to be masked.
Figure 8.2: Architecture of privacy-aware filter
1Raw data are data generated from sensor without alteration.
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Figure 8.3: Global architecture for privacy-ware access control module and TTP, data
flow
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8.3 PACM and TTP
We start with global architecture containing privacy-aware access control and TTP
modules. In the detailed functional architecture presented in Figure 8.3, there are two
main components: TTP and privacy-aware access control. TTP is managed by TTP
administrator. Accesses to raw data are controlled by the privacy-aware access control
module installed in the private network of protected facility.
• TTP module provides to TTP administrator a way to manage access control
policies, to manage and to protect the raw data and to audit the access to raw
data.
• Privacy-aware access control module controls access to raw data in the protected
facility. The access permission is determined based on access control policies
defined by TTP administrator.
It is worth noting that the whole system is generally installed in the protected facility.
However, TTP administrator can remotely control system through secure communica-
tion channel.
Details of Figure 8.3:
1. TTP administrator can be a trusted private or government entity, which is au-
thorized for the job.
2. Secure communication channel is a secure communication medium between TTP
system and the system installed at the facility.
3. Access policy and storage management provides some functional features for TTP
administrator to manage access control policies and the storage of raw data.
4. Secure storage is responsible for protecting data in storage (e.g. access control
policies and data from sensors).
5. Privacy-aware access control module is responsible for controlling access to raw
data in storage or real-time data from sensors.
6. User is a physical person allowed to access raw data for a particular purpose.
Figure 8.3: data flow explanation
We explained previously the details of each component of the system (see Figure 8.3).
In this section we provide a step-by-step explanation of the data flow. There are two
di↵erent access scenarios in Figure 8.3.
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• Firstly, TTP administrator requests access to policy and storage management
module (call 2.1). After successfully authenticated TTP administrator, “policy
and storage management” module replies. From that point on, TPP administra-
tor can manage access policies or data in storage. Through “access policy and
storage management” module, TTP administrator can request access to policy
and data storage (call 2.2) and gets the reply (call 2.3). Finally, access policy
and storage management module forwards the data to TTP administrator (call
2.4).
• Secondly, user in facility requests access to raw (call 1.1). Privacy-aware access
control system validates the request. If the permission is granted, it contacts
the database management system storing the requested data (call 1.2). Then,
the database management system replies with requested data (call 1.3). After
getting data from database management system, privacy-aware access control
system forwards the data to user (call 1.4).
It is important to note that since our main addressing issue in this paper is the design of
privacy-aware access control system, we do not go into the details of TTP’s architecture.
8.4 Privacy-aware Access Control
In this section, we present in detail the access control system taking into account
the privacy aspect. It includes the access control requirements for privacy preserv-
ing perimeter protection system, access scenarios and access control model designed
specifically for such system.
8.4.1 Access Control Requirements
To identify the access control requirements for privacy preserving perimeter protection
system, we conducted two di↵erent studies. Firstly, we worked with legal group to study
the EU Directive 95/46/EC concerning the protection of personal data of individual.
Secondly, we did a formal survey and also conducted a broad range of data collection
and analysis. For the field works, we visited existing perimeter protection systems
installed in the protected facilities in United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden, such as
National Air Tra c control in UK and OKG Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden. A
list of questions, concerning the management of access control and data storage, were
proposed to people in the control room as well as technical people working in security
department of those facilities. The responses were analyzed and then refined. Based
on the result of our survey and legal studies, we can classify the access control and
data protection requirements into four main points.
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1. Legal requirements: Directive 95/46/EC specifies rules for handling personal
data. The directive defines objectives for the legislation of the member states of
the European Union and it is binding on the member states as to the result to be
achieved but leaves them the choice of the form and method they adopt to realise
the community objectives within the framework of their internal legal order. The
directive uses the terms “controller”, “data subject” and “processing”. Article 2
defines the terms in the context of the directive.
“Controller” shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency of any other body which alone or jointly with others deter-
mines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data,
...
“Data subject or data owner” is an identified or identifiable natural
person, ...
“Processing” shall mean any operation or set of operations whether
or not by automatic means, such as collection, storage, adaption or
alteration, use, disclosure by transmission, ...
Article 10 specifies the obligation of data controller when processing personal
data. Article 10 lists the following information that data controller must provide
to data subject.
• (a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
• (b) the purpose of the processing for which the data are intended;
• (c) any further information, such as the recipients or categories of recipients
of the data, ...
Article 11 compels the data controller to notify the data subject, even if the data
are not obtained from them. Article 11 describes the need for an information
service attending to the information rights of private persons. Such an informa-
tion service can support the process of notifying the data subject by providing
the needed information.
In summary, from those articles, there are three main requirements:
• Data controller needs to notify data subject every time of access.
• Processing of private data is limited to the purpose for which data are
intended; excessive use is not allowed.
• Consent from data subject is required when processing personal data.
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2. User management requirements: security department personnel manages
access to control room as well as sensors. An assigned group of users, while they
are on duty, are allowed to be in control room to view and analyse real time data
streamed from sensors. By default, data are filtered out all the privacy-related
information. In case of emergency where there are intruders attacking the facility,
users in control room are allowed to access raw data. Other assigned group of
users can access raw data in storage or transfer recorded raw data to third party,
but special access permission is needed. The main purpose of storing data from
sensors is for forensic purpose.
3. System performance requirements: since we deal also with real-time data,
access control to such data stream must be reasonably fast to avoid the delay
to data stream. In order words, the time required for validating access control
policy must be small.
4. Security and data protection requirements: processing of private data must
be secured. We need to make sure that only authorized people can get access to
data. Data controller should be a trusted entity that overlooks the management
of access control policies as well as data in storage. To avoid data manipulation
by people inside the protected facility, we require data controller to be a trusted
entity outside the facility, either authorised government or private entity.
With those access control requirements, we are able to define the access control model
presented in Section 8.4.2.
8.4.2 Access Control Model
We introduce Context- and Privacy-aware RBAC [82] (CP-RBAC), an access control
model designed for controlling access to private data in privacy-preserving perimeter
protection system. In CP-RBAC, access authorisation is based not only on the user’s
role, but also on contextual information, such as temporal-, spatial- and environment-
context. Furthermore, the concept of privacy is also introduced into the model.
8.4.2.1 Role Model
We propose to extend Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (see Figure 8.4). Role-based
access control model (RBAC) has been traditionally used for designing access control
systems for organisation. In such systems, users are assigned to a role by system
administrator, and such memberships also tend to have long duration. In contrast to
this, in our model roles are defined as part of an application’s design. Such roles come
into existence only when that application is deployed and executed and they last during
the application lifetime. The access control system admits a user to a role based on
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Figure 8.4: Context- and Privacy-aware Role-Based Access Control Model (CP-RBAC)
the admission constraints. For example, the admission constraint based on the working
hour, user is admitted to a role only when he/she is on duty.
In the proposed model, contextual information is used as constraint for both the
role admission and data permission assignment. The purpose of access and obligation
are also the binding constraints on data permission to preserve and protect the privacy
of data subject.
8.4.2.2 Access Control model
CP-RBAC (see Figure 8.4) consists of the following entities.
• U is a set of users (u) where u 2 U .
• R is a set of roles (r) where r 2 R.
• G is a set of rights (g) where g 2 G. For example, right to “read”, “copy”,
“delete”.
• D is a set of data where d 2 D.
• P is a set of purposes (p) where p 2 P .
• O is a set of obligations (o) where o 2 O.
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• C is a set of contextual variables (c) where c 2 C.
Then, we formulate the privacy-sensitive policy (RP):RP ✓ R⇥((G⇥D)⇥(P⇥C⇥O)).
The detailed formulation of privacy-sensitive policy is as follows.
• The set of Data Permission DP = {(g, d) | g 2 G, d 2 D}
• The set of Privacy-sensitive Data Permission PDP = {(dp, p, c, o) | dp 2 DP, p 2
P, c 2 C, o 2 O}
• Privacy-sensitive Data Permission to role Assignment PDPA ✓ R ⇥ PDP , a
many-to-many mapping privacy-sensitive data permission to role.
8.4.2.3 Context and Obligation Expression
In this section, we provide a simple, but su cient way for expressing contextual vari-
ables and obligation in our model. It is worth noting that the context and obligation
expression we present in this section are su cient for use in P5 based on the require-
ments we presented in Section 8.4.1. It is not necessary a general context and obligation
expression.
Contextual data are the information surrounding user, data1 and reason that user
needs to execute the action. Contextual information can be anything, such as user’s
personal data, location or time. For example, the physical location of user can be
considered as contextual information.
Definition 1: contextual variables expression
Let C be a set of contextual variables (c), where c 2 C. “c” has the finite domain of
possible values, denoted as DC where dc2 DC. “c” is equipped with the relational
operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of c has the form (c opr dc).
let c1 and c2 are two contextual variables in the form of the atomic condition.
Then, (c1 ^ c2) or (c1 _ c2) is also condition. For example, using working-hour of user
as contextual variable, if user’s working-hour is between 8am and 5pm, we can express:
working-hour   8am ^ working-hour  5pm.
Obligation is defined as the action that user or system needs to fulfil before or after
accessing data. For example, paying before listening music is a form of obligation or
notifying data provider every access is also considered as a form of obligation.
1“Data” refers to the data that user wants to access.
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Definition 2: obligation expression
Let O be a set of obligation variables (o), where o 2 O . “o” has the finite domain
of possible values, denoted as B where b 2 B. “o” is equipped with the relational
operators (Oprs) “ =, 6=, , and  ”. The condition of “o” has the form (o opr b). For
example, a payment obligation has the form: payment   50$.
8.4.2.4 Context-aware Role Admission and Personalised Role Permission
We use context-aware role admission to admit users to a role. A complementary aspect
of context-based role admission is the need to revoke a user’s role memberships when
specified context conditions fail to hold. For example, in the perimeter protection
system, user in the role “guardian” membership must be revoked when they are out of
control room or o↵ duty. The location of user or working hours is called “role validation
constraint”.
The services, that are accessible through role permission, may be di↵erent for dif-
ferent role members and may depend on the contextual information associated with a
role member. Personalised role permission allows system to revoke role membership on
di↵erent object instances based on each role member’s individual context. An example
in privacy preserving perimeter protection system: suppose that there is a crime hap-
pened in or around protected facility. The authority wants to view the past videotapes
from that area. The facility manager assigns a user “Edward”, in role ”security man-
ager” to assist and facilitate the authority. This means that only Edward can access
the videotapes, not all the members in “security manager” role. In other words, the
videotapes are personally assigned to Edward. If the videotapes are assigned to role
“security manager” under traditional RBAC, all the members in that role can access
to the tapes. This is not what we want.
8.5 Access Scenarios and Policy Definition for P5
In this section, we provide the access scenarios for P5. Then, with those scenarios we
define the access control policies. Finally, we express those policies with the access
control model we presented in Section 8.4.2.
8.5.1 Access Raw Data in Real Time
Scenario: this happens when system detects a threat in protected perimeter. In such
situation, guard in the control room may trigger the emergency button to get access to
raw data in order to get a clear view of the target objects. However, in order to prevent
150
guard from unnecessarily triggering the emergency button, guard is allowed to trigger
emergency if and only if there is a positive acknowledgement from “early warning mod-
ule” (see Figure 8.1). That module is responsible for providing a warning message when
it detects the abnormal behaviour of the objects. The positive acknowledgement means
it really detects the abnormal activities of the target objects. Without such positive ac-
knowledgement, guard cannot trigger emergency situation to access real-time raw data.
Policy definition (P1): we define role “guardian”. The users in role “guardian”
are able to view real-time raw data streamed from sensors. However, they can do so
only in case of emergency. Otherwise, they can only view filtered data where privacy-
related information is filtered out. In addition to that, users can trigger emergency if
and only if there is a positive acknowledgement from early warning module. Moreover,
to be able to keep track user’s activities, users are required to notify system every
access to raw data.
With above policy description, we are able to mine the following information.
• Role of user: “Guardian”.
• Action: “View”.
• Data: “streaming video”.
• Context: ”acknowledgement-from-early-warning”.
• Purpose: “Observing-suspicious-object”.
• Obligation: “notify”.
With the above information and policy expression in Section 8.4.2, we can formulate
the following access control policy.
PDPA to role “Guardian”: P1
P1= (Guardian, (View, streaming video), Observing-suspicious-object, (acknowledgement-
from-early-warning= positive), Notify=yes))
8.5.2 Review or Replay Recent Past Raw Data
Scenario: this happens when guard in the control room wants to review or replay re-
cent past video stream. We define “recent past video stream” as the video stream that
has been recorded within the last 30 minutes (It can be di↵erent number depending on
requirements). The replay occurs when system detects abnormal activities of objects
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and guard wants to observe the recent past activities of those objects.
Policy definition (P2): users in role “guardian” are allowed to review recent past
video stream. The same rule in P1 is applied in P2. However, one more context is
required that is the life of video stream, which is set to be 30 minutes. The life of video
stream context limits the access to the past video streams, which are older than 30
minutes. Any access to older past video streams needs to be controlled by policy P3.
With the above policy description, we are able to define the policy (P2) as follows.
PDPA to role “Guardian”: P2
P2= (Guardian, (View, streaming video), Observing-suspicious-object, (acknowledgement-
from-early-warning= positive ^ life-of-video  30 minutes), Notify=yes))
8.5.3 Access Raw Data in Storage
Scenario: Government authority may need to access past raw data for an investiga-
tion purpose (e.g. if there is a crime scene in the coverage area around the protected
facility, authority can request access to raw data generated from the cameras installed
in that area). Authority can request raw data from facility manager. However, in order
to get access to raw data facility manager needs to send the request to TTP with proof.
Proof is an o cial document justifying the mission. Then, with the valid proof, TTP
can grant facility manager an access to raw data in storage for the limit periods of time.
Policy definition (P3): we define the role “Facility-security-manager”. Users in role
“Facility-security-manager” are able to request TTP for accessing raw data in storage.
However, they need to provide the proof to justify their request. In addition to that,
users need to mention their purpose of request. We define three possible purposes: (1)
Internal auditing, (2) Investigation and (3) Observing-suspicious-object. Moreover, to
be able to keep track users’ activities, users are required to notify system every time
they access to raw data.
With above policy description, we are able to mine the following information.
• Role of user: “Facility-security-manager”.
• Action: “View”.
• Data: “raw-video-in-storage”.
• Context: “proof”.
• Purpose: “Investigation”.
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• Obligation: “notify”.
With the above information, we can formulate the access control policy for P3 as
follows.
PDPA to role “Facility-security-manager”: P3
P3= (Facility-security-manager, (View, raw-video-in-storage), Investigation, (proof=
yes), Notify=yes))
Figure 8.5: Privacy-aware Access Control Architecture for Privacy Preserving Perime-
ter Protection System
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8.6 Access Control: Architecture and Implementa-
tion
In this section, we present the access control system architecture supporting purpose
enforcement and the implementation of such system in Java.
8.6.1 Access Control Architecture
As illustrated in Figure 8.5, access control system consists of the following components.
1. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) handles request from user and forwards it to
PDP. Beside that it also has other role that is to enforce the policy by using
di↵erent policy enforcement mechanism.
2. Purpose Enforcement Mechanism: we propose two mechanisms to enforce pur-
pose in the scope of P5 project. They are role to purpose alignment and notifi-
cation.
• Role to purpose alignment is the information indicating which roles are
allowed for which purposes. For example, security manager is allowed to
access raw data in storage for purpose of internal investigation.
• Notification is a kind of obligation that user needs to fulfil when accessing
data (e.g. sending a notification message to data subject every access).
3. Policy Decision Point (PDP) is responsible for validating access control policies
with the support of information provided by Policy Information Point.
4. Policy Information Point (PIP) is responsible for providing all needed informa-
tion to PDP during policy validation phase. It is worth noting that contextual
information is also expressed in PIP. In the scope of P5 project, we define four
contextual variables.
• Proof is an o cial mission document that user needs to provide when re-
questing access to raw data in storage.
• Early warning, this module is a part of P5’s architecture (see Figure 8.1). It
provides a warning message when it detects intruders. The warning message
is used as one of the constraints on access permission in case of emergency.
• User to role alignment provides information concerning the assignment of
users to roles.
• Working hours is the timetable of each user. This contextual information
is used as constraint in role admission.
154
8.6.2 Implementation
We have implemented a context- and privacy-aware access control (CP-RBAC) system
based on our proposed architecture (see Figure 8.5) using Java. The implemented
system is capable of enforcing the purpose-based policies and is able to validate access
control policies in accordance with the access control model we proposed (see Figure
8.4). We also developed PIP module that is able to communicate with other external
modules to get the needed information (e.g. getting early warning message from early
warning and behaviour analysis module (see Figure 8.1)). We have used XACML
version 2 as the format for access control requests, responses and policies [8]. We
have also made use of Java Enterprise XACML library 1 as the policy decision point
engine. We developed our program in Eclipse Standard/SDK (version Kepler) installed
on Macbook air OS version 10.8.4, processor 1.3 Ghz Intel Core i5 with memory 8GB
DDR3.
The user-to-role alignment, role to purpose alignment and contextual information
are expressed in XML-based documents (they will be replaced by database for final
integration of the system). Notification is developed by using mailing module in Java.
8.6.2.1 Testing Inputs and Scenarios
We created 48 access control policies that represent the data permissions for 48 di↵erent
user roles. We used standard XACML policy language to express all the 48 policies.
The policies P1, P2 and P3 (see Section 8.5) are used as the models for the 48 policies.
For example, the policy in Figure 8.8 is the formal policy expression in XACML of
P1 (see Section 8.5). We performed six di↵erent tests with the same request structure
(see Figure 8.6), but di↵erent number of policies in the policy storages. Since XACML
[87] policy engine checks all the policies in the policy storage during policy validation
phase, the policy validation processing time depends not only on the complexity of
policy, but also on the number of policies in the storage. Thus, Our objective is to
observe the policy validation time for each test scenario.
8.6.2.2 Assessment and Validation
There are two criteria we want to assess. The first criterion is the accuracy of the
access control system we developed. This means it should provide 100% correct policy
evaluation. The second criterion is the time required to evaluate a request. We need
it to be as small as possible since our access control system needs to work with real
time data. To evaluate second criterion, we created di↵erent access control policies
with di↵erent level of complexity; then we find out the validation time for each request
with di↵erent number of policies in storage. After several performance tests with the
1https://code.google.com/p/enterprise-java-xacml/
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Figure 8.6: A snapshot of a prototype of privacy-aware access control module, it is
the user’s access request form.
6 di↵erent scenarios, we have the result presented in Figure 8.7. We found that as the
number of policies in storage increases, the time required to evaluate a request also
increase; this is as expected. The first test scenario where there is only one policy
(see Figure 8.8) in the policy storage, the time required to validate the policy is 344
milliseconds. With 48 policies, it takes 954 milliseconds (see Figure 8.7).
Given the result in Figure 8.7, we conclude that in order to get small response
time for an access request, we need to have small number of policies in storage. Since
data permission is generally assigned to role; hence, reducing number of user roles in
the system can minimise the number of policies. Other solution is to extend XACML
policy decision point engine by adding a module ”role to policy mapping” that is able
to instruct XACML policy decision point engine to select only the concerned policies
from policies storage instead of searching and validating all the policies in the storage.
For P5 project, we choose the first option where we minimise number of user roles.
We allow only two groups of people to access data: “Guardian” and “Facility-security-
manager”. Thus, the average response time we can achieve for P5 is 344 ms.
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Figure 8.7: The chart shows the relationship between number of policies in storage and
policy validation processing time. Axis (X) represents number of policies in storage
while axis (Y) is the response time in millisecond.
8.7 Related Work and Contributions
In this section, we discuss two di↵erent points for related work. Firstly, we present some
existing perimeter protection, threats prevention and detection systems that have sim-
ilar aims to that of P5 project [32]. Secondly, we discuss the access control models.
Many research projects have been conducted in the area of perimeter protection by
using the advanced sensing tools for treats detection and prevention [29][31][30]. How-
ever, they do not address the privacy issue in their system. ARENA project [29] aims to
develop methods for automatic detection and recognition of threats, based on multi sen-
sory data analysis, for mobile platform such as trucks. But privacy issues have not been
addressed in this project. Other project such as CO-FRIEND[30] aims at designing a
framework for understanding human activities in real environments, through an artifi-
cial cognitive vision system, identifying objects and events and extracting sense from
scene observation. Again, CO-FRIEND does not provide privacy preserving feature.
ISCAPS [31], another European project, aims at reinforcing security for the European
citizen and to downsize the terrorist threat by reducing the risks of malicious events.
ISCAPS provides e cient, real-time, user-friendly, highly automated surveillance of
crowded areas, which are significantly exposed to terrorist attacks. Some commercial
systems such as CIAS [61] is designed for perimeter protection using di↵erent type of
sensors such as CCTV, but the detection and surveillance depend mostly on human
intervention. Moreover, it does not provide privacy preserving feature. The existing
systems provide di↵erent features, but they are not complete. P5 unifies all the needed
features, especially the privacy preserving issue. P5 is also a less human dependable
system where object detection and treats analysis are done automatically with the
support of fused data from di↵erent heterogeneous sensors, such as visual and thermal
camera and radar. The system will support, rather than replace, a human operator.
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Figure 8.8: Formal policy expression in XACML of P1 (see Section 8.5.1)
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Access control plays an important role in ensuring that the data generated from privacy
concern sensors are well protected. Thus, the careful design of access control model
is required to ensure that the created model addresses the requirements. After our
thorough study of di↵erent access control models, we arrive to the conclusion of using
RBAC [82] in P5 project, but with extension. We have also studied di↵erent models,
such as DAC, MAC [82], ABAC [88] and OrBAC [24][8][17]. In context of P5 environ-
ment setting, most of access control models (like DAC and MAC) fail to respond to the
requirements since such systems generally have very complex access control policies as
we have illustrated in Section V. OrBAC [33] provides more expressing power. How-
ever it is not specifically designed for privacy-aware system. The basic RBAC model,
where access policy is formulated primarily around role, is also not su cient. P-RBAC
[68][20] is another family of RBAC where the concept of privacy is introduced, but it
does not address the contextual information. Moreover, it does not have the concepts
of context-aware role admission and personalised role permission. With above reasons,
we propose an access control model that takes into account the aspects like privacy
[43] and contextual information. To provide privacy preservation feature, the concept
of purpose and obligation are introduced and they are well formulated. The two en-
tities (purpose and obligation) are indeed the most important elements required for
expressing privacy policies.
Contributions: There are three main contributions in this chapter. Firstly, we
propose the privacy preserving perimeter protection system architecture taking into
account not only the security of the protected infrastructure, but also the privacy
of people who are a↵ected by the surveillance. The second contribution, the most
important part in this paper, is the proposed access control model that can be used to
express privacy-aware access control policies in privacy preserving perimeter protection
system. The third contribution is the implementation of such access control system.
It is worth noting that the implemented access control system is integrated into P5
system.
8.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a detailed architecture of privacy preserving perimeter
protection system, our second application domain for implementing our finding. We
also presented the context- and privacy-aware access control model that is designed
specifically for such system. The access control system implemented in Java was also
presented. Furthermore, we presented a brief description of the role of TTP in P5
system. Our future work is to focus on the development of TTP and the privacy-aware
filter module.
159
160
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Our Vision
Given the raise of privacy issues and a demand from government authority for the bet-
ter protection of private data of individual when sharing them between di↵erent parties
in the network, many private and state entities are in demand for data usage control
system that is able to provide su cient protection (e.g. healthcare institutions). Early
in this research, we thought of using the existing digital rights management technolo-
gies to solve the challenge, but after studying the requirements for the protection of
personal data of individual (e.g. EU Directive 95/46/EC) and the properties of the
existing DRM technologies [71], we came to the conclusion that all the existing DRM
technologies do not have su cient functionalities that respond to the needs for the
processing of private data. This is because the existing DRM technologies are not
specifically built for private data. They are built to protect commercial contents (e.g.
multimedia contents); they are content-specific and lack of generalness. This rules out
the possibility of using DRM, without complement or extra support functionalities, to
control the processing of private data.
Controlling the usage of private data in distributed environment needs a lot more
attention. When we started studying it we saw only a few researches addressing the
issue [89][81][72]. Surprisingly, many researches focused on access control, not usage
control and assumed that the client side domain is the trusted domain and when data
reside on client side domain, they are safe and secured. However, this assumption is
not always feasible when we consider the distributed processing environment where
data are processed without a direct control of data owner. So far we are not aware
of a complete solution that designs for managing and enforcing privacy-aware usage
control policies in distributed environment. Consequently, it would be best to design
a dedicated system in a way that addresses the processing requirements of such data.
We summarise below the responses to our research questions we listed in Chapter 1.
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9.2 Summary of Contributions
The central argument of this thesis is that the usage control for private data can be
achieved by using the policy-based technique with the support of secured client ap-
plication; and the enforcement of purpose of use for privacy-aware policies is achieved
by controlling the execution of the tasks (and their sequencing) of the workflow rep-
resenting the purpose in conjunction with the purpose achievement prediction. Our
contribution rests on the requirements for access and usage control for private data
in distributed environment, a sound purpose modelling for privacy-aware policies, a
purpose enforcement technique and a sound mathematical definitions, properties and
theorems, which have been implemented in an open source toolset. The prototype
implementation produces evidence of e ciency and reliability of our definitions and
algorithms. More precisely, the five research questions posted on the thesis objectives
(See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2) have been answered as follows.
RQ1.1: what are the requirements for the protection of private data in
distributed system? We focus on distributed healthcare. At the early state of our
research, we have participated in a few meetings with Wallonie Healthcare Network
(WHN) [85] team, which was responsible for developing the distributed healthcare
information system for all the healthcare institutions in French speaking region in Bel-
gium. Our participation provided us a platform upon which we started our work on
access and usage control requirements analysis. Beside of working with the real world
project like WHN, we had also studied the European laws concerning the protection
of private data of individual, especially EU Directive 95/46/EC [28]. We analysed the
requirements from WHN and those of EU Directive 95/46/EC and came up with the
usage and access control requirements for distributed health. The result of our study
was published in the 7th International Conference on Health Informatics, Barcelona,
Spain, 2013 [10].
RQ1.2: how to model the purpose of use in such a way so that it can
be easily managed and e↵ectively enforced in distributed environment? To
grasp a better understanding of the meaning of purpose in the context of access and
usage control for private data, we have conducted a formal study of the meaning of
purpose in legislation like EU Directive 95/46/EC and the definition of purpose used
in the day-to-day basic (e.g. Dictionary). We found that both in legislation and in
dictionary, purpose often refers to a future goal, a final destination that someone wants
to reach; and to reach the final goal one needs to complete some intermediate tasks.
The completion of all the tasks to reach a goal is called the goal achievement or purpose
achievement. Based on the definition of purpose, we observe that purpose has similar
property to workflow. With this reason we modelled the purpose as the workflow. From
that formulation, we built our purpose enforcement technique presented in RQ1.4. The
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proposed purpose model was published in the 7th International Conference on Health
Informatics, Barcelona, Spain, 2013 [11].
RQ1.3: what access and usage control model should be used to e↵ectively
control the usage of private data in distributed environment? And what ac-
cess and usage policy languages are appropriate to be used in our context?
Starting from the requirements in RQ1.1 and the purpose modelling in RQ1.2, we con-
ducted our study on existing access and usage control model from the basic models
like DAC and MAC [82] to a more complex model like RBAC and its extension. For
usage control model, we studied UCON model [41]. All the models are studied and
analysed thoroughly; model by model, we listed its advantages and disadvantages and
then compared them against the requirements we identified in RQ1.1 (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.5). From our study we concluded that PRBAC is appropriate to be used in
our context as access control model where UCON is a good model for usage control.
However, UCON needs to be extended in order to fully support our requirements. The
result of our work was published in the Fourth International Conference on eHealth,
Telemedicine, and Social Medicine (eTELEMED 2012) [11]. For policy language, after
our thorough study, we found that XACML is very suitable to be used in distributed
setting, not only it is the XML-based language, but also it is the most developed lan-
guage among all. XACML goes a cross many reviews, implementations and regular
updates. XACML is able to not only express access control policy, but also the request
and response query. XACML research group has developed Java-enterprise-XACML,
a Java-based engine that is able to validate XACML policies. Java-enterprise-XACML
is extensible and can be adjusted to our requirements.
RQ1.4: what are the techniques that can be used to enforce privacy-aware
usage policy in distributed environment? So far, researchers have used “Audit-
ing” as method to enforce the usage control policies in distributed environment [81][72].
Auditing may be able to detect policy violations after-the-fact, but it cannot prevent
unauthorised access. Thus, a posteriori control (e.g. auditing) is not a good choice
for enforcing the privacy-aware policies since according to the laws [28], private data
are limited to only the authorised people and we need to know the data processor in
advance before releasing data to them. Moreover, we need also to ensure that data
processor uses data for the purpose it intends for. Given this reason, we focus on a
priori control (control happens before releasing data to requester). To enforce privacy
polices using formal or automated methods requires a semantics of purpose restrictions
to determine whether an action is for a purpose and that purpose could be achieved
or not once access permission is granted. We model purpose as a workflow and we
argue that an action is for a purpose if and only if that action is part of a plan for
the satisfaction of that purpose. Based on that formalisation, we propose an approach
to enforce purpose. In our approach, the access authorisation is based on the estima-
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tion of the level of certainty of purpose achievement, which is determined by purpose
achievement prediction (a probabilistic system estimating how likely user can reach
their claimed purpose after access permission is granted). The prediction module is
built using association rule learning method where user’s access history and contextual
information are used as the input data for rule analysis. The semantics of purpose
with our enforcement approach enable us to create and implement an algorithm for
enforcing the privacy policies.
RQ1.5: what are the existing usage control technologies that can be used
to control access and usage of private data in distributed environment? We
started from a broad survey of the existing data protection techniques and technologies
[70] and studied their varying degree of e↵ectiveness when used in our context. Our
survey covered the usage control techniques (e.g. encryption, watermark and digital
signature) and technologies (e.g. DRM). Concerning DRM, our finding shows that the
existing technologies cannot provide the security we need for protecting private data.
We conclude that we need a dedicated system that is able to support our proposed
usage control and enforcement technique. Consequently, we proposed a usage control
architecture supporting purpose enforcement in Chapter 7. The details of this study
can be found in Chapter 2.
9.3 Perspective
Our contributions give a good foundation to the emerging requirements of usage con-
trol of private data in distributed environment: from the usage control requirements
analysis to usage control model, purpose enforcement mechanism, usage control archi-
tecture and prototype of usage control application. These contributions pave a way for
the development of a secure platform for the protection of private data in distributed
environment. Our prototype implementation of usage control application is more of a
proof of concept rather than a customer-ready front-end. As such, it is too generic for
practitioners to use it. However, it provides a platform upon which a professional-grade
tool can be developed. We discuss below in greater detail the perspectives of this thesis
along three dimensions. We firstly discuss the limitations of our purpose enforcement
technique and the prototype we implemented. Then, we discuss the interoperability
issues. Since our technique is designed for system that uses workflows and the data
needs to be shared between di↵erent systems in the network, the interoperability issue
of the workflow definition is not avoidable. Finally, we explore the avenues for further
work on workflow and role mapping.
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9.3.1 Limitations
Issue of user access history. Since our purpose achievement prediction technique
uses user’s access history and contextual information as the input data, the perfor-
mance of the technique depends largely on user’s past activities recorded in access log.
Our method fails to conclude in case of new user who has never accessed to the system
in the past. However, this issue can be solved by providing a special key to new user.
With the special key new user can bypass some security barriers. When special key is
used, we need a mechanism to manage such key, but at this state we have not studied
yet the issue of special key management. Other solution is to observe the activities of
other users in the same role and use those information as the knowledge based on which
the decision can be made. Both proposals need to be further studied in our future work.
Probabilistic system. Our purpose enforcement model uses association rule learn-
ing method to discover in access log the relation between the requested task and the
purpose user claims. The aim of finding the relationship between requested task and
claimed purpose is to determine the probability that user could achieve the purpose
he claims if the task is allowed to be executed. Since our technique use a probabilistic
method, the wrong conclusive result is possible.
Hierarchical purpose. In Section 5.2.2 (Chapter 5), we introduced the concept
of multi-purposes and the relationship between purposes. However, the implementa-
tion of it has not been included in our prototype. The management of data in case of
hierarchical purpose is left for the future work.
Integration between workflow management system and usage control sys-
tem. Ultimately, we need to integrate the workflow management system into our usage
control system. However, at this state we implemented only the usage control system
and assumed that we have all the workflow information (see WRM Engine in Figure
7.3, Chapter 7) required for providing to usage control system we developed.
Analogue attack issue. We use policy-based method with support of secure client
side application to control and enforce the usage of data. Although our proposed tech-
nique can solve most of the issues in usage control, it is not able to protect completely
the data from misuse since user can still copy the data by using some tools such as
photo or video camera. Thus, we still need a secure data protection at client side
control domain. The issue of attack with photo and video cameras was addressed in
our unpublished paper in [18]; watermark and digital fingerprint can be the solutions
for re-enforcing the usage control of data.
Contextual data mining. In our proposed purpose enforcement technique, con-
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textual data play an important role in usage control enforcement. We have provided in
Section 6.2.2.1 (Chapter 6) the definition of contextual information related to task and
purpose. However, we did not provide a formal method for mining the contextual data
for purpose and task. We assume that the contextual data exist for a given set of tasks
and purposes. Concerning formal method for contextual data mining, we consider in
our future work.
9.3.2 Interoperability
Our main objective is to allow private data to be shared in a secure manner between
di↵erent systems in the network. Di↵erent systems may have di↵erent levels of control
on data usage, hence, di↵erent level of policy complexity; the data management may
also be di↵erent from system to system. Making them to be able to communicate and
share data between each other in the interoperable way is a challenge. One of the
interoperability challenges is the user management issue. When data with its usage
policy are moved to other system away from the source system, in general, only users
stipulated in usage policy could use data if a direct user to data permission assignment
method is used. Using direct assignment between user and data permission in context
of distributed environment can pose a burden for user as well as policy management
since every system in the network needs to have a full list of users, not only the users
in their system, but also the lists of users of other systems in the network. Any change
in user management structure in a system, other systems in the network need also
to update it; this causes the management overload. Seeing the di culties more than
the eases, we propose to use “role to data permission assignment” instead of “user to
data permission assignment”. Using role allows system engineer to separate the user
management domain and the management can be done internally, only “role” needs to
be managed globally.
Since di↵erent systems may have di↵erent role structure, it is possible that the role
incompatibility can happen; hence, role-mapping module is required for the systems
that have di↵erent role structure. We address role-mapping issue in future work.
In Chapter 6, we have clearly stated that our proposed purpose enforcement tech-
nique is designed specifically for system that uses workflows. This means that the basic
requirement for using our method is that those systems must support workflows. Dif-
ferent systems may have di↵erent workflow definition although it may serve the same
purpose. This poses other interoperable issue in workflow level. To address this issue
we need a workflow-mapping module. The workflow-mapping module will be addressed
in future work.
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9.3.3 Future Work
Beside of a complete implementation of our usage control system, there are three more
issues that need to be addressed as a part of our future work.
Workflow mapping issue. Workflow mapping issue happens when di↵erent systems
in the networks have di↵erent workflow definitions representing the same purpose; the
di↵erence can be the number of tasks in the workflow or the names of tasks. For exam-
ple in healthcare system, two hospitals (A and B) have di↵erent procedures for heart
surgery; this can mean that the number of tasks in the workflow (or names of the tasks)
representing the purpose of heart surgery of system A is di↵erent from that of system
B. Since the task execution needs to be recorded in access log and the local access log
of each system is the input data for purpose enforcement technique, incorrect workflow
mapping can lead to wrong purpose achievement prediction value.
Role Mapping Issues. Di↵erent systems may have di↵erent role management struc-
ture. A role’s name may exist in one system, but may not exit in other system. Or
di↵erent names are used to refer to a role. This kind of problem can happen since
di↵erent system may adopt di↵erent management style. Role mapping is an important
issue in order to be able to allow systems to work in the interoperable way.
Formal method for contextual data mining. Finding which contextual data
goes for which task of the workflow and purpose is an important issue since contextual
data is one of the important attributes in usage policies. However, to create a formal
method for mining the contextual data for task as well as purpose needs a thorough
study. This challenge still requires some work.
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